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I.

INTRODUCTION

The world of environmental enforcement is evolving and experiencing some profound changes. As with other aspects of environmenta11aw,
key assumptions established over the past twenty-five years are under assault by an array of critics, including governmental regulators, business
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advocates, and scholarly commentators. For example, in 1996, the former
manager of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Superfund enforcement program argued that "[i]t has become manifest that the manner
in which [the EPA] imposes, implements, and enforces environmental requirements is in serious need of reform.,,1 Likewise, Virginia's Secretary
of Natural Resources recently told Congress that "[t]he truth is that enforcement action means 'failure' not success .... [P]olicies which focus on
compliance with environmental laws are better for the natural resources
than policies which focus on enforcement.,,2 A New York deputy attorney
general similarly wrote that "[d]ecades of experience have illustrated that
traditional 'command and control' enforcement or punishment mechanisms have been unable to fully achieve the lofty goals of the major environmental statutes."3
In response, both the federal and state governments have been reexamining traditional enforcement systems, which focus on deterrence and
punishing violations. For example, the Clinton Administration is experimenting with nonadversarial approaches, including greater reliance on
self-enforcement and greater willingness to waive penalties in exchange
for compliance. In 1996, with a unanimous Senate vote, Congress passed
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA),
1. Bruce M. Diamond, Confessions of an Environmental Enforcer, 26 EnvtI. L. Rep. (EnvtI. L.
lnst.) 10,252, 10,252 (May 1996). Diamond contends that the EPA should shift from its traditional,
deterrence-based, adversarial approach to enforcement to one emphasizing cooperative efforts and
greater reliance on industry self-compliance. See id at 10,252 to 10,256.
2. The Relationship Between Federal and State Governments in the Enforcement of Environmental Laws: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 105th Congo 190 (1997)
[hereinafter Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments] (prepared statement of Becky Norton Dunlop, Secretary of NaturaI Resources, Commonwealth of Virginia).
3. Dean S. Sommer, Cooperative Approaches: Public PollutionlPublic Resolution, NAT'L
ENVIL. ENFORCEMENT J .• Aug. 1995, at 3, 3. See 142 CONGo REC. S5644 (daily ed. May 24, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Lott) ("Better environmental compliance using a voluntary flexible approach: this
is what we all-both Republicans and Democrats alike-believe to be the new environmentalism.");
MALCOLM K. SPARROW, IMPOSING DUTIES-GOVERNMENT'S CHANGING ApPROACH TO COMPLIANCE
(1994) (arguing that traditional culture and strategies of environmental enforcement are changing);
Marshall J. Breger, Regulatory Flexibility and the Administrative State, 32 TuLSA LJ. 325, 325-26
(1996) ("[M]any in the Republican-controlled Congress have sought to shift from an adversary or enforcement paradigm for regulation to a cooperative partnership with the regulated community....
[M]any in Congress and government have stressed the need to promote flexibility in regulatory enforcement and policy making."); Michael M. Stahl, Enforcement in Transition, ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec.
1995, at 19, 19 [hereinafter Stahl, Enforcement in Transition) (''For the past several years, practitioners of environmental enforcement, from Washington to state capitals to city halls, have begun to
transform their philosophy and methods, redefining the roles of government, business, and the public
in ensuring environmental compliance and thereby improving environmental protection."). See also
Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1333 (1995) (caIling for model
of "reflexive" environmental law that places greater reliance on self-critical analysis by businesses).
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which mandates forgiveness for minor violations by small businesses.4
Legislators in the 104th Congress also attempted to dramatically reduce
funding for EPA enforcement activities, limit the agency's ability to impose penalties, and take other steps to discourage traditional enforcement.5
It is the states, however, which carry out nearly ninety percent of all
enforcement actions,6 that have been leading the charge to modify enforcement practices? They have championed a "compliance first" strategy
that emphasizes working cooperatively with violators to obtain compliance, and eschewing penalties in favor of persuasion. 8 Many states have
cut funding for traditional enforcement activities, reduced the number of
facility inspections, and greatly curtailed the penalties assessed for violations. 9 In Virginia, for instance, a scathing audit by the State's General
4. See Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121,
§ 223,110 Stat 857, 862 (1996).
5. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmentalww as a Mirror of the Future: Civic Values COIIfronting Market Force Dynamics in a Time of Counter-Revolution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 733,
734-35,754-56 (1996) (noting that the House sought to slash the EPA enforcement budget, prohibit
enforcement of numerous environmental regulations, and limit imposition of penalties based on environmental audits); George S. Hawkins, Compliance and Enforcement Changes in Congress and EPA,
NAT. 'REsOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1997, at 42 (explaining how memhers of Congress tried to cut
EPA's enforcement budget to forcibly limit the agency's "enforcement first" strategy and support
other· agency tools, such as outreach and assistance). As part of the SBREFA, moreover, Congress
amended the Equal Access to Justice Act to allow small businesses to rccover attorneys fees and costs
when the federal government's enforcement efforts are determined to be excessive, and required the
Small Business Administration to establish regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards to
hear compliants about excessive agency enforcement against small businesses. See Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act § 222, 231-32. See also S.582, 104th Congo (1995) (proposing
discovery privilege for voluntary disclosure made pursuant to environmental audit).
6. See Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2, at
188 (prepared statement of Mark Coleman, Executive Director, Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality, and Chairman, Compliance Committee, The Environmental Council of Stlltes).
7.
See id. at 199 (statement of Patricia S. Bangert, Director of Legal Policy, Attorney General's Office, State of Colorado) ("[T]here is general agreement that a 'command and control' approach to environmental protection, by itself, does not work. The States, as the laboratories of democracy, are trying out new approaches that may bring greater protection at lesser cost.").
8. See id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Chafee) ("States that are trying to attain better results in administering environmental programs increasingly are experimenting with more carrots and fewer
·sticks....); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECfION: EPA's AND STATE'S
EFFORTS TO Focus STATE ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS ON RESULTS, GAOIRCED-98-113, 21-29 (1998)
[hereinafter GAO, EFFORTS TO Focus ON REsULTS] (describing more flexible enforcement approaches
adopted by numerous states).
9. See Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2, at
220-23 (prepared statement of Todd E. Robins, Environmental Enforcement, U.S. Public Interest Research Group) (documenting reductions in inspections, penalties, enforcement actions and spending
on enforcement staff in numerous states); Keith Welks, Voluntary Compliance Measures in the United
States 26 (Oct. 1996) (unpublished report for the Commission of Environmental Cooperation, on file
with author) ("[S]tate rcgulatory officials have begun to raise a myriad of creative efforts to encourage
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Assembly in 1996 found that the state failed to take meaningful enforcement action against persistent and serious violators. One investigator
concluded that the state's regulators "work with industry [and] don't enforce the law.,,10
The enforcement reform movement is notable not only because of its
potentially sweeping scope but also because of the exceptional speed with
which it has been embraced. ll Just a few years ago, for instance, the EPA
completed two long-range planning documents about enforcement that
barely considered the type of criticisms currently being levied against the
traditional system. The EPA instead focused its attention on measures to
strengthen its traditional enforcement approach.12 When Congress reauthorized the Clean Air Amendments in 1990, it likewise was most concerned about enhancing all three legs of a deterrence-based enforcement
approach: civil, citizen, and criminal enforcement. 13 The movement to
fundamentally change the traditional approaches to environmental enforcement has gained remarkable momentum in the last few years. Since
1993, twenty-three states have enacted bills that give businesses evidentiary privileges or immunity for environmental law violations discovered
and corrected as a result of internal environmental audits. Businesses have
. or assure compliance with environmental requirements. Many of these have as their common element
less frequent resort to traditional enforcement responses.") (citations omitted).
10.
Ellen, Nakashima, Report Pans Va. Efforts on Pollution; Agency Called Lax; Water Inspections, Fines Show Decline, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1996, at AI. See also John H. Cushman, Virginia Seen as Undercutting U.S. Environmental Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1997, at 22 [hereinafter
Cushman, Virginia Seen].
11. One commentator describes the quickness with which the reform movement has been accepted as follows:
Not very long ago, the observation that environmental regulatory systems in the United
States appeared to be moving from traditional command and control instruments to a more
inclusive "compliance" philosophy might be regarded as perceptive. The same observation
today would merely be trite, so quickly has this movement taken hold.
Welks, supra note 9, at 1.
12. See U.S. ENVTI.. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT FOUR-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN:
ENHANCED ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT FOR THE 1990's (1991) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT
FOUR-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN]; U.S. ENVTI.. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1990'S
PROJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ANALYTICAL WORKGROUPS (1991). James Strock, Assistant
Administrator for Enforcement of the EPA, offered insight to the agency's enforcement approach:
"For those who stumble off the road of responsible environmental citizenship, the message from EPA
enforcement should be clear: The bear is hungry." James M. Strock, EPA's Environmental Enforcement in the 1990s, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,327, 10,332 (Aug. 1990).
13. See George Van Cleve & Keith W. Holman, Promise and Reality in the Enforcement of the
Amended Clean Air Act Part II: Federal Enforceability and Environmental Auditing, 27 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 10,151, 10,157 (Apr. 1997).
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been aggressively lobbying for similar measures in virtually every other
state, as well as in Congress. 14
Although the reform movement has assumed an air of inevitability in
many quarters, its speed and scope cry out for a close and systematic examination. This Article critically examines the assumptions underlying the
reform movement, and concludes that we should ease the rush to dismantle
traditional, deterrence-based civil enforcement. 15 While some of the underlying critiques of traditional enforcement have merit, they do not demonstrate that a wholesale shift to a primarily cooperative-oriented approach .
will improve compliance with environmental law. In fact, a deterrencebased system of enforcement contains many attributes that are equally if
not more essential to achieving compliance. Rather than discarding the
current enforcement approach, we should move to a system of environmental enforcement that is grounded in deterrence theory but integrates the
most constructive features of a cooperative modeL
Part II of this Article describes the theoretical basis for the traditional
approach to enforcing environmental law, and how this approach has
evolved in practice. Part ill assesses the major theoretical critiques of deterrence-based enforcement that underlie the current push for reform. Part
IV discusses the positive elements of deterrence-based enforcement and
why they should not be abandoned. Part V analyzes the wisdom of the
most significant proposed reforms currently being considered or implemented, and suggests a better approach for improving enforcement of our
nation's environmental laws.
II. THE CURRENT SYSTEM
The traditional practice of environmental enforcement is grounded in
theory on a deterrence-based model of enforcement. It assumes that most
regulated entities are rational economic actors that act to maximize profits.
As such, decisions regarding compliance are based on self-interest. In
short, businesses comply where the costs of noncompliance outweigh the
benefits of noncompliance. The benefits of noncompliance consist of
money saved by not purchasing pollution control equipment or taking
other required measures. The costs of noncompliance include the costs of
14. See Kirk F. Marty, Note, Moving Beyond the Body Count and Toward Compliance: Legislative Options for Encouraging Environmental Self-Analysis, 20 VT. L. REV. 495, 495-98, 524-25
(1995).
15. There is a related debate.about the need to change certain aspects of criminal environmental
law, in particular the very liberal mens rea requirements of criminal environmental statutes. That
subject is beyond the scope of this Article.
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implementing control measures once a violation is detected, plus any additional penalties imposed for being found in violation, multiplied
(discounted) by the probability that the violations will be detected. 16 The
task for enforcement agencies is to make penalties high enough and the
probability of detection great enough that it becomes economically irrational for facilities to violate environmental requirements. The speed and
the certainty with which sanctions are imposed are also important factors
in obtaining compliance. 17
Deterrence may be achieved through civil or criminal sanctions.
Criminal sanctions may be more appropriate where the amount of civil
penalties needed to constitute an economic deterrent is unrealistic. 18 Many
also believe that the unique moral stigma and threat of jail time from
criminal enforcement constitute the most powerful incentives to obey the
law. 19 But whether the penalty is civil or criminal, the essential inquiry
16. A finn's cost-benefit evaluation can go beyond purely monetary losses and include damage
to the business' reputation, potential tort liability, legal system costs, increased scrutiny by regulatory
agencies, and other costs. See Colin S. Diver, A Theory of Regulatory Enforcement, 28 PUB. POL'y
257,263 (1980).
17. See TOMB. TYLER, WHY PEoPLE OBEY THE LAW 21 (1990).
18. Cf. Michael B. Metzger, Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective Products: Policies,
Problems, and Prospects, 73 GEO. L.J. 1, 67 (1984) (suggesting that extraordinarily severe penalties,
such as those that threaten corporate solvency, may be necessary for meaningful deterrence, especially
for large corporations); Mark A. Cohen, Environmental Crime and Punishment: LegaVEconomic Theory and Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes, 82 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1054, 1057-58 (1992) (noting that a possible rationale of criminal enforcement may be
the failure of civil and administrative law to deter violations).
19. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 1058. There are other important values served by imposing
criminal sanctions on conduct that society considers morally blameworthy. In practice, most environmental statutes give enforcement agencies tremendous discretion in detennining whether to prosecute a violation criminally or civilly (or administratively). Government officials consider a number of
factors in determining how to proceed. Some of these relate to the nature of the violator, such as his
or her culpability or past compliance history. Another consideration is the nature of the violation
committed, which is determined by examining how serious a deviation from applicable requirements
it was, the extent of harm it posed to the environment and public health, and the perceived deterrence
value of a criminal prosecution on other regulated entities among other factors. The decision also
turns on a number of strategic considerations. Some enforeement officials prefer criminal prosecution
because it is generally quicker and less resource intensive than civil cases. Another factor is the
strength of the evidence in a case. In criminal matters, the evidence must be sufficient to satisfy the
higher burden of proof requirement (proof beyond a reasonable doubt versus preponderance of the
evidence), as well as to make the greater showing of intent needed to establish liability for certain
violations. Moreover, if certain evidence to prove a violation is lacking, civil discovery may be the
only way to obtain it. Another consideration is the need to obtain injunctive relief, which is only
available in civil cases. Finally, prosecutors consider the probability that a criminal conviction will
lead to jail time or a more severe sanction than civil enforcement. If, for example, an individual corporate defendant has no prior record and other factors suggest that imprisonment is unlikely, the goverument will probably bring a civil action with its lower burden of proof. For a discussion of these
issues, see Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcement of Hazardous Waste Management Requirements, in
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turns on the same pleasure-pain calculus: Make the penalty sufficiently
painful so that rational actors will be deterred despite the benefits of noncompliance.
As a theoretical construct, a deterrence-based system has a number of
distinctive features. 2o A central concern regards the application of punishment for breaking a rule: If there is a breach of a legal requirement, it
deserves punishment. Thus, there is a strong emphasis on detecting noncompliance and gathering evidence to prove it. Imposing fines is seen as a
mark of success and serves notice that all violators will be treated similarly. Enforcement is also largely retrospective since it focuses on reacting
to violations that have already occurred and penalizing violators as a
means of deterring future violations.
By contrast, a "compliance" or cooperative system emphasizes securing compliance rather than sanctioning wrongdoing. Penalties are seen as
threats rather than sanctions, and sanctions are typically withdrawn if
compliance is achieved. Levying penalties is seen as a mark of the system's failure (to otherwise obtain compliance); compliance systems rely
far more on rewards and incentives than penalties.21 Enforcement is primarily prospective, oriented toward inducing conditions that lead to conformity. The system focuses more on the underlying conditions or violations than on the violator.
Deterrence-based enforcement is the prevailing societal approach for
controlling unlawful individual and corporate conduct. 22 This theory underlies the EPA's current enforcement system. 23 The agency's enforcement approach is legalistic, and its extensive enforcement policies stress
the use of formal enforcement actions. Since the mid-1980s, one of its
guiding principles has been ensuring "timely and appropriate responses" to
observed violations, which involves applying a series of escalating actions
once noncompliance is detected. The agency has traditionally measured
the success of its program by the number of inspections conducted, the
number of enforcement actions initiated, and the number and size of penalties assessed-all indicators that some type of formal enforcement action
CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICE 54-40 to -43 (Kenneth Manaster & Daniel
Selmi eds., 1995).
20. For a comparison of the features of systems based on deterrence and compliance, see Albert
J. Reiss, Selecting Strategies of Social Control Over Organizational Life, in ENFORCING REGULATION
23, 23-26 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1984).
21. See id. at 24.
22. See TYLER, supra note 17, at 3.
23. See JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 102-03
(1995).
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has been taken.24 State environmental agencies have generally followed
the EPA's lead, especially when implementing federally-delegated programs that entail EPA oversight of their enforcement activities.
Although the theoretical underpinning of the current enforcement
system relies largely on deterrence, in practice the process is much more
flexible. Most enforcers use a hybrid strategy that includes elements of
both coercion and cooperation; few rely on a strictly legalistic model.
Most enforcement activity, particularly state enforcement, is aimed at
bringing violators back into compliance rather than punishing or deterring.25 Most instances of noncompliance are met with either no sanctions
or only minor, informal ones.26 Moreover, most regulatory officials do not
rigidly adhere to legalistic procedures. In their extensive study of enforcement of the Clean Water Act, for example, Professors Susan Hunter
and Richard Waterman found a "pragmatic" EPA enforcement process in
which agency staff were flexible and employed considerable discretion.27
24. See id. at 119.
25. See CLIFFORD S. RussELL, WINSTON HARRINGTON & WILLIAM J. VAUGHAN, ENFORCING
POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 37 (1986).
26. See id. at 24-25, 37-43. See also ENFORCEMENT FOUR-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note
12, at 27 (pointing out that the EPA's mobile source enforcement program resolves over 95% of its
cases through an informal administrative Notice of Violation program); SUSAN HUNTER & RICHARD
W. WATERMAN, ENFORCING THE LAW: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACTS 53-54 (Kenneth J.
Meier ed., 1996) (indicating that a study of Clean Water Act enforcement showed 70% of actions were
at the three lowest levels of enforcement: level (0) no action warranted, comment, permit modification
request; level (1) telephone calls, meetings, enforcement notice letters; and level (2) warning letters,
notices of violations); PETER C. YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW: THE PuBUC REGULATION OF PRIVATE
POLLUTION 278-79 (1991) (reporting that a study of Clean Water Act enforcement in EPA Region II
showed that "the single most common agency response to [violations of effiuent limits] is to take no
formal action against [facilities]," and revealing there was no formal action in 423% of cases with
warning letters issued in another 40.8% of cases); Paul Downing & James N. Kimball, Enforcing
Pollution Control Laws in the U.S., II J. POL'Y STUDIES 55, 59-60 (summarizing numerous studies
showing that agencies resolve most violations through informal means and negotiations to bring violators back into compliance); Richard G. Kozlowski & Howard Bleichfeld, Wetlands Enforcement: Lion
or Lamb?, NAT. REsOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1996, at 62,64 (noting that, over a five-year period in
8,000 cases where the Corps of Engineers found violation of wetlands requirements, over 90% were
resolved without imposing any penalty, and that over a three-year period, the EPA completed 870
wetlands enforcement actions resulting in almost 90% resolved without any penalty and two-thirds
resolved without formal enforcement action).
27. See HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 50-65. This fiexibility and discretion is not
unique to the EPA staff.
The performance of various enforcement agencies are remarkably similar. . .. They all attempt to maintain a cooperative relationship with each source. Sources are given repeated
opportunities to comply without penalty for failure. The agency considers economic and
technical feasibility in its enforcement even though in many cases this is prohibited by law.
Past violations are forgiven if compliance is achieved or in the offing. Compliance is delayed, often several years. And economic penalties are almost never imposed.
Paul Downing, &lrgaining in Pollution Control, 11 POL'y STUD. J. 577, 581 (1983).
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Hunter and Watennan concluded that; "[t]he intent of the enforcement
process, therefore, was not to punish violators, but rather to coax them toward compliance. Most enforcement personnel explicitly infonned us that
a reliance on higher-level enforcement activity is not the best means of
achieving compliance for a variety of reasons.,,28 Likewise, a recent survey noted that "[m]any regulators argue that they have always employed a
wide range of mechanisms to secure compliance, and that enforcement has
seemed predominant only because it is publicized the most.,,29
Even though the EPA's and the states' enforcement systems are much
more flexible and compliance-oriented than their deterrence-based underpinning suggest, many of the current caIls for refonn attack the theoretical
model of rigid deterrence-based enforcement.3o Therefore, to some extent,
these attacks are aimed at a strawman version of current enforcement.
Nonetheless, critics have also raised important fundamental questions
about how society should approach enforcement of its environmental laws.
ID. THE PUSH FOR REFORM
The current effort to refonn enforcement practices has many sources.
Unquestionably, it originates in part from those who simply dislike effective environmental enforcement: businesses who want to be treated more
leniently, political leaders with antipathy toward environmental regulation,
and state regulators who wish to relax enforcement to create a more business-friendly climate.31 These constitute important political forces push28. HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 60. See also Christen Carlson White, Regulation
of Leaky Underground Fuel Tanks: An Anatomy of Regulatory Failure, 14 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'y lOS, 116 (1996) (stating that regulators at the regional water board reported that "consultation
and education is the best way for them to pursue their job and that issuing an enforcement order or a
fine was both ineffective and unnecessary to achieve compliance"). In San Francisco, for example,
the Bay Area Quality Management District imposed an average fine of $625 against refineries for
more than 1,000 air-quality violations from 1990 to 1996. See Jane Kay & Dick Rogers, Tiny Fines
for Refinery Air Law Violations, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 9, 1997, at AI. According to the district enforcement manager, "'We're not here to be monetary collectors of civil penalties .... We're here to
monitor facilities and make sure they're in compliance with rules.'" Id.
29. Welks, supra note 9, at 3 n.4.
30. One critic likened the EPA's enforcement methods to Gestapo tactics:
[H]ow does the EPA enforce environmental statutes under its jurisdiction? .. , They act like
the gestapo .... They come invading with terrorizing and threatening leiters. They do not
seek to solve problems but impose their will .... [T]heir problem is an absolute lack of
common sense-a sort of [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms] approach to regulatory enforcement.
139 CONGo REC. S5141 (daily ed. April 29,1993) (statement of Sen. Wallop).
31. See John H. Cushman, States Neglecting Pollution Rules, White House Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. IS, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Cushman, States Neglecting]; Cushman, Virginia Seen, sllpra note
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ing for change. From a scholarly perspective, the more interesting arguments are those raised by serious and well-intentioned observers of the enforcement system-"well intentioned" in the sense that they support the
goal of effective enforcement.
A.

CHANGED CORPORATE ATIlTUDES AND PRACTICES

One of the most vigorously asserted arguments is that the current enforcement system is based on an outdated model of corporate attitudes and
behavior. The argument has several related components: (1) Most businesses try to comply with environmental laws because of a sense of social
responsibility, and adherence to social and moral norms; (2) businesses are
highly motivated to comply voluntarily because of external factors such as
market forces, potential reputational harm, and third-party liability claims;
and (3) many businesses have implemented sophisticated internal regulatory systems that parallel or exceed governmental requirements. As a result, a punitive enforcement approach is largely unnecessary. These issues
are discussed below.

1. Compliance and Social Responsibility
A number of observers challenge the view of corporations as
economic actors solely interested in maximizing profit or value, and
contend that corporate actors instead are influenced by a mix of civic
and social motives. Some argue that corporations perceive themselves
as political citizens who are ordinarily inclined to comply with
the law-partially because of their belief in the law, and partially as a
matter of their long term self-interest.32 This is particularly true where
corporations believe the law is reasonable.33 For example, regulatory
scholars Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite insist that corporate actors
are "often concerned to do what is right, to be faithful to their identity as a
law abiding citizen, and to sustain a self-concept of social responsibil10, at 22 (reporting EPA officials' consideration of Virginia as a leading example of widespread resistance by some states against vigorous enforcement of federal environmental laws).
32. See Robert A. Kagan & John T. Scholz, The "Criminology of the Corporation" and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies, in ENFORCING REGULATION, supra note 20, at 67. See also Cheryl E.
Wasserman, Federal Enforcement: Theory and Practice, in INNOVATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL POUCy
21,24-25 (T.H. Tietenberg ed., 1992) (suggesting an array of factors may explain compliance behavior, "only some of which are rational, reasonable, and economically motivated," including societal
norms, moral values, and sense of professional conduct).
33. See Kagan & Scholz, supra note 32, at 67; Wasserman, supra note 32, at 25.
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ity.,,34 Others claim that corporate actors have internalized the general
societal norms about environmental protection:
[Business] leaders tend to see themselves comfortably in the mainstream,
cherishing and reflecting society's values and norms. More specifically,
today's business leaders grew up during decades when their culture affirmatively espoused protection of the environment as an inherently
positive goal, and held up for censure conduct which jeopardized our
natural world simply to increase profits. Accordingly, the argument
goes, today's business leaders bring a fundamentally different attitude
about environmental regulations, and their obligation to meet them, than
their predecessors who made decisions and ran facilities at the dawn of
the environmental age.
The normative rationale for a broader compliance approach to environmental regulation is ultimately based on the belief that regulators and
regulatees now share-perhaps for the first time-the same goals and
value systems.35

The critics of deterrence-based enforcement correctly reject an economically deterministic model as the only explanation for voluntary
compliance. Corporate motivations are undoubtedly more complex, and,
as the critics accurately point out, the current level of sanctions imposed
by most enforcement agencies is probably an insufficient incentive for
businesses to comply purely on grounds of economic self-interest.36 Pro34. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REsPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 22 (1992). The authors find that
business infonnants repeatedly argued that the common characterization of them as motivated only by money was a simplistic stereotype. Conceding that their primary motivations
were economic, they claimed that they and their colleagues took seriously business responsibility, ethics, and obligations to abide by the law and to be responsive to nonshareholding
stakeholders in the corporation.
Id.
35.
Welks, supra note 9, at 5. See also Michael R. Harris, Promoting Corporate SelfCompliance: An Examination of the Debate Over Legal Protection for Environmental Alldits, 23
EcOLOGY L.Q. 663,711 (1996) ("American businesses often argue that years of command and control
regulation, increased public scrutiny due to environmental reporting requirements, liability under
CERCLA, and intense pressure to confonn to international standards have fostered a commitment
among some firms toward voluntary environmental compliance.").
36. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 34, at 96 (explaining that regulatory agencies
rarely have the resources to detect, prove and punish cheating with sufficient consistency for it to be
economically rational not to cheat); RUSSELL ET AL., supra note 25, at 43 (noting that even in states
with the largest penalties, sanctions for noncompliance are unlikely to be sufficient to induce continuous compliance). But see Winston Harrington, Enforcement Leverage When Penalties Are Restricted,
37 J. PuB. EcON. 29 (1988) (suggesting that firms comply with environmental laws despite the small
size of penalties assessed, because enforcement agencies and regulated entities behavc according to a
dynamic repeated-game model in whieh, among other things, agencies adjust inspection frequency
and penalties based on past perfonnance of firms); Downing & Kimball, supra note 26, at 60-63
(suggesting that corporations comply despite low penalties because compliance costs relatively low,
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fessors Ayres and Braithwaite are closer to the mark in arguing that firms
have different "lexical orderings" of money and responsibility: The behavior of regulated entities ranges from those exclusively motivated by money
to those for whom this goal is constrained to a greater or lesser degree by
ideals of social responsibility. For example, some firms will insist on satisfying a minimum level of care before pursuing maximum profits; others
will engage in as much socially responsible activity as they can before it
affects profitability.37
However, many critics also understate the role that ideological resistance to regulation plays in undermining compliance. Absent deterrence,
corporate actors are far more likely to adhere to laws that in their eyes
are legitimate, particularly when compliance is expensive.38 As Peter
Yeager notes, corporations violate environmental protection laws more
frequently than laws designed to protect the integrity of the marketplace
such as tax, securities, and unfair trade laws, because these laws do not
enjoy the same legitimacy in the eyes of businesses.39 This is hardly
a novel proposition; individuals are much more likely to comply with
laws that are consonant with their own moral and political values.40 Indeed, many law-abiding individuals ignore rules inconsistent with their
beliefs if there is little or no risk of getting caught.41 There is no question
allows finns to argue for strict enforcement of regulations against competitors, may reduce the frequency offuture government monitoring and inspections, and may help finns maintain a positive corporate image).
37. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 34, at 27-29. Analyzing the issue from a more
psychological perspective, the authors argue that corporations are "bundles of contradictory commitments to values of economic rationality,law abidingness, and business responsibility." Id. at 31. Professor Christopher Stone also argues that within corporations there are a variety of goals associated
not only with different corporate types but also with different stages of corporate development. In
particular, once a corporation's basic survival is assured, it is more likely to seek a satisfactory level
of profits rather than be entirely profit-oriented; at later stages of corporate development, it is likely to
become more social-oriented in its objectives. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS:
THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 38-39 (1975).
38. See Kagan & Scholz, supra note 32, at 67 (acknowledging that among businesses which
act like "political citizens," some noncompliance will result from principled disagreement with the
law).
39. See YEAGER, supra note 26, at 8-10. He adds that "where laws lack legitimacy, violation
rates are likely to be relatively high, other factors held constant" Id. at 9. See also STONE, supra note
37, at 228 (noting that laws regulating corporate behavior run into the widely held business view that
the conduct they forbid is not morally reprehensible).
40. See TYLER, supra note 17, at 37-38, 64; Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation
of Federal Regulations, 13 YALEJ. ON REG. 535, 543 (1996) (arguing that individuals will voluntarily
comply with rules only so long as rules are perceived as reasonable).
41. Consider laws governing minor drug use or requiring all income earned under the table to
be reported to the IRS. See David C. Johnston, Despite an Easing of Rules, Millions Evade 'Nanny
Tax,' NY TiMES, April 5, 1998, at Al (reporting that the IRS estimates that fewer than 1 in 13 persons
are complying with federal law for reporting wages paid to nannies, maids and other servants, and for
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that many businesses are philosophically opposed to some substantial
portion of the current regime of environmental regulation and consider
it illegitimate. This opposition has been fueled over the past five to ten
years by a drumbeat of intense criticism of the EPA and other regulatory
agencies. Members of Congress have repeatedly referred to EPA inspectors as part of an "environmental Gestapo.,,42
During the early days of the 104th Congress, when the political
climate seemed most sympathetic to corporate concerns, regulated entities
proposed to radically weaken the major environmental statutes. 43 Their
rush to overthrow basic environmental regulation is hardly consistent with
an internalization of environmental protection values. Given this strong
hostility to environmental regulation, the belief that a deterrence orientation should be abandoned because businesses will comply with these
laws because of their identity as law-abiding citizens is naive. Thus, theorists who argue that predominant reliance on voluntary compliance is
the answer because "regulators and regulatees now share-perhaps for
the first time-the same goals and value systems"44 are overly optimistic. 45

2. Compliance and Market Forces
Other adherents of the "changed corporate attitude" school rely less
on the civic-mindedness of businesses, and emphasize instead that other
paying the employer's share of Social Security, Medicare and federal unemployment taxes to household help).
42. See Hawkins, supra note 5, at 42. See also 139 CONGo REC. S5142 (daily cd. April 29,
1993) (statement of Sen. Wallop) (describing the EPA as a "Gestapo-like agency" and as an
"un tethered agency arrogantly imposing itself on the people of America, not to resolve the problems
of the environment, but to assert its own power"); 141 CONGo REC. H4952 (daily ed. May IS, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Shuster) ("[I]n western Maryland there are hundreds of people who are furious
about the environmental Gestapo which is there and which is attempting to tell thcm how to live their
lives ....").
43. Among other things, members of Congress sought to drastically rewrite the Clean Water
Act and the Endangered Species Act, repeal the I 990 Clean Air Act Amendments, and attach numerous riders to the EPA's appropriations bill severely restricting the agency's ability to enforce existing
laws. The House also passed a moratorium on new regulations and a comprehensive regulatory reform bill that would have required federal agencies to prepare risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses for every major regulation, greatly increasing the analytic burdens on agencies and delaying new
rulemaking. Finally, the House cut the overall EPA budget by 30% and the budget for its enforcement
activities by 50%. See Plater, supra note 5, at 742-60.
44. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
45. See Joel Mintz, Rebuttal: EPA Enforcement and the Challenge of Change, 26 EnvtI. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst) 10,538, 10,540 (Oct. 1996) (arguing that there is insufficient evidence to support
the notion that "the 'regulated sector' has gradually altered its attitude toward regulatory compliance
and environmental protection").
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market factors make it a matter of self-interest for businesses to voluntarily
comply with environmental requirements. Thus, in enacting its law providing a grace period for certain environmental violations, the New Jersey
legislature recently found that
the economic dynamics of pollution control ... have changed since the
inception of environmental regulatory and enforcement programs; that
considerable market forces now exist which substantially influence the
economics of compliance; that the threat or imposition of monetary
sanctions is no longer the dominant force driving corporate compliance
decisions and investments.46

The fact that environmental performance is now viewed as a criterion
for product quality and firm reputation has become the biggest such market force.47 Corporations see important benefits from being publicly perceived as environmentally responsible entities. The rush by business to
market environmentally-friendly products over the past decade is perhaps
the most obvious, but certainly not the only example of this.48 The National Academy of Public Administration characterized the new business
thinking as follows: "[C]hanging attitudes ... have dramatically altered
the operating environments faced by businesses and industries. Many
firms have found that becoming 'environmental leaders' is good for business because a good corporate image can appeal to consumers and improve
relations between factories and host communities.'>49
Other external forces also motivate voluntary compliance measures.
One is the desire to avoid tort liability. 50 Another is the recognition that
doing so saves money through reduced waste management and disposal
46. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D-125 <,Vest 1995). See also Welks, supra note 9, at 41 (explaining
the impetus behind compliance assurance refonns in Minnesota: "Minnesota feels that it can encourage change from inside organizations, by helping leaders understand that conscientious environmental
performance can translate into risk reduction, enhanced efficiency and, ultimately, savings and increased profits.").
47. See Tony Lent & Richard P. WeIIs, Corporate Environmental Management Survey Shows
Shift from Compliance to Strategy, in ENVIRONMENTAL TQM 13 (John T. Willig, ed., 1994).
48. See John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some Lessons from the Economics of Infonnation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 245, 277 (1994).
49. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PuB. ADMIN., SEITING PRIORITIES, GEITING RESULTS 25 (1996)
[hereinafter NATIONAL ACADEMY]. See also Marianne Lavelle, Environmental Vise: Law, Complialice, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30, 1993, at SI ("A nationwide survey of more than 200 corporate general
counsel .•• revealed ... that vast majority believe that investment in environmentally sound practices
and products wiJI improve profitability over the long run.").
50. EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK-THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 60-62 (1982).
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expenses, purchases of raw materials, energy costs, and other ways.51
Moreover, firms realize that superior environmental performance can lead
to competitive advantages, that "[t]he result of excellence in environmental
management is higher productivity.,,52
While market forces have changed the dynamics of environmental
compliance,53 critics are mistaken in suggesting that these considerations
by themselves will result in widespread compliance with environmental
laws. 54 Reputation benefits are important for firms that directly market
consumer products; indeed, consumers report that they consider the environmental reputation of a product or manufacturer to be an important purchasing factor. 55 However, there are significant limits to relying on the
consumer product marketplace as a way to reward positive environmental
performance. For example, for some products there are no readily available substitutes consumers can purchase if they are dissatisfied with the
record of a manufacturer.56 Additionally, many consumers will not have
the time or interest to seek out product information; and even if they do,
judging among competing claims of compliance/noncompliance by firms
may depend upon information that is complex, uncertain, and difficult to
obtain. 57 Moreover, for most regulated entities-those that do not sell
consumer products-there are relatively few tangible gains that come from
being perceived as an environmentalleader.58 Few commercial purchasers
51. See NATIONAL ACADEMY, supra note 49, at 25. See also Testimony of Donald E. Huffman,
Chainnan of the American Textile Manufacturers Institute Environmental Excellence Task Force, be·
fore U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Workshop on National Perfonnance Measures Strategy
for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance 6 (March 17, 1997) ("[W]e are confident that a high per·
centage of companies realize that compliance does affect the bottom line and treat environmental
compliance as an important part of doing business."); Lent & Wells, supra note 47, at 14 (noting that
pollution prevention results in finns spending fewer resources buying, storing, tracking and managing
pollutants, and spending more on the product).
52. Lent & Wells, supra note 47, at 13.
53. See, e.g., BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 50, at 60 ("In many areas of protective regula·
tion, voluntary compliance is prevalent because economic pressures and the threat of private lawsuits
compel enterprises to institute safety measures that parallel the content of government regulations.").
54. See STONE, supra note 37, at 88-92.
55. See Church, supra note 48, at 252 & n.l8, 253-54 (1994); Terri Shaw, The Selling of
"Green"; Labels Use All the Buzz Words, But What Do They Mean, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1991, at
T9.
56. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings Under California'S
Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 316 (1996).
57. Cf. Howard A. Latin, Environmental Deregulation and Consumer Decisionmaking Under
Uncenainty, 6 HARV. ENVIL. L. REV. 187 (1982) (noting these as difficulties in detennining whether
products are environmentally beneficial in decentralized consumer decisionmaking context).
58. See STONE, supra note 37, at 90-91 (pointiug out that many corporations produce too few
consumer products, even indirectly, to submit them to classic market pressures). See also Naomi
Roht·Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation: The International Organization for Standardization
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or suppliers use a firm's environmental record as a criteria for doing business. Likewise, few government programs provide direct rewards to businesses for achieving environmental compliance.59 Thus, many private
firms will not be driven by market forces to comply with the law. Additionally, these market forces will have no impact on compliance by government entities, which face totally different incentives than private businesses but are nonetheless responsible for a substantial share of pollution.
Likewise, while the occasional large tort damages award may have
some deterrent value, the fear of tort litigation in the environmental context is a highly imperfect means of ensuring compliance with environmental requirements. Private lawsuits alleging environmental harm from
routine, continuous environmental discharges, as opposed to catastrophic
accidents or releases, are very difficult to win for a host of reasons. Causation is difficult to prove because of long latency periods and the problem
of confounding causes for most environmental harms. 6o The cases are
lengthy and expensive, requiring a great deal of expert testimony. In the
workplace, the effectiveness of tort claims is further limited by workers'
compensation.61 These and other factors make these cases economically
unattractive to litigate, particularly on behalf of individual plaintiffs, and
corporations understand the very small likelihood of their being sued, successfully or not, for routine emissions or discharge. Moreover, for some
regulatory requirements, such as training, record-keeping, or reporting obligations, there is almost no likelihood that failure to comply will increase
a corporation's risk of tort liability since these violations often do not re011 Trade alld the Ellvirollmellt, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 479, 531 (1995) ("[T]he
'compliance pull' of voluntary standards may be limited to consumer goods and other highly visible
sectors, or to large enterprises where brand-name recognition is important."). See gellerally Jennifer
Nash & John Ehrenfeld, Code Greell: Busilless Adopts Volu1llary Ellvirollmelltal Stalldards, 38
ENV'T, Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 16 (reporting that companies participating in private environmental codes
tend to maintain direct sales relationships with the public or to hold corporate values that are strongly
consistent with code requirements).
59. There is a growing socially responsible investment movement that evaluates the environmental record of companies as a basis for investment in the stock market. See STEVEN J. BENNEIT,
RICHARD FREIERMAN & STEPHEN GEORGE, CORPORATE REALITIES & ENVIRONMENTAL TRUTHSSTRATEGIES FOR LEADING YOUR BUSINESS IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL ERA 13 (1993) (estimating that
$625 billion is invested in products that are selected on the basis of ethical, environmental and political criteria). The size and impact of this movement is uncertain, but in any case it is not relevant to
the majority of regulated facilities, which are not publicly-traded corporations.
60. See Daniel Farber, Toxic Causatioll, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1227-29 (1987); Developmellts ill the Law-Toxic Waste Litigatioll, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1617-30 (1986). Accord Rubanick v. Witco Chern. Co., 593 A.2d 733, 739 (N.J. 1991) ("[W]e have recognized the extraordinary and
unique burdens facing plaintiffs who seek to prove causation in toxic-tort litigation.").
61. See 82 AM. JUR. 2d Workers Comp § 62 (1997) (explaining that workers' compensation is
generally the exclusive remedy for injuries suffered by employees against employers).
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suIt in direct environmental harm. Arguably in fact, corporations have an
incentive not to comply with reporting requirements out of fear that disclosure of releases might trigger tort liability by exposed individuals.62 Most
likely then, the primary deterrent effect of potential tort liability is to
stimulate prophylactic measures aimed at avoiding accidents, since litigation stemming from these occurrences is the most worrisome to businesses. These prophylactic steps lead to compliance with some underlying
environmental requirements, but there is little reason to believe it will lead
to compliance with all or even most of them.
It is harder to assess whether the prospect of improved profitability
will motivate most companies to voluntarily obey regulations. In many
instances, firms will save money, often substantial amounts, from environmental compliance, particularly if they invest in pollution prevention or
other measures that translate into improved productivity. But some of
these benefits are counterbalanced by the economic savings realized from
noncompliance. Not all compliance measures translate into economic
gains; likewise, some may result in savings in five to ten years but cause
short-term financial losses that cash-poor companies are hesitant to incur.
3. Internal Regulatory Systems
Commentators also argue that traditional enforcement approaches
should be modified to account for corporations' increasingly sophisticated
internal regulatory schemes, the content of which parallels government
rules. Scholars have for some time urged that greater attention be paid to
corporate self-regulation.63 Some contend that internal regulatory programs are, in many cases, more comprehensive and effective than government enforcement efforts. 64 Over the past decade, in response to stepped62. These record-keeping and reporting requirements are nonetheless considered essential for
agency and public review, and oversight of the activities of regulated entities.
63. See JOSEPH V. REEs, REFORMING THE WORKPLACE-A STUDY OF SELF-REGULATION IN
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 6-8 (1988) (emphasizing importance of internal regulatory systems and arguing that "[tlaken as a whole, the American regulatory system can be viewed in terms of the proverbial
iceberg, the tip being government's regulatory bureaucracy, while the massive body represents society's great array of private regulatory systems").
64. See AYRES & BRAITHWAI1E, supra note 34, at 2. According to Ayres and Braithwaite,
studies show that internal corporate rules cover a wider range of hazards and corporate abuses than
government regulations. They also suggest that persons found violating regulatory requirements are
more likely to be disciplined by internal compliance groups. See also BARDACH & KAGAN, SlIpra
note 50, at 99-109; James M. Weaver, Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & Michael K. Stagg, Slale EnvironmenIal Audil Laws Advance Goal of a Cleaner Environmenl, 11 NAT. RESOURCES & ENy'T, Spring
1997, at 6, 11 ("Environmental regulators simply do not have the financial resources or personnel to
perform the type of detailed inspections being performed by companies in their efforts to self-police,
nor can the regulators inspect every permitted business with the frequency self-policing provides.").
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up government enforcement activity, liability concerns, and other economic forces,

U.S.

companies have greatly enhanced their self-policing ef-

forts in the environmental area. 65 Many fIrms now regularly conduct environmental audits to assure compliance with regulatory requirements. 66
Others have implemented more complex environmental management systems,67 and a considerable number have adopted private, voluntary codes
of conduct. 68 EPA offIcials note that most reports of problems with Clean
Water Act permits come from permittees themselves.69 Accordingly, as
two state enforcement officials suggest, environmental agencies "must retool [their] policies to address the reality of the highly professional, sophisticated nature of environmental management currently underway in
many quarters of the regulated community.,,70
The growth in environmental auditing and other environmental management systems undoubtedly has improved compliance among regulated

65. See Mary Ellen Kris & Gail L. Vannelli, Today's Criminal Environmental Enforcement
Program: Why You May Be Vulnerable and Why You Should Guard Against Prose clition Through an
Environmental Audit, 16 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L 227, 240 (1991); Lucia Ann Silecchia, Ounces of Prevention and Pounds of Cure: Developing Sound Policies for Environmental Compliance Programs, 7
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 583, 584-594 (1996).
66. See Lavelle, supra note 49, at SI (noting that 65% of 200 corporate counsel surveyed indicated that they have audit programs; of the remaining finns, about half indicated they had plans to
implement such programs in the future). A 1995 survey by Price Waterhouse found that 75% of the
369 companies that responded reported performing environmental audits. See Price Waterhouse LLP,
Tile Voluntary Environmental Audit Survey of u.s. Business 1,5 (Mar. 1995) [hereinafter Voluntary
Environmental Audit]. See also Craig N. Johnston, An Essay on Environmental Audit Privileges: The
Rigllt Problem, the Wrong Solution, 25 ENVTL. L 335, 336 (1995) (noting that a survey by Investor
Responsibility Research Center found that 85% of the 249 companies surveyed had established voluntary audit programs and that a 1992 Arthur Anderson survey of 257 companies, including 38 companies with revenues less than S100 million, found that 59.2% had conducted compliance audits between 1989 and 1991).
67. For discussion of environmental management systems, see infra Part V.C.2.
68. See Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 58. Among these private codes are (I) the Chemical
Manufacturer Association's (CMA) Responsible Care program, (2) the Coalition for Environmentally
Responsible Economies' (CERES) (formerly the Valdez) principles, and (3) the International Chamber
of Commerce (lCC) Business Charter for Sustainable Development. To varying degrees, these codes
encourage companies to conduct life-cycle management, addressing the "cradle to grave" environmental impacts of business activities; to engage in environmentally sustainable practices; and to involve outside groups, including suppliers, customers, and community groups, in their environmental
programs. Each calls on businesses to implement environmental management systems. To differing
degrees, these systems require businesses to assess the environmental impacts of their activities; to
establish environmental goals, targets and timetables for meeting these goals; to audit their progress
toward realizing these objectives; and to provide appropriate employee training. The CERES principles also require companies to complete and make public an annual report containing detailed information on corporate environmental practices.
69. See HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 61.
70. Gary L Spielman & Frank V. Bifera, DEC Enforcement in the Modem Day Environmental
Management System, 1 ALB. L ENVTL. OUTLOOK, Summer 1995, at 46, 47.
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firms, although there is little hard data demonstrating this effect or to what
degree it has occurred, and as discussed further below, it should be a factor
in enforcement decisions. This development, however, does not justify
discarding the current system. For one thing, many firms cannot afford
environmental audits and do not have sophisticated internal regulatory
programs.71 Moreover, merely because a firm conducts an environmental
audit does not ensure that it will correct any violations detected, or of
greater concern, take appropriate measures to prevent a violation from recurring.72 In addition, and perhaps most fundamentally, self-policing efforts are not infallible, underscoring the need for regulatory oversight.
This was dramatically illustrated recently by a major enforcement case involving the flawed self-monitoring efforts of Pacific, Gas & Electric
(pG&E) at its nuclear power plant in Diablo Canyon, California, which resulted in a $14 million Clean Water Act settlement and undetermined
damage to the marine environment.73
71. The size of a company and its available resources impact the likelihood that a company will
have an auditing program. See Voluntary Environmental Audit, supra note 66, at 66. For example,
Price Waterhouse found in its survey that every company with sales over $1 billion conducted audits,
and less than half of companies with sales under $50 million maintain auditing programs. See id. See
also Harris, supra note 35, at 719 ("[S]mall businesses have limited technical and financial resources
to comply with the law,let alone engage in proactive environmental management strategies like environmental auditing."); Tom Arrandale, Can Polluters Police Themselves?, GOVERNING MAG., June
1997, at 36 (quoting a senior EPA enforcement official who states that "[s]mall business doesn't do
audits. This is coming from big companies that have been targets of enforcement action ...•"). See,
e.g., Donald A. Carr & William L. Thomas, Devising a Compliance Strategy Under tire ISO 14000
International Environmental Management Standards, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 85, 149 & n.l54
(1997) (citing estimates that ISO 14000 certification costs may range from $100,000 to $1 million for
large multinational companies and as much as $10,000 to $100,000 for medium-size businesses, and
concluding that "[i]t is yet unclear whether small and medium-sized firms will find the hurdles to certification insurmountable").
72. See generally CHRISTOPHER BEDFORD, ENVTL. ArnON FOUND., DIRTY SECRETS: THE
CORPORATIONS' CAMPAIGN FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT PRIVILEGE (Feb. 1996)
<http://www.envirolink.orglorgslgnp/dirtyl.html> (pointing to several instances in which corporations
failed to correct environmental violations revealed to them by internal environmental audits or failed
to act on repeated recommendations by environmental, health and safety staff to remedy unsafe conditions that later resulted in serious accidents). Accord Sanford Lewis, Analysis of ISO 14000 Mallagement Systems: A Community Environmental Perspective (Sept. 25, 1996) (evolving paper, on the
Good Neighbor Project for Sustainable Industries website) <http://www.environlink.orglorgs/gnp/
isollhtml> [hereinafter Lewis, Analysis of ISO 14000] (using example of Rhone-Poulcnc facility in
Institute, West Virginia, to illustrate that environmental audits can fail to diagnose and rectify underlying problems-in this case, underinvestment in preventive maintenance at a facility-and that as a
result, audits can fail to prevent the recurrence of chemical leaks). See generally RICHARD WELFORD,
ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT-THE CORPORATE CHALLENGE FOR
THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 56 (1994) ("Seeing a single audit as a panacea would not only be
wrong but is likely to lead to more problems than it solves.").
73. There, PG&E's Clean Water Act permit required it to monitor the impacts of its massive
cooling water intake system on the adjacent marine environment. In 1988, PG&E omitted sampling
data from a key report that showed the possibility of up to a 90% loss of larval fish between cooling
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Likewise, many environmental management systems are designed not
to evaluate compliance with regulatory requirements but to ensure that
regulated entities have appropriate training, decisionmaking, and other
management systems.14 Similarly, none of the existing voluntary industry
codes include specific performance standards or prescribe specific operational practices, and none explicitly require compliance with environmental requirements. Nor do any require third-party verification of firms'
environmental systems.15

Additionally, participation in the voluntary

schemes has been relatively limited thus far, and most of the participants
have been large firms.1 6 At least some preliminary results suggest that
compliance with voluntary standards may falter during difficult economic
times.17

B. THE COMPLEXITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Another motivation underlying current reform efforts is the complexity of environmental law.18 Professor Richard Lazarus has recently provided one of the most detailed analyses of the sources of environmental
law's complexity.19 First, he argues, environmental law is highly technical, requiring sophistication and expertise to understand because of its dewater system intake and discharge points, indicating a possible significant impact on the marine environment. PG&E produced additional reports and took additional samples following government
agency questions raised by the data actually submitted by the company, but PG&E continued to withhold the original results. Eventually, after years had passed, PG&E biologists "rediscovered" the
omitted data and requested internally that PG&E management turn it over to the regulatory agencies.
PG&E failed to do this for another two years. In 1997, 10 years after the original studies were carried
out, regulators ordered PG&E to redo the initial two-year study since the omitted data rendered the
original study invalid. Throughout this 10-year period, PG&E maintained control over the study and
data generated; government agencies relied entirely on the company's entire control and audits. See
Chris Bowman, Big PG&E Settlement Over Nuclear Plant, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 28,1997, at A3;
Telephone Interview with Ken Alex, Deputy Attorney General, State of California (Aug. 8, 1997).
74. See discussion infra Part V.C.2.
75. See Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 58, at 16.
76. This is not true for members of the CMA; adherence to the Responsible Care program is
mandatory. The members' degree of commitment to meeting code requirements has varied, however.
See id. See also WELFORD, supra note 72, at 76 (noting that the pilot program of the British Standards
Institution's voluntary environmental management system showed that firms were generally strong on
drawing up environmental policies but weak on providing training and resources).
77. See Alastair T. lIes, Letter to Editor, ENV'T, Sept. 1996, at 4 (commenting on and quoting
Welford's work, which notes that a report of the British Responsible Care program for 1993 showed
that many firms failed to follow standards and concludes that "voluntary approaches often slip down a
list of priorities when other pressing issues arise. It is perhaps not surprising that the lack of response
from the chemical industry over Responsible Care occurred during a particularly bad economie recession."). See also WELFORD, supra note 72, at 36-37.
78. See Diamond, supra note 1, at 10,254.
79. See Richard Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental LaIV: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407 (1995).
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pendence on science, engineering, and economics. 8o Second, the law is
relatively indeterminate: Outcomes are hard to predict, and legal categories
do not necessarily tum on differences that are significant in the real
world.81 Third, the law is obscure: It can be difficult for regulated entities
to locate all the "law" applicable to them because, among other things,
regulations are densely worded, and rules are made through informal
agency documents, regulatory preambles, or other materials difficult to access.82 Finally, environmental law is considerably differentiated; regulatory authority is fragmented among federal agencies, and between federal
and state (and sometimes local) agencies.83
Although Lazarus' critique does not describe all environmental regulation, it does highlight genuine difficulties faced by regnlated entities.
One local prosecutor's guide candidly acknowledges that "[n]o facility of
moderate complexity which handles hazardous materials or wastes ... can
be expected to be in full compliance at all times.,,84 Likewise, a survey of
general corporate counsel at major firms found that two-thirds believed
their businesses had operated, at least some time in the prior year, in violation of environmental laws. Nearly seventy percent indicated that they
did not believe absolute compliance was achievable because of the law's
complexity, varying interpretations by regulators, the role of human error,
and cost considerations. 85 Numerous other observers have likewise noted
the difficulty of maintaining perfect, continuous compliance with all environmental rules.86 Small businesses face particularly great challenges in
dealing with complicated environmental regulations. 87 The widespread
80.

81.
82.
83.

See id. at 2429-31.
See id. at 2431-36.
See id. at 2436-38.
See id. at 2438-39.

Other scholars argue that modern regUlations are complex because
regulated entities seek to exploit the slightest ambiguity in simple, generally-worded rules, forcing
government agencies to draft exquisitely detailed provisions. See ROBERT REICH, TALES OF ANEW
AMERICA 212-21 (1987).
84. CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASS'N, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO HAZARDOUS MA·
TERIALS ENFORCEMENT AND LIABILITY I-I (1992).
85. See Lavelle, supra note 49, at S1.
86. See Harris, supra note 35, at 710; Silecchia, supra note 65, at 590 & n.14 (citing multiple
sources).
87. For an illustrative discussion, see ILLINOIS ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY & ILLINOIS DEP'T
OF COMMERCE AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, GOVERNOR'S SMALL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTAL TASK
FORCE REpORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (1994) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S SMALL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTAL TASK FORCE] (copy on file with author). In summarizing its findings, the Task Force
noted:
a widespread and pervasive 'fear factor' among small businesses .... [This includes] a fear
by small businesses that they cannot detennine whether they need a permit or mUltiple
pennits from the [Illinois EPA]. They cannot understand how to determine what regulations
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concern with these burdens explains the overwhelming Congressional support for mandating grace periods for environmental violations committed
by small businesses.ss
The complexity of environmental law suggests a number of things. It
points out the need for agencies to spend considerably more resources on
education and compliance promotion, particularly with smaller businesses.
It highlights the need for agencies to be flexible and pragmatic in their enforcement of many requirements, which is how most environmental agencies operate in practice. It also indicates the need to re-examine the very
liberal mens rea requirements of criminal environmental statutes, as Professor Lazarus recommends. But the law's complexity is not a justification for a wholesale dismantling of the enforcement system. Other areas
of law that are highly complex-tax law, for example-have not gone in
this direction. Thus, while the Internal Revenue Service has recently embarked on an important effort to increase voluntary compliance through a
variety of service-oriented initiatives, it has not discarded deterrence-based
enforcement. S9
C.

THE DETERRENCE-Is-COUNTERPRODUCTIVE ARGUMENT

Critics charge that a cooperative approach to enforcement is the best
way to achieve compliance and that sanction-oriented enforcement is
counterproductive.9o The basic argument proceeds from the assumption
that corporations have a generalized commitment to abiding by the law.
Under this mind-set, persuasion works better than punishment; essentially,
carrots are superior to sticks. Thus, John Braithwaite explains:
Punishment is the best strategy when good will is wanting. We apply
this common sense psychology in educating our children, in management, and in our everyday lives .... Punishment is something we resort
apply to them. And they cannot understand the multitude of regulations that may apply to
them.
Id.
88.
89.

See discussion infra Part V.B.
See SPARROW, supra note 3, at 15. The IRS' initiatives include tax simplification, taxpayer

assistance programs, customer-oriented total quality management, community volunteer programs to
help those who need it preparing their returns, and other measures. See id. See generally NATIONAL
COMM'N ON RESTRUcruRlNG THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., A NEW VISION FOR A NEW IRS (1997)
(outlining initiatives to improve the IRS' public image). Likewise, very recent IRS reform legislation
was enacted to rectify perceived over zealousness in the IRS enforcement system. See Richard w.
Stevenson, Senate Votes 96-2 on Final Approval for Changing IRS, NY TIMES, July 10, 1998, at Ai.
90. See Sommer, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that enforcement attorneys should realize that litigation is "expensive and delay-ridden, and frequently rewards no one but the professional litigator,"
and that it fosters an "unproductive dynamic" between the community and industry and government).
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to only when we confront a spouse, a student or a colleague at work to
whose better nature we cannot appeal for compliance with the goals we
have in mind .... Every schoolteacher knows that in some circumstances
a child who would have been alienated by punishment can be given a
greatly enhanced will to behave by saying, "That's not like you, Johnny
Brown," and then forgiving the transgression. 91
The same psychology applies to businesses. Therefore, the argument
goes, if they are found in violation of regulatory requirements, they should
be treated like a partner, and they will respond positively to suggestions
and advice about how to achieve compliance. If, however, the response to
noncompliance is inflexible, sanction-oriented enforcement, regulated entities will become resentful and hostile. They will feel as though they have
been treated unfairly and that their efforts to comply have gone unrecognized and unrewarded by regulators. The result will be resistance: Corporations will be less forthcoming with information, more apt to exploit
regulatory loopholes, more likely to contest agency conclusions, and more
likely to expend resources litigating citations. In short, they will become
less cooperative. The job of agencies in turn will become more difficult.
They will have a harder time detecting violations, since companies will be
less likely to voluntarily disclose problems to them. They will have to
spend more resources litigating cases, as well as more time and effort
gathering competent evidence for enforcement actions. The net impact is
less compliance by regulated entities (or, at the least, more instances of
minimal compliance) at greater cost to enforcement agencies. 92
Supporters of this view cite favorably to the less adversarial approach
of enforcement agencies in European countries. In Great Britain, for instance, Keith Hawkins found that water pollution inspectors rarely impose
sanctions on firms found to be in violation, relying instead on a system of
informal negotiation and persuasion to achieve compliance. The central
assumption of enforcement personnel is that their efforts will be more productive if they are conciliatory rather than coercive, and that they will
91.
(1985).

JOHN BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY 99

92. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 50, at 99-117; BRAITHWAITE, supra note 91, at 100
("The problem with the punitive model of man as essentially bad is that we dissipate the will of wellintentioned people to comply when we treat them as if they were ill-intentioned."). Professors Ayres
and Braithwaite argue that the psychological theories of minimal sufficiency and positive attribution
demonstrate that long-term internalization of a commitment to compliance is more Iikcly to occur
when triggered by positive incentives rather than punishment. See AyRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra
note 34, at 49-50.
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achieve the most compliance by maintaining good relations with regulated
entities.93
The argument that cooperation works better than deterrence to
achieve compliance with environmental law is unconvincing. Most fundamentally, it is largely untested.94 As two researchers conclude:
[S]cholarly attention has focused much more on building credible arguments for particular points of view than on evaluating their effectiveness
based on actual experience in the field. As a result, there is little in the
way of empirical evidence that can be used in deciding which enforcement techniques [approaches based on deterrence or cooperation] are
most likely to achieve regulatory goals. 95

Likewise, in 1991, the EPA noted that although the states and federal
government had tried different enforcement philosophies over the prior
two decades, "[l]ittle systematic research or program evaluation has been
conducted to help understand what techniques are effective under what
circumstances.,,96 Six years later, the EPA reiterated the need for a national compliance study designed to better characterize compliance with
federal environmental laws, including developing a better understanding of
the motivation for compliance or noncompliance.97
There are several reasons for skepticism about the argument that deterrence-based enforcement is counterproductive. First, this contention
rests on certain suppositions about enforcement behavior-most notably
that inspectors are rigid and legalistic, and respond to all violations with
formal sanctions.98 These assumptions, however, are belied by studies
showing that enforcement personnel in fact eschew formal, legalistic ac93. See KEITH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION AND THE SOCIAL
DEFINmoN OF POLLUTION 110-54 (1984).
94. See Mintz, supra note 45, at 10,541 (noting that there is no persuasive evidence that coopemtive approaches are more likely to produce environmental compliance than a deterrent-based regime).
95. Raymond J. Burby & Robert G. Paterson, Improving Compliance with State Environmental
Regulations, 12 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 753, 757 (1993). See Kathryn Harrison, Is Cooperation
the Answer? Canadian Environmental Enforcement in Comparative Context, 14 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 221, 223 (1995) ("[P]ast studies that have hailed the merits of coopemtive enforcement have
offered surprisingly little by way of empirical support."). See also Wasserman, supra note 32, at 30
(asserting that there is need for research to determine the efficiency of dollars spent promoting compliance versus enforcing requirements).
96. ENFORCEMENT FOUR-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 12, at 19.
97. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTEcrION AGENCY, MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF EPA'S ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM, DRAFT REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES STRATEGY (Sept. 1997) [hereinafter DRAFT REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
PERFORMANCE MEASURES STRATEGY].
98. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 50, at 72-80,99-114.
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tions and rely heavily on informal negotiations (while using traditional
sanctions as a backup) to achieve compliance. 99 Second, advocates of cooperative enforcement presuppose that most corporations are inclined to
generally comply with law. As detailed above, this assumption is problematic with respect to environmental regulations. lOo Third, the cooperative model under emphasizes the economic pressures for noncompliance.
Coaxing and persuasion may be productive when firms make good-faith
efforts to comply and have the resources to do so. It is far less likely to
work when compliance has significant financial consequences for a
firm. 101 A North Carolina enforcement study discussed below illustrates
this point: Researchers found that deterrence-oriented enforcement was
more effective'than cooperation when substantial cost savings could be
realized by noncompliance. t02
Finally, there is little hard evidence to support the claim that deterrence is counterproductive. To be fair to critics of existing practice, the
current state of compliance with environmental regulations does not provide definitive evidence that deterrence-based enforcement is more effective. In fact, rather surprisingly, we do not have a good idea about what
the overall state of compliance with environmental requirements is. On
99. See HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 53-56,72-73; YEAGER, sllpra note 26, at 280
(stating that the study of EPA enforcement found that agency "stayed well away from nitpicking enforcement").
100. See HUNTER & WATERMAN, sllpra note 26, at 60. Some argue that a portion of companies
fail to comply because of organizational incompetence, and that for these finns, a strategy of education and persuasion will be most effective in stimulating compliance. See Kagan & Scholz, Sllpra note
32, at 67-69 (observing that where violations are attributable to organizational failures, the appropriate
regulatory strategy should be education, not sanctions; enforcers should act like consultants). But as
other scholars point out, the threat of sanctions can be a strong deterrent to lack of organizational care
in the first place. See Harrington, supra note 36, at 51 ("A finn has considerable discretion in the care
with which abatement equipment is operated and maintained. It stands to reason that its diligence
would be the greater during those times when violations were likely to be costly."); Johnston, slIpra
note 66, at 338 ("Most violations result from a mere simple lack of care-a lack of sufficient attention
being paid to environmental matters. Vigorous enforcement programs can and do have a dramatic
impact on the amount of attention that regulated entities pay to environmental compliance matters.").
101. See White, supra note 28, at 151-53 (suggesting that the cost of compliance was the most
important factor explaining low compliance rates of regulated entities where the local agency adopted
conciliatory enforcement style). See also JOSEPH F. DIMENTO, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
AMERICAN BUSINESS: DILEMMAS OF COMPLIANCE 86-87 (1986) ("We find sufficient examples of
cost-benefit calculations in the toxic dumping cases to support the conclusion that in some areas of
environmental control the 'rational man' [i.e., deterrence-based enforcement] model may be useful for
devising control policies.").
102. See Burby & Paterson, Sllpra note 95, at 759, 765 (estimating that noncompliance with the
requirement that sedimentation and erosion plans be installed and maintained could save $8,000 for a
typical project). See also RUSSELL ET AL., slIpra note 25, at 107-16 (suggesting that modeling exercise demonstrates that voluntary compliance will work poorly for finns wishing to skimp on maintenance of pollution control equipment).
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the one hand, the evidence generally suggests that presently there are relatively high levels of compliance, particularly in those areas where enforcement has been systematic, aggressive and targeted. 103 New Jersey's
deterrence-oriented Clean Water Act Enforcement Act,I04 to cite one very
recent illustration, has significantly improved compliance since it was
adopted in 1990.105 Even advocates for change concede that the traditional
approach has worked effectively in achieving compliance with many
regulatory requirements. 106
On the other hand, a host of studies, most notably a series of reports
by the General Accounting Office and EPA's Inspector General, demonstrate considerable levels of noncompliance by regulated entities. 107 In
one recent report, for instance, the GAO found that one in six major facili103. See Mintz, supra note 45, at 10,539 to 10,540; HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 46
(indicating that some EPA officials state that 95% of all NPDES pennittees in their region are in
compliance at any given time).
104. N. J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-14.1 ('Vest 1995).
105. See Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2, at
227 (prepared statement of Todd E. Robins). Among other provisions, the statute provides for mandatory minimum penalties for serious violations and significant noncompliance, requires that penalties
recover the economic benefit resulting from violations, and enhances citizen enforcement. According
to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the number of Clean Water Act violations
in the state has dropped by 78% since 1992. See id. (quoting NEW JERSEY DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CLEAN WATER ENFORCEMENT ACT (March 1997); NEW
JERSEY DEP'T ENVTL. PROTECTION, 1995 ANNUAL REpORT OF THE CLEAN WATER ENFORCEMENT ACT
(March 1996». Moreovcr, enforcement actions have declined by 67% since 1992, and penalties have
declined by 92% since 1994, suggesting that the law's strong deterrent effect has prompted much of
the increased compliance. See id.
106. See Hawkins, supra note 5, at 47. The critics argue, however, that this method is not appropriate for the more complex compliance challenges regulatory agencies currently confront. See id.
107. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIR POLLUTION: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN
DETECTING AND PREVENTING VIOLATIONS, GAOIRCED 90-155 (1990) (observing that in more than
50% of significant violator cases under the Clean Air Act over a two-year period, no penalties were
imposed, and when they were assessed, they were often insufficient to recover the economic benefit
gained from noncompliance); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER POLLUTION: IMPROVED
MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT NEEDED FOR TOXIC POLLUTANTS ENTERING SEWERS, GAOIRCED89-101,3 (1989) [hereinafter GAO, WATER POLLUTION: IMPROVED MONITORING] (indicating that a
survey found that 41 % of industrial users were not complying with publicly owned treatment works'
pretreatment discharge limits under the Clean Water Act); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER
POLLUTION: OBSERVATIONS ON COMPUANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT, GAOrr-RCED-91-90 (1991) (statement of Richard L. Hembra, Director of Environmental Protection Issues, before the Senate Subcommittee on Environmental Protection) (reporting
that a series of GAO and EPA evaluations have revealed the widespread and continuing pattern of
noncompliance with water quality programs, and a reluctance on the part of the EPA and states to take
strong enforcement action); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER POLLUTION: STRONGER
ENFORCEMENT NEEDED TO IMPROVE COMPUANCE AT FEDERAL FACILITIES, GAOIRCED-89-13, 3
(1988) (stating that over a two-year period in the late 1980s, 20% of major federal facilities violated
priority Clean Water Act requirements, and more than 40% of those violating facilities did not comply
for a year or more).
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ties was in "significant noncompliance" of the discharge limits in their
NPDES permits,I08 and that the actual number could be twice as high. 109
Moreover, during fiscal year 1994, fifty percent of major dischargers violated their permits at some time during the year (including both lesser infractions and significant violations).llo Other observers have reached
similar conc1usions. lll These latter studies do not tell us, however,
whether noncompliance resulted from flaws in the deterrence-based model,
or, as others argne,II2 from, a lack of meaningful deterrence-based enforcement.
The limited empirical data actually comparing deterrence and cooperative-oriented strategies is mixed. Some studies indicate improvements
in compliance rates after cooperative strategies were substituted for traditional practices. For example, a pilot cooperative compliance program
conducted by the California Occupational Safety and Health Administration (CallOSHA) in the early 1980s resulted in significantly lower accident
rates at the participating job sites than at comparable company projects or
comparable projects by other firms in California. II3 Under the program,
108. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER POLLUTION: MANY VIOLATIONS HAVE NOT
RECEIVED ApPROPRIATE ENFORCEMENT ATTENTION, GAOIRCED-96-23, 1-2 (1996) [hereinafter
GAO, WATER POLLUTION: ENFORCEMENT ATTENTION]. The EPA defines "significant noncompliance" as "(I) for toxic pollutants as exceeding an average monthly limit by 20 percent or more in any
2 months of a 6-month period and (2) for conventional pollutants as exceeding an average monthly
limit by 40 percent in any 2 months of a 6-month period." Id. at 3.
109. See id. at 2.
110. See id. at 3.
Ill. Most recently, a study by the U.S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) found that during
a IS-month period from 1995 to early 1996, close to 20% of the major industrial, municipal and federal dischargers nationwide were listed by the EPA in significant noncompliance with their Clean
Water Act permits in at least one quarter. The study additionally found that 21 % of major industrial
dischargers exceeded their discharge limits by 50% or more during the first quarter of 1996. See Todd
Robins, U.S. PUB. INTEREST REsEARCH GROUP, DIRTY WATER SCOUNDRELS: STATE-BY-STATE
VIOLATIONS OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT BY THE NATION'S LARGEST FACILITIES (1997) (visited July
16, 1997) <http://www.pirg.org/pirg/enviro/water/dws97> [hereinafter DIRTY WATER SCOUNDRELS].
See also David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Call
Three Not Be a Crowd Whell Enforcement Is Shared by the United States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1603-09 (1995) (discussing the erratic enforcement record of govern-

ment agencies and significant levels of noncompliance by regulated entities).
112. Professor Hodas, for instance, attributes the documented rate of significant noncompliance
with the Clean Water Act to a combination of the relaxed enforcement efforts by states (to create favorable business conditions), and the reluctance of the federal government (due to politics) to meaningfully supervise state enforcement efforts. See Hodas, supra note Ill, at 1572-75, 1585-89, 161517. See also Joseph F. DiMento, Can Social Science Explain Orgallizatiollal NOllcompliallce with
Envirollmental Law?, 45 J. SOC. ISSUES 109, 112 (1989) (stating that traditional literature finds that
efforts to achieve compliance with environmental law fail because of a weak enforcement approach:
"Not enough violators are identified; when identified, not enough are sanctioned; and when they are
sanctioned, penalties are too weak to communicate that violations will not be tolerated.").
113. See REES, supra note 63, at 1-6.
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CallOSHA largely refrained from traditional enforcement activities at selected construction sites in favor of self-regulation by a joint labormanagement safety committee. Cal/OSHA stopped its routine compliance
inspections of these sites and instead assigued a compliance officer to assist the safety committee in devising solutions to problems at the sites.
The author of this study, however, cautions against broadly applying this
model: The firms involved already had stellar safety records; there was
broad agreement between labor and management as to the nature of the
safety problems at the sites; and the beneficiaries of self-regulation were
directly involved at the site where the violations occurY4 As he points
out, the experience may be very different in other regulatory contexts, like
environmental protection, where the affected constituents are not present at
the firm.
In another example, the federal OSHA has found benefits in its Voluntary Protection Program (VPP). Employers who have outstanding safety
records and a program to identify and correct workplace hazards assume
primary responsibility for monitoring compliance and are thereby exempted from routine agency inspections. ll5 In 1992, with 150 worksites
participating in the program, injury incidence rates averaged from thirtyfive percent to sixty-five percent below the expected average for similar
industries, and workday injury rates were sixty percent below the expected
average in similar industriesY6 Likewise, a study of occupational safety
114. Seeid. at 237.
115. OSHA conducts a pre·approval review of all participating worksites before they qualify for
the VPP. OSHA also conducts a review similar to the pre·approval review, including a site visit,
every three years. See Michael, supra note 40, at 559. There are three levels of VPP participation.
For those companies that have the most comprehensive health and safety programs and have achieved
the highest level ("star status"), minor violations reported to OSHA or detected during recertification
inspections are resolved by requiring prompt correction or revoking the company's star status. Only
cases involving knowing misconduct or serious injury at a star facility are referred to OSHA's en·
forcement staff. See Breger, supra note 3, at 330.
116. See Michael M. Stahl, Promoting Voluntary Compliance: A Valuable Supplement to Envi·
ronmental Enforcement, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 551, 554 (1994) [hereinafter THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE].
In 1996, OSHA reported that in the prior three years participation in the program had doubled, and
that injury rates at participating companies were 45% below the industry average. See Occupational
Safety and Health Admin., U.S. Dept. of Labor, Head Says Programs of "New OSHA" Are Successful
Ways to Improve Worker Safety and Health, Sept. 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 536220 (D.O.L.)
(news release). For criticism that the VPP has not in fact promoted better compliance, see Kenneth A.
Kovach, Nancy G. Hamilton, Thomas M. Alston & Judith A. Sullivan, OSHA and the Politics of Refonn: An Analysis of OSHA Refonn Initiatives Before the l04th Congress, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 169,
179-80 (1997) {noting that according to the AFL-CIO, industries in which compliance has been voluntary have shown little improvement in the death and injury rates of workers since 1970, and that a
study by the Associated Press reviewing 778,000 OSHA inspections found that lack of inspections
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and health enforcement suggests that the level of cooperation employed by
enforcement agencies increases the effectiveness of their enforcement efforts, as measured by lower injury rates among workers. ll7
A compliance incentive program implemented with the auto repair
industry in Santa Rosa, California, also reported positive results. In place
of traditional enforcement practices, local regulators began an intensive
program of providing information and technical assistance to businesses.
In addition, the regulators awarded recoguizable stickers to complying
businesses, and attempted to raise consumer awareness about the program. 118 Whereas before the campaign the compliance rate hovered near
zero, nearly three-quarters of the repair shops were fully compliant after
two inspections. 119
On the other hand, a comparative study between the pulp and paper
industries in the United States and Canada, where regnlators follow the
cooperative school, found that rates of compliance with effluent limitations
in Canada are significantly lower than in the United States. 120 In particular, the study found that rates of compliance with Biological Oxygen Demand requirements for Canadian mills were around sixty-nine percent,
compared to an average in the United States ranging from eighty-six percent to ninety-eight percent, and that compliance with Total Suspended
Solids CTSS) requirements was fifty-nine percent, compared to an estimated ninety-two percent compliance in the United States. 121 Noting that
the regulatory systems of the two countries are very similar except for the
since 1990 correlated with 75% of the worksites reporting serious worker accidents in 1994 and early
1995).
117. See John T. Scholz, Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative
Effectiveness, 85 AM. POL. SCIENCE REV. 115, 128 (1991) [hereinafter Scholz, Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement]. Scholz developed a rough "cooperation index" based on the percentage of citations issued that included serious violations and the percentage of penalties imposed for serious violations. High percentages mean a high concentration of agency activities on egregious violators, which
is consistent with a cooperative strategy. See id. at 120.
118. See John w. Gam, Martin L. Grimsrud & Dean C. Paige, The Compliance Incelllive Experience in Santa Rosa, California, in THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 116, at 527, 529.
119. See id. at 544. The study's results should be viewed with some caution, however. First, the
low rate of prior compliance may be attributable to the fact that the auto repair shops had rarely bcen
inspected in the past. See id. Second, a key factor motivating compliance was market pressure
stemming from publicly designating facilities as being in compliance. See id. at 544-46. This same
type of pressure can be deployed in a deterrence-based system.
120. See Harrison, supra note 95, at 237-38.
121. See id. at 238. The evidence also suggests that the U.S. firms would have a substantially
higher rate of compliance with toxicity standards.
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divergent approaches to implementation,122 the author concluded that
"[t]he findings thus constitute prima facie evidence that cooperative enforcement is less effective than the more prosecution-oriented approach, at
least in North America."123
The EPA and states also proved singularly unsuccessful in bringing
municipalities into compliance with safe drinking water and municipaltreatment plan violations through a compliance promotion approach.124 In
the mid-1980s, close to 1,500 publicly-owned treatment works (POTWs)
were not in compliance. One important reason was that many industrial
users were exceeding their limits on discharges to POTWs, and the efforts
of POTWs to coax compliance from these dischargers through a voluntary
approach were unsuccessful. 125 Regulators then initiated a major enforcement effort against the municipalities and filed judicial or administrative actions against almost eighty percent of noncomplying facilities,
resulting in dramatic increases in compliance. 126
Another study of local environmental enforcement in North Carolina
found that both deterrence-based and cooperative strategies were necessary
to ensure adequate compliance with environmental standards. The study
examined compliance with the state's sedimentation and erosion control
program by private developers. It concluded that deterrence-based aspects
of the enforcement system, including more frequent and lengthier inspections, were key factors in ensuring greater compliance with the more expensive requirements that approved plans be installed and maintained. 127
On the other hand, a cooperative approach worked better at ensuring
compliance with the performance standard of the regulations-that all
sediment be retained on site. 128
In the end, in the absence of more supporting evidence, those advocating a wholesale departure from a deterrence-based approach bear some
burden of persuasion-namely, explaining why the basic theory of deterrence that predominates so many other areas of law enforcement (the
Benthamite utilitarian notion that behavior is based on a pleasure-pain cal122. "Canadian regulators have been more inclined to bend the rules when they perceive that
regulated firms are making good faith efforts, and to negotiate informal compliance schedules when
firms fail to comply." Id.
123. Id. at 238-39.
124. See Wasserman, supra note 32, at 30.
125. See GAO, WATER POLLUTION: IMPROVED MONITORING, supra note 107, at 25-31.
126. See Robert I. Van Heuvelen & Peter Rosenberg, Successful Compliance and Enforcement
Approaches, in THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 116, at 163, 164-65.
127. See Burby & Paterson, supra note 95, at 763.
128. See id. at 763, 765-66.
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culation) is inappropriate for environmental regulation. 129 Americans still
regard economic sanctions against business as one of the most potent, if
not the most potent, means to shape corporate behavior and achieve compliance. A striking illustration is the recent global tobacco settlement
reached by the states and the tobacco industry. A key part of that agreement provides that if underage use of tobacco products fails to meet certain
specified reduction targets, the tobacco companies will be penalized billions of dollars based on a percentage of the profit earned from product
sales in excess of the stipulated levels. 130 Notably, among many groups
reviewing the settlement, the question is not the appropriateness of this approach, but whether the sanctions are high enough to prompt the desired
industry response. 13 I
D. THE INEFFICIENCY ARGUMENT AGAINST DETERRENCE

The argument about the superior effectiveness of a cooperative approach is often joined with the contention that such an approach is more
efficient, both because it is less costly to administer and because its flexible nature allows facilities to use the most efficient methods to achieve
compliance. 132
129. See HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 3-5. Hunter and Watennan note the dichotomy in attitudes toward general criminal enforcement and enforcement of environmental regulations
among some politicians:
Should enforcement of environmental standards be strict and severe? The message that is so
emphatic in the area of law enforcement [that enforcement should be strict and severe] does
not seem to resonate as clearly when we tum our attention to the behavior of federal regulatory agencies.... Whereas most politicians today voice similar opinions about the need for
vigorous criminal enforcement, opinion is widely distributed on the issue of regulatory enforcement.
Id.
Likewise, in New York, Assemblyman Richard Brodsky commented on the results of an EPA
audit showing a lack of enforcement by the New York Department of Environmental Conservation: "It
shows a pattern of lawbreaking gone unpunished. If these were petty street thieves, (officials in the
[Governor George] Palaki administration) would be pounding their fists on the table and demanding
law and order. But when it comes to corporate polluters, they look the other way." Sarah Metzgar,
Federal Audil Faults DEC on PoliutionLaws, UMES ALBANY UNION, May I, 1997, at B2.
130. See Excerpts from Agreement Between Slates and Tobacco Industry, reprinted in N.Y.
UMES, June 25, 1997,atA7.
131. See Neil A. Lewis, Citing Flaws, Health Panel Rejects Deal on Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, June
26, 1997, at D26 (reporting that a panel of leading public health experts established to advise Congress on the proposed tobacco settlement claimed the proposed penalties were far too small to have an
impact).
132. See Diamond, supra note I, at 10,254; John T. Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement, 6 L. & POL'y 385, 390-92 (1984) [hereinafter Scholz, Voluntary Compliance]
(arguing net social benefits wiII be higher if enforcement and compliance costs are minimized through
cooperation between agencies and regulated entities).
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Many critics note that government agencies lack the resources necessary to enforce environmental law according to the traditional model. The
traditional model requires agencies to monitor and detect violations, inspect facilities, and timely and appropriately respond to each observed
violation. Responses range from informal warnings to civil or administrative penalty actions. This is a highly resource-intensive approach. By
contrast, a system that places greater reliance on self-policing and selfenforcement would allow a government to concentrate its limited resources on the most serious instances of noncompliance. 133 It would also
allow increased government spending on outreach and education efforts
that commentators suggest can reach a larger audience and educate regulated entities at a lower cost to enforcement agencies.134
One such critic, political scientist John Scholz, contends that a game
theory model of enforcement also demonstrates the superior efficiency of a
cooperative approach, and that the standard deterrence model fails to account for the strategic interactions that occur between regulated firms and
enforcement agencies. 135 Based on this model, he claims that whenever an
agency adopts a strict deterrence approach, firms are better off evading the
law rather than complying. Scholz argues that agencies will expend resources pursuing insignificant violations; firms will be required to achieve
compliance in one prescribed manner. A cooperative approach, in which
regulators overlook minor violations in recognition of efforts to do more
than the law requires, avoids these inefficiencies. Firms can comply with
regulations in a more cost-effective way, while agencies can conserve
scarce enforcement resources. 136
133. Thus, the New Jersey legislature concluded that
[e]xpanding the use of grace (compliance) periods will promote compliance by allowing
those members of the regulated community who are committed to working diligently and
cooperatively toward compliance, to invest private capital in pollution control equipment
and other measures which will yield long-term environmental benefits, instead of in costly
litigation and the payment of punitive monetary sanctions .... [T]his will enable the
[Department] to more sharply focus limited public resources on serious violations of environmental law.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:ID-125 (\Vest 1995). See also Michael, supra note 40, at 554.
134. See Diamond, supra note I, at 10,254.
135. See Scholz, Voluntary Compliance, supra note 132. Broadly speaking, game theory is a
branch of economic theory holding that, in markets consisting of just a few participants, the behavior
of a participant is explained by how she believes other participants will react to her actions rather than
by standard economic assumptions. See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is
There a "Race" and Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 299-300 (1997) (quoting sources).
The teachings of game theory have been extended to other situations where participants interact strategically so that each participant's action is influenced by the anticipated reaction of others to her own
measures.
136. In Scholz's view, cooperation is not an altruistic strategy but one which helps both regulated entities and enforcers maximize their utility over the long term. The contingent nature of en-
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It is certainly true that government resources are constrained, forcing
the government to depend to a considerable degree on the self-policing efforts of firms.

Indeed, enforcement agencies have never had sufficient

staff to inspect more than a fraction of regulated facilities nor the resources
to pursue more than a small percentage of violations in court or through
the administrative hearing process. 137 From 1979 to 1994, for example,
the EPA's budget remained frozen, despite the passage of numerous new
statutes. 138 The problem recently has become even more severe as budget
battles have caused sharp reductions in the EPA's enforcement budget,139
while the universe of regulated facilities has become larger and more dispersed. 140

forcement, however, results in a type of prisoners' dilemma when a cooperative strategy is used.
Firms will be tempted to cheat to avoid compliance costs, since instances of noncompliance arc less
likely to be detected in a cooperative scheme. Conversely, agencies uncertain that all finns arc complying are tempted to retreat from cooperation because deterrence-based enforcement is more likely to
detect noncompliance. Firms then have no guarantee that if they act exceptionally and do morc than
the law requires, the agency still will not enforce the law strictly against them. The result is that,
while mutual cooperation is in the long-tenn iuterest of both sides, it is unlikely to occur in a single
encounter because of the short-tenn temptation to cheat. Thus, agencies arc always safer in choosing
deterrence, and firms are safer in choosing to cheat. Scholz suggests a cooperative uTit for Tat" strategy in which the agency sets a minimal level of compliance, uses less rigorous enforcement routines
against firms that meet this level in the prior period, and reserves its more severe enforcement procedures for firms that fail to meet these minimal compliance standards. To maximize the effectiveness
of this approach, the agency should seek to maximize sanctions against violators, but also be willing
to forgive rapidly when the firm decides to cooperate. See Scholz, Voluntary Compliance, sllpra note
132, at 393.
137. See E.S. Schaeffer, Encouraging Voluntary Compliance Withow Compromising Enforcement: EPA's 1995 Auditing Policy, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, FOURTII INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 451, 453 (1996) [hereinafter
FOURTIlINTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE] (indicating that u[b]y one estimate, at least 700,000 facilities
are subject to one or more federal environmental laws, while the federal government and states together conduct fewer than 100,000 inspections per year"); HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at
62 (noting that EPA officials rely on a fiexible approach to enforcement because it does not have the
fiscal or personnel resourees necessary to implement a strict enforcement approach, which would require a radical increase in the number of enforcement personnel).
138. See Robert I. Van Heuvelen & Peter J. Fontaine, Planning and Executing Strategic Environmental Enforcement 1nitiatives: Maximizing Enforcement 1mpact, in THIRD INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE, supra note 116, at 309,310; Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire,
Aim: A New Framework to Link Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 Ky. LJ. 803, 912
(1997).
139. See Silecchia, supra note 65, at 622 & n.l24 (documenting how EPA enforcement resources have been greatly constrained).
140. Federal and state environmental statutes
have swept increasingly more, and increasingly smaller, entities into the net of liability ....
In short, the original view that environmental degradation could be solved by changing the
behavior of a few, easily identified and large-volume polluters has given way to a new perception that the universe of culprits is substantially more diffuse and atomistic.
Welks, supra note 9, at 3-4 (citations omitted).
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A cooperative approach, however, mayor may not save agencies
money, depending on its structure. 141 Agencies will be spared some of the
costs of monitoring, detecting, and proving violations, which will shift to
private corporations. On the other hand, agencies will have to devote
considerably more resources to providing technical advice and cooperative
assistance to regulated facilities. In addition, the government oversight of
regulated firms in a cooperative scheme may be just as costly as the traditional inspection model it is replacing. For example, inspectors in
Cal/OSHA's Cooperative Compliance Program stopped most routine
compliance inspections and were assigned to assist the joint labormanagement safety committee in improving safety at construction sites.
This new role for OSHA staff was expensive as inspectors spent up to ten
times more time inspecting these sites than they did at other facilities. 142
Likewise, as the General Accounting Office recently reported, measuring
the results of cooperative enforcement strategies can be quite expensive. 143
The fact that agencies will never have sufficient resources to adequately monitor, detect, remedy, and sanction all instances of noncompliance does not necessarily mean that an overhaul of the current system is
the answer. Limited resources may suggest that any actions brought
should have the most widespread deterrent effect, such as by generating
the maximum penalties. They also suggest the need for enforcement activities to be strategically targeted. Others cite the lack of adequate agency
resources as demonstrating not the wisdom of greater self-regulation but
the need for more vigorous private enforcement of environmental laws.
Scholz's game theory model suffers from a number of flaws. First, it
posits a model of deterrence-based enforcement in which enforcement
agencies lack discretion, each violation is met with maximum enforcement, and all firms are treated randomly. Such a model is greatly overThe Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, for example, reports that small businesses collectively add up to a major source of poIIution, but the agency lacks enforcement staff and resources
to force them to comply. See Small Businesses Encouraged to Make "Clean Break" with Polluting
Practices, 4 ILL. ENVTL. L. LETIER, May 1995, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, AIInws File.
141. See Wasserman, supra note 32, at 40 ("[W]e do not have a good feel for the impact or costeffectiveness of the various types of enforcement responses.").
142. See REEs, supra note 63, at 234. See also BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 50, at 160
(suggesting that a flexible enforcement approach requires time, knowledge, and money); Welks, supra
note 9, at 32 (noting that compliance-assistance programs are resource intensive). Welks, who examined the Illinois Clean Break Program, found that the agency stiII may have to spend substantial resources on enforcement because one-third of the original participants remained out of compliance.
See Welks, supra note 9, at 32. Welks concluded that "[e]ven with carefuIIy controIIed studies, which
do not presently exist, it may be impossible to gauge whether small business programs like Clean
Break realize a greater compliance return on resource investments." Id.
143. See GAO, EFFORTS TO Focus ON REsULTS, supra note 8, at 39.
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simplified, and in practice, minor infractions are frequently overlooked or
met with minimal response. l44 Second, it assumes that as a trade-off for
overlooking minor violations, firms take steps to reduce even greater hazards not addressed by the law or to comply more efficiently. But firms
that deviate from strict compliance may not be doing more in other areas;
they may simply be skirting the law. Third, the model downplays the concern that a cooperative approach will lead to agency capture by regulated
entities. 145 Lastly, the critique that cooperative enforcement leads to more
cost-effective compliance strategies by firms is in many ways an argument
for greater flexibility in the underlying, substantive environmental standards, not pliancy in how these standards are enforced. These issues are
distinct, and it is important for them to be treated as such so that they can
rise and fallon their own merits. 146
E. SOCIETY' S AMBIVALENCE TOWARD POLLUTION
Another important argument for a nonadversarial enforcement approach, developed in detail by Keith Hawkins, is that society has ambivalent attitudes toward polluting activity. This ambivalence is due in part to
the fact that most pollution results from otherwise productive, economically desirable activity that contributes to the material well-being of society.147 Thus, "the [typical] conduct prohibited by economic regulatory
laws is not immediately distinguishable from modes of business behavior
that are not only socially acceptable, but affirmatively desirable in an
economy founded upon an ideology ... of free enterprise and the profit
motive.,,148
Second, the lines between what is or is not permitted by environmental regulation are often only a matter of degree and are not intuitively
obvious. Pollution frequently falls in the category of conduct that is malum prohibitum rather than malum se-conduct that is illegal because it is
proscribed by law, not because it is morally reprehensible. 149
See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.B.!.
146. The difference is reflected, for example, in the distinction between (I) the EPA's Environmental Excellence and Leadership (XL) initiative, which gives facilities discretion to vary from some
environmental standards in exchange for realizing environmental improvements in other areas, and (2)
its Environmental Leadership Program, which encourages innovative approaches to achieving compliance. See discussion infra Part V.E.
147. See HAWKINS, supra note 93, at 10-13, 203. See also REES, supra note 63, at 178.
148. Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions ill Ellforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 436 (1963).
149. See HAWKINS, supra note 93, at 10-13,203. Hawkins also notes that societal ambivalence
about environmental enforcement exists because environmental regulation is relatively new, regulat144.
145.
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Analyzing societal attitudes toward pollution-generating activity and
pollution is a complex undertaking, and a subject well beyond the scope of
this Article. While much of the underlying activity that generates pollution is socially beneficial, it is an oversimplification to argue that the public therefore is ambivalent about the resulting pollution or about enforcing
pollution control requirements. Rather, much of the public apparently
wants economic activity to proceed so long as it accommodates environmental concerns. Thus, solid majorities of the public (sixty-three percent
in 1996) consistently say that environmental protection and economic development can go hand in hand. Where a conflict between the environment and development is unavoidable, the public favors protecting the environment by a three-to-one ratio, sixty-three percent to twenty-one
percent. ISO These findings suggest that public attitudes are more complex
than Hawkins indicates, and that the public's desire to protect economic
activity may not greatly temper its concomitant wish to sanction pollution
resulting from that activity, regardless of whether in fact these two desires
are incompatible.
Hawkins also overstates matters by suggesting that the public clearly
distinguishes unlawful pollution from other inherently evil conduct. For
some segments of the population, protection of the environment has a decidedly moral character, and pollution, even that which results from economically desirable activity, is morally wrong. As Mark Sagoff explains,
"Americans have moral convictions about the environment that have
nothing to do with economic 'common sense."'ISI Thus, the public may
ing behavior that for decades or centuries has been pennissible or even encouraged, and because the
harms associated with regulatory violations are more amorphous and delayed than those resulting
from other laws. The relative "newness" of environmental law, however, does not justify relaxing
enforcement. As with any area of law, environmental requirements have changed in response to perceived changes in social conditions, and businesses must adapt to these changes. In any event, modern environmental law is no longer novel, having been introduced 25 years ago. Likewise, the delayed nature of environmental harms is not a reason to enforce environmental requirements less
rigorously. In fact, because it is more difficult to win tort actions for such harms, environmental requirements arguably should be enforced even more strictly.
150. See NATIONAL ENVTL. EDUC. AND TRAINING FOUND., REPORT CARD: ENVIRONMENTAL
ATTITUDES AND KNOWLEDGE IN AMERICA 10-14 (1996). A plurality of Americans (45%) believe that
environmental laws generally have not gone far enough, and substantial majorities believe this to be
true with respect to water pollution (73%) and air pollution (64%). See id. at 31-33. See also John H.
Cushman, Public Backs Tough Steps for a Treaty on Wanning, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1997, at A36
(reporting that 6 I % of Americans favor protecting the environment even if it costs jobs in their community, and 57% believe environmental improvements must be made regardless of costs); EVERETT C.
LADD & KARLYN H. BOWMAN, ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ENVIRONMENT-TwENTY-FlVE YEARS
AFI"EREARTHDAY 7-8, 20-23 (1995).
151. Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1393, 1398
(1981).
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believe that companies are morally blameworthy for conduct such as
skimping on compliance expenditures to increase profits, exposing individuals to avoidable risks, using unknown chemicals, burdening communities that do not benefit from the polluting activity, and so forth. Such
moral judgments may be derived from the deeply held values that some
scholars suggest underlie much of the public's support for environmental
protection. 152 These values include religious and spiritual values, concern
for the preservation of a healthy environment for future generations, and
fidelity to the idea that nature has rights and deserves justice. 153 Clearly,
societal attitudes about polluting activity are not sufficiently ambivalent to
justify treating violations of environmental requirements differently than
other unlawful conduct.
F. THE FIXATION ON BEAN COUNTING
Critics charge that the current system results in a preoccupation with
numerical indicators: counting the number of inspections carried out,
complaints filed, criminal convictions obtained, and the size of penalties
collected. They contend that this focus is inherent in a deterrence-based
enforcement system because deterrence theory holds that the best way to
promote compliance is to enforce the law. Thus, all enforcement activities
are seen as contributing to the effectiveness of the deterrent threat; more
actions mean more deterrence, and larger penalties have a more powerful
deterrent impact than weaker sanctions.
According to the critics, bean counting fails to accurately measure the
success of enforcement efforts. They maintain that "a focus on enforcement statistics measures the number of problems encountered, not avoided.
Each violation and resulting case is a failure to achieve the goal of eliminating harms to human health and the environment.,,154 Moreover, critics
argue, bean counting distorts the priorities of enforcement agencies, which
152. See WIllET KEMPTON, JAMES S. BOSTER & JENNIFER A. HARTLEY, ENVIRONMENTAL
VALUES IN AMERICAN CULTURE 87-115 (1996). The authors found that most Americans share a
common set of environmental beliefs and values (in favor of environmental protection) and that there
was no coherent or consistent "anti-environmental position." [d. at 211-12.
153. See id.
154. Hawkins, supra note 5, at 46. Virginia Wetherell, secretary of the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, warns that stressing the "beans" risks losing focus on the real concern of
environmental quality:
People assume that a drop in penalty orders means a state has gone soft on polluters. But
how can one make that assumption without information on compliance rates? ... If we don't
move beyond the beans, we will miss what is really important: the quality of our environment.
Virginia Wetherell, Counting Results, ENVTL. F., Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 21,26.
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concentrate as a result on concluding a greater number of easy-to-prove
but insignificant infractions (inflating their numerical indicators) rather
than on more threatening but time-consuming violations. ISS
Few are satisfied with or interested in defending bean counting as the
sole means of measuring the effectiveness of an enforcement program. 156
Few also would disagree that an excessive focus on bean counting has at
times skewed agency activities. Indeed, the EPA, which until very recently relied almost exclusively on numerical indicators to evaluate its
program, has acknowledged that it needs to go beyond these traditional
measures, and has been involved in a major effort to develop and implement an enhanced set of performance measures for its enforcement program. 157 The more fundamental question is whether a bean counting approach is inevitable with deterrence-oriented enforcement. The answer is
no. Bean counting has been relied upon because it is much more convenient than tackling the difficult problems of measuring compliance and environmental outcomes,158 and because it makes it far easier to evaluate the
performance of enforcement personnel,159 not because it represents the
ends of enforcement activity. Indeed, compliance-based enforcement
could easily fall into the identical trap of using the number of consultations
or advice visits carried out to evaluate the success of the program. One
advocate of compliance-based approaches, for instance, calls for EPA to
substitute counting the number of training sessions and complianceISS. Colin Diver points out that using the volume of citations as a measure of performance
will induce inspectors to concentrate, in their selection of targets to inspect, evidence to examine, and conditions to report, on readily identifiable violations at the cost of less obvious
violations. Since readily observable violations are more amenable to self-policing and very
frequently less serious in nature, this tendency will produce suboptimal performance.
Diver, supra note 16, at 296.
156. See ENFORCEMENT FOUR-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 12, at 6; Stahl, Enforcement
in Transition, supra note 3, at 19 (counting activities "reveals little, if anything about the actual state
of compliance or even the actual impact of enforcement actions, much less the state of the environment").
157. The project is known as EPA's National Performance Measures Strategy. See Environmental Protection Agency, Notice of Public Meeting on the National Performance Measures Strategy
for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, FRL-569 1-9, 62 Fed. Reg. 8014 (Feb. 21, 1997)
(announcing and describing the project). The EPA has issued a draft report summarizing its conclusions. See generally DRAFT REpORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES STRATEGY, supra
note 97.
158. "Outputs, by their nature, are inherently easier to measure, report, and understand than outcomes and environmental results." GAO, EFFORTS TO Focus ON RESULTS, supra note 8, at 33.
159. See David W. Ronald, The Role of the CEC in Balancing Free Trade with Environmental
Protection, 12 NAT'L ENV1L. ENFORCEMENT J. 3, 6 (1997) ("Measuring effective enforcement and
levels of environmental protection has bedeviled environmental regulators in the United States for
years ...."). Accord SPARROW, supra note 3, at 144 (suggesting it is much easier to evaluate employee performance when the measure of success is enforcement outputs rather than results).
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assistance inspections conducted for its traditional enforcement outputs. 160
The bottom line in both systems is achieving compliance and better environmental outcomes; beans are counted as a very imperfect proxy for those
results. If better measures are developed to evaluate performance, there
will be less focus on inflating beans and more emphasis on those activities
that clearly lead to greater compliance and improved environmental quality.
G. SUMMARY
As the above discussion illustrates, the critiques of traditional environmental enforcement advance a number of legitimate points. The criticisms do not, however, justify a radical altering of traditional enforcement,
nor do they demonstrate that a primarily or exclusively cooperativeoriented scheme is a superior way to improve compliance with our nation's
environmental laws.
IV. THE BENEFITS OF DETERRENCE-BASED ENFORCEMENT
While the rush to dismantle traditional environmental enforcement
may seem a welcome shift in some sectors, a heavy axe approach is shortsighted and detrimental to the country's long-term interest in effective environmental enforcement. A deterrence-based system contains many
positive attributes that are essential to an effective system of enforcement.
First, strong enforcement serves an important expressive function. Second, deterrence-based enforcement better guards against agency "capture"
by regulated entities and ensures more consistent treatment of regulated
facilities. Finally, and most fundamentally, a deterrence-based system
provides a strong and credible threat of vigorous enforcement that is
needed for widespread voluntary compliance. This includes a strong system of citizen enforcement to supplement goverument enforcement efforts.
A. THE EXPRESSIVE FuNCTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
Environmental regulation, like other areas of law, serves important
expressive functions. The underlying notion is that when the government
acts, it conveys ideas and attitudes in addition to the tangible consequences
160. See Diamond, supra note I, at 10,255. An audit of 10 states by the GAO recently found
that most compliance-assistance programs were assessed on the basis of outputs, such as the number
of facilities participating in a program or the number of workshops conducted, rather than on results.
See GAO, EFFORTS TO Focus ON RESULTS, supra note 8, at 6.
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resulting from its action. 161 As Professors Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi explain: "Actions of all sorts-public and private, collective and individual-express certain values as well as bring about certain consequences. Actions both 'do' something and 'mean' something; at the same
time that they bring about certain consequences, they also express some set
of values and normative attitudes."162
The meaning of the government's action can thus be as important as
what the government actually does. 163 Moreover, when the government
acts, it does not merely reflect what it interprets as the collective public
understanding about the values underlying certain areas of law; it also
"shapes and reconstitutes them."l64
Thus, when the government enforces the law, it gives voice to the
public's desire to regulate and sanction undesirable behavior. Criminal
law most forcefully expresses collective moral values by conveying condemnation and shame about unlawful activity .165 But civil sanctions also
give symbolic representation to moral values. These sanctions can be
punitive in character, they can convey moral outrage, and they can result in
significant negative publicity and its attendant negative consequences for
violators.
The current debate over the future of environmental enforcement,
with its emphasis on the efficiency and relative efficacy of various approaches, obscures the important expressive values served by deterrencebased enforcement. Deterrence-based enforcement, with its reliance on
sanctions and enforcement orders, conveys a set of meanings about environmental violations that is very different from that communicated by a
cooperative-oriented approach, with its emphasis on negotiation and conciliation. The message imparted by deterrence reaffirms for the public that
161. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Hanns. "Bizarre Districts," and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483,
506-07 (1993); Richard H. Pi1des, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936, 938 (1991) (explaining that in addition to direct con-

sequences, public policy has significant impacts on social understandings, nonns, and meanings).
162. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 161, at 511 (citation omitted).
163. See id. at 507.
164. Id. ("Governmental actions can express-and therefore perhaps sustain-a reaffinnation or
a rejection of these nonns"). Professor Cass Sunstein explains that
[a] society might identify the kind of valuation to which it is committed and insist on that
kind, even if the consequences of the insistence are obscure or unknown. A soeiety might,
for example, insist on an antidiscrimination law for expressive reasons even if it does not
know whether the law actually helps members of minority groups.
Cass R. Sunstein. Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779,823 (1994).
165. See Susan Hedman, Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental Law, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 889, 896 (1991); Cohen, supra note 18, at 1060.
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environmental statutes are important and that transgressions are to be taken
very seriously. This message is consistent with the public's expressed
strong disapproval of noncompliance with environmental requirements-a
desire evidenced by the harsh sweeping penalties for noncompliance and
the potent enforcement tools contained in all of the major environmental
statutes.

B. THE DANGERS OF AGENCY CAPTURE AND INCONSISTENT TREATMENT
1. Agency Capture
A fundamental tenet of a cooperative-based system is that regulators
work closely and in alliance with regulated facilities; they act more as educators and consultants than inspectors or punishers, seeking to solve problems jointly and bring facilities into compliance. While this approach can
be highly beneficial, it raises an important countervailing concern: Regulators who become so cozy and closely identified with regulated entities will
overlook important violations and bend over too far in the direction of lenient treatment. In short, the agency staff will be captured by those they
are ostensibly regulating. 166
The concern with agency capture is certainly not novel,167 and agencies have often sought to deal with it by limiting the discretion and flexibility of agency staff. 168 But eliminating agency flexibility has its own serious drawbacks, such as forcing regulators to sometimes punish trivial
violations or act unreasonably, and in tum provoking resentment on the
part of regulated entities. 169 Other approaches may hold more promise,
166. See Welles, supra note 9, at 33 (stating that the cooperative-based approach is vulnerable to
capture because it "reserves enforcement authority for certain circumstances about whose existence
reasonable people could (and may be forced to) disagree").
167. See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 90,
270-71 (1955). Welles describes the regulators' concern to maintain objectivity or the appearance of
objectivity as follows:
Regulators have generally felt it essential that they avoid the perception, or the reality, that
they are so closely affiliated with a facility or company that they have lost the ability to respond impartially and in a manner consistent with the treatment of other facilities. This unhealthy closeness can occur on the personal level of an inspector who is too identified with a
facility or on the institutional level, as when an agency appears to endorse the actions of a
facility.
Welles, supra note 9, at 12.
168. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 50, at 44-46 (citing concern with agency capture as the
primary motivation for legislation that limited discretion of regulatory enforcement officials).
169. See id. Professors Bardach and Kagan conclude that concerns of potential capture are outweighed by the importance of providing regulators with the additional flexibility necessary to avoid
regulatory unreasonableness. They offer a number of administrative management recommendations
for keeping regulatory discretion in check. See id.
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such as having separate inspectors carry out the more "cooperative"
(advice and consultation) functions of regulatory agencies as opposed to
the agencies' traditional inspection and enforcement activities. Some recently developed state compliance-assistance programs are structured this
way po Another thoughtful solution suggested by Professors Ayres and
Braithwaite is a republican form of tripartism in which relevant public interest groups become the third player in the game traditionally played between regulators and regulated entities only. These public interest groups
would have the power to sanction regulators who fail to punish noncompliance by firms, access to all information available to regulators, a seat at
the negotiating table with regulators and firms, and the same standing as
regulatory agencies to bring enforcement actions. l7l

2. Inconsistent Treatment
One of the most desired features of any enforcement system is consistency-similarly situated enterprises should be treated consistently. Such
consistency is essential to ensuring the credibility of an enforcement program and widespread voluntary compliance. 172 An oft-quoted and sagacious maxim of enforcement practice coined by Chester Bowles, a member
of the 1941 wartime Office of Price Administration, holds that "20 percent of the regulated population will automatically comply with any
regulation, 5 percent will attempt to evade it, and the remaining 75
percent will comply as long as they think that the 5 percent will be
caught and punished.,,173
In environmental law, consistent treatment is particularly crucial so
that regulated entities believe they are competing on a level playing field.
Thus,
[l]aws such as the [Clean Air Act] often require facilities to make large
investments in pollution-control equipment. These investments can be
large enough that they may materially affect decisions concerning the
construction of new facilities; the sale or purchase of businesses; the decision to continue or discontinue a line of business; the competitive position of a company within an industry; and so on.... If, however, only
some companies within an industry are permitted to evade such control
170. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
171. Professors Ayres and Braithwaite further propose that the right to participate as a public
interest guardian should be contestable among public interest organizations in a market created for this
purpose. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 34, at 54-60.
172. See DIMENTO, supra note 10 I, at 100-02.
173. BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 50, at 65-66 (quoting CHESTER BOWLES, PROMISES TO
KEEp: My YEARS IN PUBLIC LIFE 1941-1969,25 (1971)).
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requirements, ... the evaders can unfairly obtain an advantage over their
competitors, who will in response quickly resist making continued or
additional pollution control investments themselves. 174

As a recent study concludes, many firms have invested heavily in
meeting strict standards and want their competitors to be forced to do the
same. 175 They worry that inadequate enforcement can lead to a competitive disadvantage for firms that comply. 176
To be sure, under the current system there is substantial variability in
the way regulated entities are treated, since many inspectors take a pragmatic approach to enforcement, and since different EPA regional offices
and the states respond differently to similarly situated violators. 177 But in
a truly cooperative regime in which all compliance and enforcement issues
are open to negotiations, there is a much greater likelihood that firms will
be treated differently by individual inspectors. 178 Moreover, the perception of disparate treatment is likely to increase considerably without uniform policies governing enforcement, thus undermining the extent of voluntary compliance.
174. Van Cleve & Holman, supra note 13, at 10,157. See also ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEcrJON
AGENCY, OmCE OF INSPEcrOR GEN., FuRTHER IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
RCRA CIVIL PENALTIES 6 (1997) [hereinafter EPA, FuRTHER IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED] ("Managing
hazardous waste in accordance with regulations can be expensive. Therefore, facilities may have a
strong economic incentive to violate regulations. As a result, without effective enforcemcnt, facilities
in compliance may be vulnerable to competitors who avoid the high costs of compliance.").
175. See NATIONAL ACADEMY, supra note 49, at 25.
176. See Government Has Too Many Rules, Too Little Enforcement, Not Enough Prevention,
Environmental Managers Report in BNA Survey, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2386, 2387 (Feb. 14, 1992).
See also White, supra note 28, at 136-37 (noting that disparate treatment by regulatory agency bred
resistance by facilities against compliance).
177. See Letter from Joel A. Mintz, Professor, Nova Southeastern University, to author (Sept. 22,
1997) (on file with author).
178. See Downing, supra note 27, at 581-82, 584 (arguing that bargaining between regulatory
sources and agencies about pollution control requirements undennines enforcement and compliance).
Larger, more politically powerful sources are likely to obtain delays in compliance, lower levels of
control, and a greatly diminished likelihood of penalty for noncompliance. See id. See also MINTZ,
supra note 23, at 104 (suggesting that varying types of enforcement can lead to inconsistent treatment
by regulatory officials); Breger, supra note 3, at 336 ("The difference between two hypothetical settlement agreements may depend as much upon the attitude of the EPA negotiator or the persuasive
ability of industry officials as on the objective characteristics of each site. The danger, then, is that
flexibility could mean relaxed standards rather than adapting compliance to circumstances.") (citations
omitted).
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C. A STRONG, CREDIBLE THREAT OF ENFORCEMENT

Environmental enforcement, like other areas of regulatory enforcement, is highly "leveraged."179 Because regulators lack the resources to
systematically inspect and monitor every entity, their enforcement actions
must provide a big bang for their buck. The actions must send a credible
signal to other regulated entities that their noncompliance will also result
in meaningful and certain penalties, including recovery of any economic
gain realized from noncompliance. 180 Without this general deterrent effect, widespread voluntary compliance is unlikely. 181
The perception of enforcement consequences is as important as the
reality in achieving compliance. 182 Publicity about enforcement efforts
can lead to enhanced compliance by increasing an individual or corporation's subjective belief about the likelihood of being caught.l 83 As one
EPA official relates: "The annals of military history are filled with stories
of military battles won where few in number created an effective image of
a formidable fighting force, thereby successfully competing against snpe179.

See Hodas, supra note Ill, at 1609.
See EPA, FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED, supra note 174, at 10. The significant economic benefits a facility can reap from some violations may result in a facility paying a sizable penalty without paying back "the full economic benefit it gained from noncompliance." Id. The penalty
in such a case would be ineffective because the facility would have no incentive to comply since it
"would be better off economically by remaining out of compliance." Id. Thus, "[r]ecovering economic benefit is essential to deter facilities from violating regulations." Id.
181. See HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 60 (noting that EPA inspectors report that
"without the ..• deterrence [provided by EPA enforcement and the threat of citizen suits] many permittees would clearly violate the law"); Promoting Voluntary Compliance: Environmental Auditing,
Outreach, Incentive Programs, in FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 137, at 399, 400
(noting agreement of participants at an international environmental enforcement conference that "there
[will be no] such thing as voluntary compliance without regulation or requirements with which all
must comply"). See generally Diver, supra note 16, at 297 ("Enforcement is necessary not only to
control the aberrant lawbreaker, but also to defend the legitimacy of governmental intervention that
sustains voluntary compliance. This is particularly true of the typical business regulation, which cannot readily be identified with widely held moral values.").
182. See Michael, supra note 40, at 548; Wasserman, supra note 32, at 25-26.
183. In one experiment, regulators in the Netherlands wamed drivers through media announcements in advance that there would be speed traps on certain highways. The drivers were subsequently
much better about observing speed limits on the affected stretches of highways. See J.C.M. Veenman,
The Role of Communication for Implementing Enforcement Policy, in THIRD INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE, supra note 116, at 295. Other research shows that public education campaigns about
drunk driving decrease the rate of drunk driving (albeit temporarily) even though they have little or no
infiuence on the likelihood that a person will be punished. Researchers suggest this occurs because
the publicity campaigns lead citizens to overestimate the probability of being caught and punished.
See TYLER, supra note 17, at 22-23.
180.
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rior forces. So must enforcement actions, including inspections, be well
placed and well publicized for maximum impact.,,184
A fundamental problem with relying primarily on cooperative enforcement is that it threatens to significantly weaken the general deterrent
effect of individual enforcement actions. Punitive enforcement may remain as a backstop for noncompliance, but it is likely to be used far less
frequently, which regnlated entities will understand. The public message
will be that noncompliance is far more likely to be met with conciliation
than sanctions, at least for most first-time violations. Experience has demonstrated that efforts to promote compliance are often ineffective alone. 18S
Moreover, having the opportunity to remedy noncompliance without the
threat of penalty greatly reduces the incentive to comply. As one analyst
explains:
[I]t is now generally recognized that if the polluter expects no consequence from noncompliance (except having to meet with government
officials to agree to do what was required in the first place), he has little
incentive to undertake any costs of compliance before getting caught.
This has proven to be true even when it is broadly understood that cleanup costs will increase substantially if violations are not corrected early
and where actual cost savings from compliance activities has been realized. 186
Likewise, the General Accounting Office has concluded that penalties
playa key role in environmental enforcement by deterring violators and
by ensuring that regulated entities are treated fairly and consistently so
184. Cheryl E. Wassennan, An Overview of Compliance and Enforcement in the United States:
Philosophy, Strategies and Management Tools, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, FIRST INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 7, 10 (1990).
185. See Cheryl E. Wassennan, The Principles of Environmental Enforcement and Beyond:
Building Institutional Capacity, in THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 116, at 15, 29;
Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi, Effectiveness of the EPA's Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of
Industrial Effluent Standards, 33 J.L. & ECON. 331, 343 n.20 (1990) (observiug that in a wellfunctioning regulatory system, it is not necessary for an agency to issue fines frequently, but rather
only for firms to believe they will be sanctioned if they fail to comply).
186. Wassennan, supra note 32, at 4041. See also RUSSEll.., ET AL., supra note 25, at 38-39
(concluding that "it is not clear that voluntary compliance provides any compliance incentives until
after a violation has bcen discovered because a plant knows that it will have a chance to return to
compliance before sanctions are imposed," and noting that this is consistent with fragmentary evidence that rates of continuing compliance with environmeutal requirements are only fair). The Supreme Court recognized the nced for sanctions to ensure compliance when it interpreted the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act in National Independent Coal Operators' Ass'n v. KleplJe, 423 U.S.
388 (1975). The Supreme Court noted that "the deterrence provided by monetary sanctions is essential" to acbieving the statutory objectives: "If a mine operator does not ... face a monetary penalty for
violations, he has little iucentive to eliminate dangers until directed to do so by a mine inspector."
National Indep. Coal Operators' Ass'n, 423 U.S. at 401.
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that no one gains a competitive advantage.... [T]he Clean Water Act
and other environmental statutes have been violated repeatedly when
penalties have not been applied. 187

On the other hand, enforcement without the threat of meaningful
sanctions often directly translates into noncompliance. Absent a targeted
enforcement effort against municipal dischargers in the 1980s, for instance, the great majority of municipal facilities violated the Clean Water
Act. 188 A study of enforcement of underground fuel tank laws in northern
California found that the conciliatory style of the local agency failed to
bring most regulated facilities into compliance. 189 In Virginia, the legislative auditor recently concluded that lackadaisical enforcement by state
regulators resulted in serious noncompliers thumbing their noses at regulatory requirements. 190 In one highly publicized instance where Virginia officials failed to assess sanctions against a recurrent violator, the U.S. Justice Department eventually filed criminal and civil actions against a
company that committed more than 5,000 violations of its discharge
permit from 1991 to 1996. These violations contributed to the closure of
shellfish harvesting in the Pagan River in Virginia. 191 Most recently, envi187. GAO. WATERPOLLunON: ENFORCEMENT ATIENTION. supra note 108. at 12-13. See also
DIMENTO. supra note 101. at 110-121 (arguing that enforcement activity perceived as equitable. imminent, continuous. consistent, and carried out in a professional manner is likely to result in greater
compliance by regulated entities).
188. See GAO. WATER POLLunON: IMPROVED MONITORING. supra note 107. at 4 (describing
high levels of noncompliance by industrial users with discharge limits to sewage treatment plants and
concluding that "GAO's review suggests that the absence of aggressive enforcement by treatment
plants against violators may be an important underlying cause for discharge limit violations"). Anecdotal evidence also suggests that during the mid- and late 1990s. in the absence of meaningful enforcement efforts. there has been widespread noncompliance with the Clean Water Act's industrial
stonn water discharge requirements. at least in California. See Telephone Interview with Laurie
Kermish. Assistant Regional Counsel. Region IX. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Dec. 18.
1997).
189. See White. supra note 28. at 112-13.117. Of the more than 1.000 instances of unauthorized
releases from underground fuel tank (lIFT) sites between 1985 and 1990 in Alameda County, California, the agency failed to take enforcement action at 834 sites. See id. at 113. Of these 834 sites,
726 had not taken any voluntary steps to remediate the release four to nine years after its occurrence.
See id. The agency determined that the spill had affected or threatened groundwater in 512 of the unremediated releases. See id. at 112-13. The author of this study explained that because of the lack of
enforcement,
a rational UFf owner or operator will make only token efforts to comply. They have no incentive to pursue costly remediation knowing that the most a [local] regulator will do is issue a fonnalletter requesting a preferred course of action ... with no follow-up or subs tantiallikelihood of further enforcement action.

/d. at 145.
190. See Nakashima, supra note 10, at AI.
191. See Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2, at
67-68 (prepared statement of Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural
Resources Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice). Another high-profile instance in which weak sanctions
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ronmental groups have assembled considerable anecdotal evidence suggesting that weak enforcement and a shift to compliance-assistance activities by state agencies have contributed to significant rates of industry noncompliance. 192
Strong enforcement strengthens the internal regulatory systems of
many companies, and it provides credibility and resources to internal company compliance officers. 193 Thus, the EPA has concluded that its enforcement efforts contributed to the recent dramatic expansion in environmental aUditing. More than ninety percent of corporate respondents in one
survey, for example, reported that they conducted audits at least in part to
find and correct violations before agency inspectors discovered them. 194
Another recent EPA study found that environmental enforcement actions
were among the most important factors in getting businesses to consider
environmental issues in the performance of their duties. 195 State officials
reported similar findings. 196
failed to deter a company involves Fancy Cut! Farms, Inc., a lettuce company in Hollister, California,
whose contaminated produce may have caused more than 60 cases of serious food poisoning in 1996.
State health officials failed to fine or shut down the company, despite repeated inspections showing
violations of state food safety laws, based on its policy of trying to work cooperatively with industry.
As a result, the company failed to correct the violations, and the company's president cited the state's
low-key approach as a reason for its slow response. See Pam Belluck & Christopher Drew, Tracillg
Bout of Illness to Small Lettuce Farm, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1998, at AI.
192. See Hearillgs all the Relatiollship Betweell Federal alld State Governmellts, sllpra note 2, at
219-24 (prepared statement of Todd E. Robins). Robins cites a host of states in which the number of
inspections conducted, enforcement actions taken, and penalties collected by environmental departments have declined noticeably in the mid-1990s. See id. at 220-23. At the same time, approximately
20% of Clean Water Act permit holders were in significant noncompliance in 1995 and 1996. See
DIRTY WATER SCOUNDRELS, supra note III.
193. See REEs, sllpra note 63, at 225-27. See also Jeff Johnson, Ellforcemellt Cuts Hit by Corpo·
rate Attorney, 30 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. NEWS, 1996, at 109A (quoting a corporate environmental at·
torney who asserted that cutbacks in EPA enforcement will undermine corporate willingness to com·
ply with environmental laws by diminishing the authority of a company's environmental health and
safety officer). Some believe that, without the threat of a strong federal hand in enforcement, the in·
ternal company compliance official's role would return to a lowly part of the corporate hierarchy and
be staffed by a person "close to retirement, with no real power base in the organization, and no staffjust window dressing." Id.
194. See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, FRL-5400-1, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,707 (1995) [hereinafter Incentives for Self.Policing]
(quoting 1995 Price-Waterhouse survey).
195. See Manik Roy & Ohad Jehassi, Envtl. Protection Agency, Study of Industry Motivation for
Pollution Prevention (April 23, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, draft on file with author).
196. See David A. Ronald, The Case Agaillst all Erzvirollmelltal Audit Privilege, NAT'L ENVTL.
ENFORCEMENT J., Sept. 1994, at 3, 4. According to James Morgester, Chief of the Compliance Division of the California Air Resources Board, the number of companies conducting environmental
audits has increased in direct proportion to the level of civil and criminal enforcement. See id.
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Moreover, moving toward a primarily cooperative approach overlooks evidence that the level of traditional enforcement activity tends to
increase the rate of industry compliance. 197 In their study of Clean Water
Act enforcement in the pulp and paper industry, for example, Professors
Wesley Magat and Kip Viscusi found permanent improvements in discharge levels as a consequence of regulatory inspections and associated
enforcement activities. These activities substantially reduced discharges
of Biological Oxygen Demand chemicals after about three months and
helped permanently reduce an individual firm's future pollution levels.
They also had a major impact on compliance rates; firms not subject to inspections and enforcement activities were twice as likely to be in noncompliance as those subject to the activity .198 Professor Evan Ringquist in
his detailed study of state and federal environmental programs likewise
concluded that the strength of enforcement programs made a significant
difference in reducing pollutant emissions. He specifically found that federal enforcement efforts, which generally tend to be more aggressive than
state efforts, and state enforcement efforts that were "consistent, focused
and well-supported" resulted in greater reductions than weaker and inconsistent state programs. 199 An examination of OSHA enforcement demonstrated that between 1979 and 1985, inspections imposing penalties resulted in a twenty-two percent decline in injuries in the inspected plants
197. The evidence is not unambiguous, however. Professors Hunter and Watennan eoncluded
that higher levels of Clean Water Act enforcement activity did not translate into improved waterquality outcomes, as measured by the percentage change in average pollutant concentrations of phosphorous, dissolved oxygen, and dissolved solids between 1973 to 1975 and 1986 to 1988. See
HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 199-205. Moreover, there is relatively little experience with
environmental inspections and enforcement activity conducted in a nondeterrence-based system. For
example, a recently completed pilot project in Washington found that, one year after state inspectors
made compliance-oriented visits to auto repair shops, the great majority of the facilities had complied
with at least some (and in many instances most) of the inspectors' recommendations. See Environmental Protection Agency, Briefing Materials for Public Meeting, Workshop on National Perfonnance
Measures Strategy for EPA's Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Program (Mar. 17, 1997)
<http://es.epa.gov/oecalperfmeaslmarchI7/meeting.htrnl> [hereinafter Workshop on National Perfonnance Measures Strategy] (on file with author) (testimony of Brian Dick, Wash. State Department
of Ecology). The range of compliance issues identified by state inspectors was broad, however, and
the agency did not attempt to analyze compliance with significant as opposed to minor recommendations. See Electronic Mail Communication with Darin Rice, Wash. State Dep't of Ecology (Apr. 2,
1997).
198. See Magat & Viscusi, supra note 185, at 353-54.
199. See EVAN J. RINGQUIST, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AT THE STATE LEVEL: POLITICS
AND PROGRESS IN CONTROLLING POLLUfION 135-50 (1993). See also DIMENTO, supra note 101, at
136-37 (citing s study showing a direct link between the level of enforcement resources and the level
of local compliance with the Clean Air Act).
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during the following few years.200 Other studies have found that pollutant
emissions have declined as the probability of detection and the size of
[mes levied for a violation increase.201 A California study found that
stepped-up enforcement by the State Department of Toxic Substances
Control successfully fostered compliance with hazardous waste requirements. The study found that over a five-year period the average number of
violations per facility inspection dropped two-thirds, from 3.3. to 1.1, and
that the percentage of facility inspections finding mUltiple violations
dropped from sixty-three percent to thirty-three percent.202 Most recently,
the Indiana Department of Environmental Management found that in sixtyfive percent to seventy percent of cases in which enforcement actions were
taken against facilities, follow-up inspections showed the facilities complied with environmental requirements. 203
Thus, shifting too far toward cooperative enforcement threatens to
seriously undermine the threat of enforcement that is essential for widespread voluntary compliance.
D. A SmONG SYSTEM OF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT

Currently, citizen enforcement is a feature in all the major federal
environmental statutes.204 As a general matter, these statutes allow citizens to sue companies for violations when the government fails to do so
and various, often strict, procedural conditions are met.205 Traditionally,
Congress has viewed citizen enforcement as an important supplement to
200. See Wayne B. Gray & John T. Scholz, Does Regulatory Enforcement Work? A Panel
Analysis of OSHA Enforcement, 27 LAW & SOC'y REV. 177, 199 (1993). The authors posit that
"[ilnspections that impose a penalty appear to focus managerial attention on safety issues in a way that
leads to broader efforts to reduce hazards." Id. See also Kovach, et al., supra note 116, at 179 (noting
a high correlation between worksites where the majority of serious accidents occurred and worksites
that were not inspected by OSHA).
201. See RUSSELL, ET AL., supra note 25, at 95 (citing studies). Cf, id. at 98 (noting studies thnt
show monitoring and enforcement efforts led to more accurate reporting of discharges by firms when
an emission tax policy was in place).
202. See Evaluation of Changes and Patterns in RCRA Violation Rates for Treatment, Storage
and Disposal Facilities in California, Report prepared for U.S. EPA, Contract No. 68-W9-0009, Dec.
7,1993 (on file with author).
203. See Workshop on National Performance Measures Strategy, supra note 197 (testimony of
Michael O'Connor, Commissioner, Indiana Department of Environmental Manngement).
204. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1995) (citizcn suit provision); Clean
Air Act § 304,42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1995).
205. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
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agency enforcement and an important prod to agency regulators.206 Congress therefore has repeatedly sought to strengthen it. In the

1990

Clean

Air Act Amendments, for example, Congress expanded citizen suits by
authorizing private actions for repeated past violations.207
Citizen enforcement has played an extremely valuable role in
achieving compliance with environmental law, including spurring EPA
and state agency enforcement efforts.208 Citizen enforcement has been especially instrumental in helping to bring government facilities into compliance.209
sector.

It

also has played a siguificant enforcement role in the private

Citizen groups are not dissuaded from enforcement by political

pressure, nor are they subject to capture like regulatory staff.210

Citizen

action thus provides an important deterrent to noncompliance when government agencies fail to act either because of lack of resources or political
will. As Professor David Hodas has convincingly demonstrated, government agencies by themselves cannot ensure widespread compliance: Many
states have weakened enforcement efforts to attract economic growth, and
206. See Wendy Naysnerski & Tom Tietenberg, Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental
LaIV, 68 LAND EcON. 28, 30-31 (1992) ("A pervasive recognition that the government had neither the
time nor resources to provide sufficient enforcement led Congress to authorize citizen suits.").
207. This was in direct response to the Supreme Court's decision in GlValtney of Smithfield Ltd.
v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 (1987), holding that citizens could only sue for ongoing
violations under the Clean Water Act.
208. See William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional Prescription for
Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 202, 206-07 (1987);
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ALAN S. MILLER, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER & JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, SCIENCE & POLICY 1078 (2d ed. 1996) (quoting Environmental
Law Institute study of citizen enforcement); Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 206, at 35, 4 I.
209. See Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 206, at 42, 46. Unlike citizens who are willing to
pursue violations by government entities, enforcement agencies have been historically reluctant to do
so:
The track record for public enforcement actions against public facilities has been rather
poor, not because of any statutory or constitutional barriers to enforcement, but rather because of a lack of will. Private enforcers have no such lack of will to pursue public polIuters
and therefore would presumably be able to produce compliance faster.
[d.
210. See generally AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 34 (arguing for citizen enforcement to
prevent agency capture); PERCIVALET AL., supra note 208, at 932 (noting that EPA officials acknowledge that they virtually never obtain economic benefits when they file enforcement actions against
municipal sewage treatment facilities). For an interesting recent illustration of how citizen enforcement can guard against sweetheart deals with regulators, see Citizens for a Better Environment v. Union Oil Co., 83 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied 117 S. Ct. 789 (1997). In that case, the local
regulatory agency, succumbing to political pressure, granted a lengthy extension on stricter discharge
limits to several refineries. It did so by resolving an enforcement action through a settlement agreement that did not impose any penalties on the refineries. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the agency settlement did not preclude a citizen suit to enforce the stricter permit limits.
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the federal government lacks the resources and political will to fill the gap
left by this lax state enforcement,211

A

system of enforcement that relies primarily on cooperative methods

would have difficulty co-existing with vigorous citizen enforcement,
which has always been unpopular with businesses for obvious reasons.
Under existing law, citizen enforcement is largely unsupervised by the
government. Private enforcers do not need agency approval before initiating actions, and agencies generally are quite reluctant to file enforcement
actions merely to contain or preempt citizen enforcement,212 Some statutes require private settlements to be reviewed by the Department of Justice before they are judicially approved, but the scope of this review is
rather limited. 213 Thus, citizens largely are able to set their own enforcement priorities.
Citizen enforcers do not adhere to the cooperative school. They generally believe that noncompliance with environmental laws is significant,
and that the central failings

in

current enforcement are too many un sanc-

tioned violators and lenient treatment of violators. 214

They believe that

more stringent enforcement is necessary to increase compliance, and they
are likely to continue aggressively to seek sanctions in enforcement actions.
211. See Hodas, supra note Ill, at 1572-75, 1585-89, 1615-17; Engel, supra note 135, at 351-54
(concluding, based on empiricnl study, that states engage in a "race to the bottom" in environmentni
regulation to attract business); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT:
PENALTIES MAY NOT RECOVER EcONOMIC BENEFITS GAINED BY VIOLATORS, GAOIRCED-91-166, 89 (1991) (reporting that state and local enforcement offices are susceptible to pressures that make
them reluctant to adhere to strong penalty policy); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, AUDIT OF REGION 9's ADMINISTRATION OF TIlE CALIFORNIA AIR COMPLIANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, EIGA06-06-0023-7100246, 9 (1997) [hereinafter EPA, AUDIT OF REGION
9] (observing that locni air districts reported their boards did not support aggressive enforcement actions in some cases because of potential economic impacts if major industries relocate).
212. Under most citizen enforcement schemes, the government can preclude a private action by
filing a suit within 60 days after receiving a notice of intent to sue by the private party. See, e.g.,
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1994).
213. See, e.g., id. § 1319(g)(6)(b); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c)(3) (1994).
214. See Hodas, supra note II 1, at 1613-14 (arguing that only significant penalties have a
meaningful deterrent effect and motivate voluntary compliance). "[B]oth Congress and EPA have
long declared civil penalties to be central to the [Clean Water Act's] enforcement scheme because
without adequate and consistently imposed civil penni ties, particularly in judicial aetions, polluters
will have little motivation to comply voluntarily with the law." [d. at 1644-45. See also Hearings on
the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2 at 219 (prepared statement of
Todd E. Robins) ("Without environmental cops aggressively on the beat, without a credible, predictable deterrent to illegal pollution, polluters have little incentive to clean up their acts and plenty of
incentive to disregard the law.").
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The schism between advocates of cooperative enforcement and citizen enforcers was highlighted at a recent Congressional hearing on the
federal-state relationship in environmental enforcement. On the one hand,
state government representatives chastised the EPA for stifling state innovative reform efforts to move away from traditional enforcement, and for
the EPA's continued emphasis on "enforcement-specific activities, focusing on enforcement for enforcement's sake.,,215 By contrast, environmentalists argued that the new enforcement approach of the states was resulting in "gross and unacceptable levels of non-compliance" with
environmental law:
A significant number of States around the country have explicitly reduced, or even dismantled, their already weak, under-funded environmental enforcement programs under the philosophy that voluntary,
hand-holding compliance assistance efforts will achieve compliance
more efficiently. State and EPA data, as well as anecdotal evidence
from around the country indicates that the opposite is true ....216
They called on Congress to beef up traditional enforcement:
[The approach] to Clean Water Act enforcement that we have seen in
New Jersey since 199O-characterized by mandatory minimum penalties
for serious violations, stronger citizen suit provisions, better monitoring
and reporting, and adequate resources-should serve as a national model
for enforcement of the Clean Water Act and other Federal environmental
statutes.217
Even if private enforcers were more philosophically sympathetic to
cooperative enforcement, it would be very hard for them to implement.
Under the cooperative scheme, inspectors act mainly as consultants and
educators, dispensing advice and assistance about how to achieve compliance. The system works best when regulated entities have ongoing, predictable relations with regulators. 218 Citizen enforcers, however, do not
215. Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2, at 202
(prepared statement of Christopher A.G. Tulou, Secretary, Delaware Department of Natuml Resources
and Environmental Control). See also id. at 198 (prepared statement of Patricia S. Bangert).
216. ld. at 220 (prepared statement of Todd E. Robins) (citation omitted). For a similar argument, see Sanford Lewis, Feel-Good Notions, Corporate Power and the "Reinvention" of Environmental Law (Good Neighbor Project for Sustainable Industries, Working Paper, March 17, 1997)
<http://www.envirolink.orglorgs/gnp/fgnful.htm> [hereinafter Feel-Good Notions] ("Diminishing the
threat of detection and punishment makes it less likely that individuals and corporations will do the
right thing. The environmental audit laws are based on a faulty, feel-good assumption about the reach
of people's and corporations' good intentions.").
217. Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2, at 218
(prepared statement of Todd E. Robins).
218. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 91, at 114-15.
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have the resources, expertise, or access to company information to be consultants. Citizen enforcers also do not enjoy continuing relationships with
regulated fIrms in many instances. Additionally, few companies would
likely heed the advice of citizen groups even if they attempted to undertake
this role.
A radical shift away from deterrence-based enforcement is thus likely
to greatly weaken citizen enforcement, which has played an important role
in promoting compliance with environmental requirements.

V. HOW TO REFORM ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
As discussed in Part III, the evidence is mixed about the best way to
achieve compliance with environmental laws; it does not decidedly show
the superiority of either deterrence or cooperative-oriented enforcement.
Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses, and elements of both
systems are desirable. A system that is purely or primarily deterrencebased can be improved by integrating features of the cooperative model,
such as more emphasis on agency advice and consultation, and greater reliance on voluntary self-policing. A system that is purely or primarily cooperative-based, however, will lose some of the expressive character of enforcement, suffer serious risks of substantial noncompliance, agency
capture and inconsistent treatment, and negate citizen enforcement. The
best approach, therefore, is one that is grounded in deterrence theory but
integrates certain constructive features of a cooperative model. This section discusses ways in which current enforcement practice may be improved, and evaluates many of the key enforcement reforms urged by critics.
A. AGENCIES SHOULD PROVIDE MORE CONSULTATION AND
COOPERATIVE ASSISTANCE

Enforcement agencies have always considered compliance promotion
and education necessary to enforcement programs. Until recently, these
efforts have often been overlooked and underfunded. 219 One positive elemeut in current reforms has been a push to expand cooperative assistance
efforts signifIcantly, particularly those directed at small businesses.22o
219. See MINTZ, supra note 23, at 106.
220. In other regulatory areas, some Congressional proposals have sought to phase out direct
agency enforcement activities and replace them with compliance-assistance programs. For example,
one bilI introduced in 1995 would have required OSHA to spend at least 50% of its budget on consulting and other employer assistance programs. See H.R. 1834, 104th Congo § 4(f) (1995). Another
measure would have required OSHA to institute a program of cooperative agreements under which
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Congress mandated in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments that
states establish compliance-assistance programs for small businesses.221
Likewise, in the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
(SBREFA), Congress required all agencies to publish easy-to-understand
"small entity compliance guides" for all federal rules.222 On its own, the
EPA has made a major effort to elevate the importance of its complianceassistance efforts, as reflected in the reorganization of its enforcement program into a new Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance.223
The agency recently developed national Compliance Assistance Centers in
several industrial sectors to provide "plain English" guides about compliance requirements, technical assistance, and pollution prevention training
to regulated entities.224 As an incentive for industries to use these centers,
the EPA offers businesses with up to six months to correct violations identified through these programs.22S EPA regional offices have also been experimenting with enhanced assistance programs.226 The EPA also has inregulated employers could consult with agencies about voluntary self-regulatory efforts. See H.R.
1433, 104th Congo § 2 (1995).
221. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661(f) (1997). Programs must include adequate mechanisms for informing small businesses of their obligations under the act, including providing referrals to qualified auditors or providing state-sponsored audits of sources. See id.
222. See Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121,
§ 212, 110 Stat. 857, 858 (1996). Agencies are also required, whenever appropriate, to answer inquiries by small businesses about how to comply with regulatory requirements. Guidance provided by the
agencies may be considered as evidence in assessing the reasonableness of penalties sought against
the firms in subsequent enforcement actions. See id. § 213.
223. See Stahl, Enforcement in Transition, supra note 3, at 21.
224. See id. at 22. Such centers have been developed for the metal finishing, agricultural, automobile services and repair, and printing industries. The EPA is working on centers to assist municipalities, the transportation industry, small chemical manufacturers, and manufacturers of printed wiring boards. See Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2,
at 157-58 (prepared statement of Steven Herman, Assistant Administrator, Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency); Steven A. Herman, New OECA Incentives Policy, Metal Finishing National Assistance Center Will Enhance Compliance by Small
Business, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Aug. 1995, at 9. The EPA has also published 18 "sector
notebooks," described as comprehensive environmental and technical profiles of industries designed
to help the EPA develop compliance-assistance strategies and to help industries improve their compliance. See Steven Herman, EPA's FY 1997 Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Priorities (1997)
<:bttp:/Ies.epa.govloeca/naag97.html>.
225. See Bill Clinton & Al Gore, "Reinventing Environmental Regulation": Clinton Administratioll Regulatory Reform Initiatives (March 16, 1995) <:bttp:/Iwww.epa.gov/ooaujeaglnotebookl
clinton.hlm>.
226. For example, in Region l's CLEAN initiative (Compliance Leadership through Environmental Audits and Negotiation), the EPA, state agencies, universities, and a trade association provide
free audits to small and medium-sized firms in exchange for a commitment to achieve compliance and
implement at least one pollution prevention project. Violations uncovered during the audit receive
penalty reductions or waivers. See Hawkins, supra note 5, at 44-45. The EPA's Region 6 has established compliance-assistance programs for chlorofiuorocarbons, dry cleaners and foundries. The programs provide training and certification to the small business community to make them aware of
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fonned front-line inspectors that it is proper for them to provide compliance assistance as part of their traditional enforcement activities. 227 Many
states have pursued similar programs that provide businesses with detailed
technical assistance and compliance advice, usually in exchange for an
agreement not to seek penalties or take enforcement action if detected
violations are promptly corrected.228 Other states have sought to integrate
compliance-assistance programs directly into their enforcement activities.229
regulations. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 6's
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM, EIGAF5-06-0056-6100309, at 21 (1996)
[hereinafter REGION 6 PROGRAM] (reporting findings of an audit of Region 6's (and Texas and Louisiana's) enforcement programs).
227. See Enforcement: Pollution Prevention Guidance Deemed Appropriate Action for Agel/cy
Inspectors, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 726,726 (Aug. 15, 1997).
228. The Illinois' Clean Break project, geared toward small businesses with an emphasis on
firms reluctant to participate, is one such example. Small businesses seeking help with regulatory requirements can contact initially the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) directly or can
call the State Department of Commerce and Community Affairs, which will provide an anonymous
contact with the 11Iinois EPA. The 11Iinois Office of Small Business then schedules an in-person
meeting or a telephone meeting (with the option for business anonymity) at which regulatory staff will
provide the company with preliminary options for compliance and pollution prevention. The firm can
then drop out of the program and remain anonymous or schedule a site visit so that agency staff can
develop more detailed advice. Participating firms enter a compliance/amnesty agreement under which
the business agrees to achieve compliance and the state agrees to forego enforcement action if compliance is accomplished within the agreed-upon timeframe. The program excludes a range of serious and
criminal violations. See ILLINOIS ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND
COMMUNITY AFFAIRS & ROCKFORD AREA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SMALL BUSINESS GUIDE FOR
GETIING A CLEAN BREAK (1995) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter SMALL BUSINI!SS GUIDE].
The California Department of Toxic Substances Control (for all regulated hazardous waste facilities)
and the Ohio Environmenlal Protection Agency (for all dry cleaners) run similar, if somewhat less
elaborate, compliance-assistance programs. See CALIFORNIA ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ON-SITE
CONSULTATION AT YOUR BUSINESS (on file with author); Ohio Envtl. Proteclion Ageney, Dry Cleal/er
Initiative, in ECOS-OLD INNOVATIONS (The Envtl. Council of the States, June 16, 1997)
<http://www.sso.orglecosloldinno.htm> (describing Ohio's multimedia initiative targeting dry cleaners). Texas has an amnesty program in which the state provides assistance to particular industrial
sectors for one-year periods. See REGION 6 PROGRAM, supra note 226, at 15. Like many other states,
Texas and Louisiana also provide compliance assistance to small businesses through methods such as
industry workshops, distribution of literature, special hotlines, aid with permit applications and regulatory questionnaires, and determinations of whether regulations are applicable to a particular firm. See
id. at 15-16. See generally GAO, EFFORTS TO Focus ON RESULTS, supra note 8, at 21-24, 66-67
(indicating that most of the 10 states surveyed by GAO had adopted compliance-assistance programs
that included seminars, technical assistance visits, and "plain-English" guides explaining regulatory
requirements-all generally targeting smaller businesses and specific industries).
229. In Massachusetts, for instance, the Department of Environmental Protection conducts multimedia facility inspections and provides firms with guidance about how to achieve basic compliance
and meet the state's toxics use reduction law. See Stahl, Enforcement in Transition, supra note 3, at
23. Indiana's Department of Environmental Management has recently created a multimedia compliance division that brings together pollution prevention, technical assistance, compliance, and enforcement staff. See Indiana Dep't of Envtl. Management, Integrated Complial/ce Division, in ECOSOLD INNOVATIONS (The Envtl. Council of the States, July 28, 1997) <http://www.sso.org
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These stepped-up assistance efforts should increase compliance. The
programs should be directed first at small businesses, many of which may
lack the expertise and resources needed to fully comprehend environmental regulation. Assistance directed at small businesses presents the
greatest opportunity for significant improvements in compliance.23o
Agencies should also have separate inspectors carrying out these expanded
"advice and consultation" functions, or at least not assign inspectors to
carry out these traditional activities at the same facilities where they have
provided special technical assistance. This separation will help minimize
the risk and appearance of preferential treatment by agency staff who have
devoted considerable time and energy consulting with a firm. It also will
promote business confidence that the compliance-assistance program will
not be used to gather evidence for later enforcement actions, and thus
should prompt greater openness by participating firms.231 Agency employment of aggressive outreach efforts in connection with the technical
assistance programs also would be desirable. In Illinois, for example,
regulators carried out a promotional campaign, organized workshops with
trade associations, and contacted facilities several times to enlist their participation.232 These outreach efforts hopefully will allow agencies to reach
lecosloldinno.htrn> (describing Indiana's "reengineering effort" to create a new multimedia compliance division).
230. The lllinois Small Business Environmental Task Force noted that
there are a substantial number of small businesses that are currently operating in noncompliance with one or more regulatory requirements. Some of the businesses have some knowledge of environmental requirements but are unsure if the requirements are applicable to
them and are afraid to find out. Some are unaware of environmental requirements in general. Some know they are operating in violation, but are afraid if they attempt to come into
compliance they will subject themselves to large monetary penalties and thereby jeopardize
their business. It is believed that the [lliinois EPA] is unaware of the identity of many of
these businesses.
GOVERNOR'S SMALL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENTAL TASKFORCE, supra note 87, at 12.
231. The compliance-assistance programs in lllinois, Arizona, and Texas, for example, accomplish this separation of function. Under lllinois' Clean Break Program, regular agency inspectors
provide technical assistance but do not have the routine inspection responsibility for the facilities
which they assist See Welks, supra note 9, at 28 n.30. Moreover, there is an express understanding
in the agency that the routine inspectors will not try to discover nor make use of the information obtained through the Clean Break Program. See id. at 30. In Arizona, state employees who conduct
hazardous waste and other types of facility assessments are employed by a special Office of Customer
Service that is completely segregated from the traditional enforcement and inspection staff. See id. at
36. Arizona's drinking water program employs independent representatives entirely outside the
agency to provide technical assistance-an idea dubbed the "circuit rider" program. See id. at 39. In
Texas, the staff of the Small Business Assistance Program is separate from enforcement personnel.
See REGION 6 PROGRAM, supra note 226, at 15.
232. See SMALL BUSINESS GUIDE, supra note 228; Welks, supra note 9, at 31.
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some firms that have the most difficulty keeping abreast of current requirements. 233
Unfortunately, many states have swung too far in providing assistance
and consultation without utilizing traditional enforcement tools. As a result, enforcement is seriously undermined. Indeed, recent experiences in a
number of states suggest that, under the guise of working more cooperatively with industry and providing greater compliance assistance, state
agencies have simply weakened enforcement. For example, the EPA recently found that while Texas and Louisiana had effective compliance assistance programs, their traditional enforcement efforts had important
weaknesses. 234 A report by auditors in Virginia indicated that environmental officials were giving no more than a slap on the wrist to persistent
and serious violators, and had cut back substantially on air and water inspections.235 In Pennsylvania, an audit by the EPA's Inspector General
found that the state had seriously underreported the number of significant
violators of the Clean Air Act and failed to take appropriate enforcement
action to bring violators into compliance, thereby "allowing facilities that
were serious contributors of air pollution to continue harming the environment-sometimes for many years."236 EPA auditors reached similar
conclusions about New York's enforcement of environmentallaws.237 The
EPA, fearing that these results represent only the tip of the iceberg, has
commenced a nationwide examination of the states' performance.238 Its
233. While it is appropriate for compliance-assistance programs to offer participating firms incentives, such as reduced inspections and reduced penalties, it is unwise to remove all agency discretion to impose penalties on such finns when violations are detected and corrected as a result of agcncy
assistance. See infra Part V.B.
234. See REGION 6 PROGRAM, supra note 226. The EPA reported that both states failed to compute economic benefit when assessing fines, that Texas failed to complete enforcement actions in a
timely manner, that Louisiana did not adequately publicize its actions, and that both states underreported or inaccurately characterized violations. See id. The EPA recently reached comparable conclusions about air quality enforcement in California, which it noted has an excellent complianceassistance program. See EPA, AUDIT OF REGION 9, supra note 211.
235. See Cushman, Virginia Seen, supra note 10, at 22; Nakashima, supra note 10, at AI.
236. EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., VALIDATION OF AIR ENFORCEMENT DATA REPORTED TO
EPA BY PENNSYLVANIA (1997) <hUp:/Iwww.epa.gov/oigearthlpennchp2.htm>. The audit also concluded that Pennsylvania's inspections sometimes were not thorough enough to determine whethcr
facilities were in compliance, and that the state did not always ensure that facilities took action to correct detected violations. See id. Pennsylvania has vigorously disputcd the suggestion that it is undermining enforcement of the Clean Air Act and attributes the Inspector General's conclusions to differing approaches over how to bring violators back into compliance. See id.
237. See Metzgar, supra note 129, at B2 (reporting EPA findings that the New York Department
of Environmental Conservation failed to take timely and appropriate enforcement action against significant violators in 12% of cases studied over a two-year period and that an earlier EPA report notcd
a significant decrease in the number of air inspections by the state agency).
238. See Cushman, States Neglecting, supra note 31, at AI.

1998]

ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT

1239

findings to date document serious problems in the states enforcing environmentallaws.239
B. POLICIES AUTOMATICALLY PRECLUDING SANCTIONS AND
ELIMINATING ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
ARE UNDESIRABLE

One very popular strand of current reform efforts seeks to preclude or
greatly mitigate penalties for certain classes of violations or against small
businesses. While in many circumstances this type of enforcement response is entirely appropriate, it is unwise public policy to negate agency
discretion totally and mandate that sanctions are impermissible.
The most notable example of this type of initiative is the SBREFA,
enacted by Congress in 1996.240 The statute requires federal agencies to
develop policies that provide for the reduction and waiver of minor violations by small businesses in certain instances, such as when the violation is
corrected within a reasonable period or is discovered in a complianceassistance program.241
239. For example, the EPA Inspector General found that numerous states failed to recover (and
some failed to even calculate) economic benefits stemming from noncompliance with the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). This audit also found that penalties imposed for RCRA
violations by states were significantly lower than those levied by the local EPA regional offices-in
some cases 4% and 6% of those assessed by the regions. See EPA, FuRTHER IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED,
supra note 174, at 21. Another study noted significant weaknesses in enforcement of federal air quality requirements by agencies in California, including failures to timely resolve enforcement actions
and to impose adequate penalties, including those that recover economic benefits of noncompliance.
See EPA, AUDIT OF REGION 9, supra note 211. Another series of reports by EPA's Inspector General
found extensive failures by agencies in Idaho, Alaska, Washington, and New Mexico to take enforcement actions against permit violators, conduct inspections, and report violations to the federal government. See John H. Cushman, EPA and States Found to Be Lax on Pollution Law, N.Y. TiMES,
June 7, 1998,atAI.
240. See Small Business RegUlatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121,
110 Stat. 857 (1996).
241. See id. § 223. As part of the SBREFA, Congress took other steps to modify traditional
agency enforcement efforts. For example, it amended the Equal Access to Justice Act to make it easier for small businesses to recover costs of defending government enforcement actions. Specifically,
small businesses can recover costs in administrative actions to enforce a party's compliance with a
statutory or regulatory requirement if "the demand by the agency is substantially in excess of the decision of the adjudicative officer and is unreasonable when compared with such decision, under the
facts and circumstances of the case." 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(4) (1997). A like provision applies in civil
actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(D) (1997). Congress also required the Small Business Administration (SBA) to designate an ombudsman to facilitate small businesses' complaints about agency
enforcement activity. Also under the act, Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards set up
by the SBA are required to report instances of excessive agency enforcement actions to the ombudsman. See Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act § 222.
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Even before the SBREFA was implemented, the EPA announced a
very similar policy declaring that it would refrain from seeking civil penalties or would mitigate civil penalties when a small business makes a
"good-faith" effort to comply with environmental requirements by either
receiving on-site compliance assistance or promptly disclosing the findings
of a voluntary environmental audit. 242 A related EPA effort is its Policy
on Flexible State Enforcement for Small Community Violations, designed
to afford states greater enforcement flexibility in responding to environmental violations by small communities.243 Under the policy, the EPA
agrees not to initiate its own enforcement actions against small community
violators where a state waives all or partial penalties against any violators
that show good faith in correcting identified violations. Good faith is
measured by a community's requests for compliance assistance and other
steps taken to achieve compliance promptly.
States have adopted similar measures.244 In California, for instance,
recent legislation mandates that minor violations of state hazardous waste,
air, and water pollution requirements result in "notices to comply," rather
than in penalties.245 Notices to comply are informal agency notices that
instruct the facility to correct the violations within a given time period. No
sanctions attach to the discovery of violations. A 1997 California proposal
would extend this principle further, providing immunity for persons who
disclose minor violations that are detected as a result of monitoring already required by existing law. The bill does not require the entity to take
242. See Interim Policy on Compliance Incentives for Small Businesses, FRL-5512-7, 61 Fed.
Reg. 27,984 (June 3, 1996). Small businesses are defined under the policy as companies employing
100 or fewer persons on a company-wide basis. The policy does not apply to criminal violations, repeat violations, violations that cause a significant health, safety, or environmental threat or hnnn, or
violations that are not remedied within the period set forth by the agency. See id. at 27,985. The EPA
reserves the right to recover any economic benefit associated with a violation (but to waive the gravity
component of any penalty) where a business may have obtained an economic advantage over its competitors from a violation under certain conditions. See id.
243. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Policy on Flexible State Enforcemellt Responses to
Small Community Violations (last modified Sept. 16, 1996) <http://es.epa.gov/oecnlore/aedlcomp/
acomp/a24.html>. Small communities are defined as communities with fewer than 2,500 residents.
See id.
244.
See GAO, EFFORTS TO Focus ON REsULTS, supra note 8, at 27-28,68-69 (listing programs
adopted by a number of states that grant amnesty from penalties to facilities under certain conditions).
245. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25187.8,39152 (West Supp. 1998); CAL. WATER
CODE §§ 13399-13399.2 (West 1997). A minor violation is defined by a number of criteria, including
its magnitude, scope, and severity; its threat to human health and the environment; and its impact on
important regulatory objectives. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 31 950(d)-(t).
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steps to come into compliance, nor does it require (or provide any incentives for) facilities to engage in any special monitoring activities.246
Likewise, under New Jersey's "grace period" law, when state or local
enforcement agencies detect minor violations of environmental laws, they
must provide regulated firms with a period of time (from thirty to ninety
days based on the nature of the violation) in which to achieve compliance. 247 If compliance is achieved within the specified time period, the
department is precluded from imposing a penalty for the violation.248 The
law also bars regulators from imposing penalties against persons who voluntarily disclose minor violations within thirty days of discovery, immediately remedy them, and achieve compliance.249
On the one hand, the notion of excusing first-time minor violations
seems quite reasonable, particularly if limited in scope and tied to proactive measures by regulated facilities, such as requesting agency assistance
or making good-faith efforts to comply.250 This allows agencies to devote
their resources to serious cases and minimizes resentment by businesses
when they are penalized for insignificant violations.
On the other hand, it is poor policy either to mandate that all minor
violations be forgiven, or that they be forgiven simply because they are
246. See S.B. 647, 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997) available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Sttext
File.
247. Minor violations are those that are not purposeful, pose minimal risk to the public health
and safety, do not substantially undermine the goals of the regulatory program, have existed for less
than 12 months prior to discovery, and do not involve repeat offenders (meaning no prior violations
by the same person within the previous 12 months). See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:10-129 (West 1995).
248. See id. § 13:10-127.
249. See id. § l3:1O-l30. Washington also enacted a general regulatory reform statute in 1995
that restricts the ability of the Department of Ecology to issue civil penalties for certain first-time violations, including those that result in only minor environmental harm or are likely to result in property
damage ofless than $1,000. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.05.070 (West 1997). In late 1997, the
department indicated that it would not implement this statutory provision, citing threats from the EPA
to withhold approvals of federal hazardous waste and air quality program delegations to the state. At
the same time, the agency indicated it would continue to follow its (very similar) administrative enforcement policy of not imposing civil penalties for minor, first-time violations that do not result in
environmental harm. See Washington, Facing USEPA Pressure, Abandons Amnesty Law, 3 STATE
ENVTL. MONITOR 11 (Feb. 2, 1998). Other proposals in this vein would go considerably further than
the New Jersey or Washington laws, and would bar penalties except for serious violations. During the
104th Congress, for instance, proposed legislation addressing OSHA enforcement provided that certain violations, including requirements for reporting and notification, would not result in a citation
unless a "pattern or practice" was shown and the violator intended to deceive. See H.R. 1834, 104th
Congo (1995). The proposed legislation also provided that penalties could be imposed only when an
employer failed to correct a violation previously noted or when there was a death or serious injury.
See id.
250. But see MINlZ, supra note 23, at 104 (noting that there are many practical difficulties in
trying to discern the motives of those who violate the law).
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corrected. Such a policy is unnecessary since repeated empirical studies
show that environmental requirements are enforced in a pragmatic way,
with little likelihood of penalties being imposed rigidly or arbitrarily.2S1
More importantly, this approach removes any incentive for entities to
comply before they are found in violation, since being caught has essentially no consequence other than perhaps a warning. Professor Hodas
notes that this approach "often signals to the regulated community that it
need not comply until enforcement begins."252 An OSHA administrator in
the Reagan Administration, analyzing similar proposals in the occupational safety and health area, noted:
One of the basic premises underlying the present OSHA law is the concept that employers are expected to be in compliance prior to an OSHA
inspection. OSHA will never have the resources to inspect every workplace under its jurisdiction. [Congress] did not want to allow employers
to wait until after an inspection before taking steps to come into compliance. That essentially is how every law works. You don't get to drive
drunk or hold up a store one time for free; a penalty is provided the first
time such a "violation" occurs.253
A better way to deal with relatively minor violations is to expand
agency authority to enable regulators to rapidly issue informal administrative orders, such as field citations, or "fix-it" tickets. Field citations are
similar to traffic tickets: The citations, issued in the field, address a c1earcut violation, require the violator to correct the violation, carry a small
penalty, and provide for some type of appeal. 254 Congress expanded the
EPA's authority to utilize these tools in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, authorizing a field citation program assessing civil penalties of up
to $5,000 for minor air quality violations. 2S5 Field citations have been
used effectively in a range of contexts, both domestically and internationally.256 In New Mexico, for example, when the state relied on traditional methods to enforce its underground storage tank requirements, only
fourteen percent of the owners/operators who were found in violation
251. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
252. Hodas, supra note Ill, at 1616-17. Hodas also argues that as the regulated community
perceives that government agencies are unlikely to initiate formal enforcement aetions, they are less
willing to settle on terms favorable to the government. See id.
253. Patrick R. Tyson,ls This Really OSHA Reform?, SAFETY + HEALTH, July 1995, at 33,3536.
254. See Shelda A. Sutton-Mendoza, Field Citations: A Tool for Enforcing UST Reglliations in
New Mexico, in THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, sllpra note 116, at 409.
255. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3) (1994).
256. See Cheryl E. Wasserman, Bllilding International Networks, Cooperation, and Capacity for
Environmental Compliance: A Progress Repon, in FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, sllpra note
137, at 97, 110-11.
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complied with the agency's orders. By contrast, eighty-two percent of
owners/operators cited as part of the field citation program corrected their
violations and achieved compliance.257 In California, when the state experimented with "fix-it" tickets in its hazardous waste program, inspectors
used these informal citations to resolve the great majority of violations at a
fraction of the time and expense required for formal administrative orders.258
C. GREATER SELF-REGULATION SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO
SUPPLEMENT, NOT REPLACE ENFORCEMENT

The environmental enforcement reforms advanced with the greatest
vigor and currently attracting the most intense controversy concern internal environmental audits and environmental management systems. Businesses and other reformers aggressively have pushed to substitute these
self-regulatory systems for traditional enforcement activities. Twentythree states have adopted environmental audit privilege or immunity laws
that provide qualified immunity from penalties for violations disclosed and
corrected as a result of voluntary internal audits. Reformers propose to afford similar treatment to the self-policing efforts of management systems.259
The expansion of internal regulatory systems is a positive development that should be encouraged. In fact, audits should be made mandatory
for publicly traded corporations. Non-publicly traded firms that implement audits or management systems should receive enforcement benefits
such as reduced penalties and inspections. But audit privilege and immunity laws, promoted by some businesses as it strategy to curtail government enforcement, should be resisted. These laws undermine incentives for preventative compliance measures and conceal important
257. See Sutton-Mendoza, supra note 254, at 410-11, 417-18.
258. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 19, at 54-17. In 1992 and 1993, the California Department
of Toxic Substances relied on expedited administrative orders, known as "toxic tickets" and "desk
orders," to resolve 85% of all enforcement actions for violations of hazardous waste requirements.
See id.
259. See, e.g., Ira Feldman, Escapefrom Command and Control?, ENVfL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at
39, 39-40 (quoting Pennsylvania Environmental Secretary Jim Seif stating that "the day may soon
come when a company certified to ISO 14001 would never again need to see an inspector from his
agency," and arguing that "[t]he time has arrived to begin the shift away from prescriptive regulation
to a greater reliance on an environmental management systems approach to environmental policy").
Accord Ed Shoener, No Substitute for Legal Standards, ENVfL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 27, 27 (noting
that some government officials have asserted "that if [the ISO 1400 I management standard] is used by
a company •.. there wi11 be no need for the government to inspect its manufacturing facilities").
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environmental information. More generally, self-policing systems should
supplement, but not replace, traditional enforcement activities. 260

1. Mandatory, Publicly Disclosed Environmental Audits of Publicly
Traded Companies
a. Existing policies for disclosure of violations detected by
environmental audits: As the term is generally used and defined by the
EPA, an environmental audit is a "systematic, documented, periodic and
objective review by regulated entities of facility operations and practices
related to meeting environmental requirements.,,26I
conducting

audits

with

some

frequency

in

the

Companies began
mid-1980s

due

to

increasingly aggressive activity by government and private citizens,
including stepped-up criminal enforcement, as well as the recognition that
audits could result in siguificant economic savings.262
The EPA, reasoning that auditing would lead to higher levels of
compliance, issued a policy statement in 1986 designed to encourage
aUditing.263 The EPA indicated it would not routinely request environmental audit reports from regulated entities. 264 It also stated that facility
260. Professor Douglas Michael has advocated a modified form of self-regulation, which he describes as "coopemtive implementation" of regulations. Under this approach, regulatory standards are
written to provide entities with considemble discretion in determining how to achieve compliance.
Agencies rely to a greater extent than usual on the internal regulatory efforts of firms and conduct
fewer routine inspections. In exchange, firms are required to self-monitor and report their own compliance to agencies, which retain tmditional enforcement authority. Professor Michael maintains that
regulated entities will be attmcted to this approach because it will give them greater flexibility in interpreting regulatory standards, and he proposes other incentives for participating firms. See Michael,
supra note 40, at 543-53. He also argues that this self-regulatory approach will better enable agencies
to evaluate the compliance efforts of regulated firms. He notes that, under the current system, inspections provide only a "snapshot "of what is occurring at a facility. Under the coopemtive implementation approach by contmst, firms will keep ongoing compliance records that will allow investigators to
see how a facility opemtes over time, to determine whether problems have occurred and how they
were addressed, to spot trends that could lead to problems, and to help prevent problems from recurring. See id. at 570. He also argues that coopemtive implementation will place a greater emphasis on
prevention mther than detection and correction of violations. See id. at 571.
261. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, OPPE-FRL-3046-6, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004, at
25,006 (July 9, 1986) [hereinafter Environmental Auditing Policy Statement]. Beyond verifying
compliance, environmental audits can also evaluate the effectiveness of environmental management
systems or assess risks from facility activities. A compliance audit is a snapshot of a firm's current
compliance with environmental requirements. A comprehensive management audit assesses a firm's
adherence to a broader set of firm environmental policies and pmctices. See id. See a/so Harris, Sllpra
note 35, at 671-72.
262. See supra note 65 and accompanying text, and infra note 305.
263. See Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, sllpra note 261.
264. It reserved the right to do so in limited instances, such as where the reports were integml to
"accomplish a statutory mission" or material to a criminal investigation. It listed as examples instances where audits are conducted nnder a settlement agreement, a firm places its management pmc-
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audits would be taken into consideration in determining inspection priori265
Subsequent governmental

ties and fashioning enforcement responses.

policies created additional incentives to conduct audits. In

1991,

the De-

partment of Justice issued guidance indicating that self-auditing would be
a mitigating factor in its decisions whether to criminally prosecute environmental violations.266 Likewise, sentencing guidelines proposed by the
Federal Sentencing Commission for environmental crimes provided that
voluntary compliance programs, including auditing, would be important in
267
evaluating both aggravating and mitigating factors in sentencing.
Since
practices.

1993,

the states have moved rapidly to encourage auditing

By the end of

1997,

twenty-three states had adopted audit

privilege or immunity laws,268 and similar bills have been introduced in

tices at issue by raising them as a defense, or a defendant's state of mind is at issue. In these instances, the EPA explained that it would likely limit its request to particular information rather than
the entire report, and make the request only where the pertinent information could not be obtained
through other sources. See id.
265. The agency refused, however, to flatly forego inspections or waive penalties in exchange
for implementing audits. See id. at 25,007.
266. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS IN TIIE CONTEXT OF SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OR
DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY TIIE VIOLATOR (July I, 1991). The policy provides that "self-auditing, selfpolicing, and voluntary disclosure of environmental violations" are mitigating factors in the Department's exercise of its criminal enforcement discretion. See id. at I.
267. See Memorandum from Phyllis J. Newton, Staff Director, U.S. Sentencing Commission, on
the Report from Advisory Group on Environmental Sanctions (Dec. 6, 1993). The Commission decided in 1994 not to submit its proposal to Congress for consideration, but the guidelines likely will
playa significant role in shaping future proposals. See Silecchia, supra note 65, at 607 n.70. Both the
Department of Justice policy on criminal enforcement and the Sentencing Guidelines encourage
compliance management systems that are more comprehensive than environmental auditing. See id. at
604-12. Other policies that seek to encourage auditing through similar approaches are the EPA's policy on the exercise of its criminal investigative discretion and its policy on debarment from government contracts. See Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, U.S. Envtl. Protection
Agency, The Exercise of Investigative Discretion (last modified Apr. 17, 1997) <http://es.epa.gov/
oecalore/aedlcomp/acomp/all.html>; EPA Policies Regarding the Role of Corporate Attitude, Policies, Practices, and Procedures in Determining Whether to Remove a Facility from the EPA List of
Violating Facilities Following a Criminal Conviction, FRL-4039-4, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,785 (Dec. 12,
1991). Congress also sought in a limited way to encourage auditing by stating in the Conference Report accompanying the 1990 Clean Air Amendments that available criminal penalties "should not be
applied in a situation where a person acting in good faith, promptly reports the results of an audit and
promptly acts to correct any deviation." H.R. REp. No. 101-952 (1990).
268. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.450-09.25.490 (Michie 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-301 to
8-1-312 (Michie 1995); COLO. REV. STAT §§ 13-25-126.5,25-1-114.5 (1995); IDAHO CODE §§ 9-801
to 9-811 (1997); 415lLL. COMPo STAT. 5152.2 (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-28-4-1 to 13-28-410 (Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3332 to 60-3339 (1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01040 (Banks-Baldwin 1997); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 324.14801-324.14810 (West 1997); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 114C.20-114C.31 (West 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71 (1996); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 75-1-1201 to -1206 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 445c.Ol0-.120 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 147-E:l to -E:9 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3745.70-3745.73 (Banks-Baldwin 1997); OR.
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almost all of the remaining states.269 The measures fall into two general
categories, granting either an evidentiary and discovery privilege for the
contents of reports based on environmental audits or immunity for violations uncovered by an environmental audit.27o Although the specifics of
the state measures vary, they generally require that entities voluntarily report any self-discovered violations within a certain time to regulatory
agencies and timely correct the violations to qualify for immunity.271
In 1995, the EPA issued its policy on voluntary disclosure of violations in an attempt to forge a middle ground in the audit debate. 272 The
policy does not accord any privileges or immunities, but rather seeks to
promote auditing and other iuternal review processes by granting a variety
of beuefits to firms that voluntarily disclose and correct violations they
discover in their self-conducted audits.273 Several states have taken simiREV. STAT. § 468.963 (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS, § 42-17.8-1 to -8 (1997); s.c. CODE ANN. §§ 48-5710 to 48-57-110 (Law Co-op. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 1-40-33 to 1-40-37 (Michie 1996); TEx.
NAT. REs. CODE ANN. Art. 4447cc (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-101 to 19-7-109 (1996);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1198 to 10.1-1199 (Michie 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-11-1105 to 3511-1106 (Michie 1995).
269. See Lynn Holdsworth, Comment, Florida's Environmental Self-Audit Legislation: All /11centive for the Environmentally-Conscientious Business or an Opportllnity for the Corporate Polllller
to Suppress the Truth?, 27 STETSONL. REV. 211, 217 nn.26, 27 (1997). Federal legislation providing
privileges to environmental audits has also been introduced. See S.866, 105th Congo (1997); S.582,
l04th Congo (1995); H.R. 1047, l04th Congo (1995).
270. The majority of states have adopted laws that contain both privilege and immunity provisions.
271. The scope of the privilege varies by state. Generally, the privilege does not apply to information required by law to be collected and disclosed to government agencies, where the audit is conducted in bad faith or for fraudulent purposes, where the audit shows evidence of noncompliance and
no attempt to correct the noncompliance, or where information in the audit report is necessary to protect the publie health or safety and cannot be obtained by other means. A few states extend the privilege to the underlying facts of an audit or require the auditing entity to report the audit to assert the
privilege; the majority of states do not. The immunity laws also vary, but they typically do not grant
immunity where there are repeated violations, willful violations, knowing criminal violations, serious
harm from violations, or where disclosure to the agency occurs after the violations have been discovered or enforcement action commenced by government agencies. Almost all state immunity laws
provide immunity in civil court proceedings, but only about one-third also grant immunity in criminal
proceedings.
272. See Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 194. For a detailed discussion of the policy, see
James T. Banks, EPA's New Enforcement Policy: At Last, a Reliable Road Map to Civil Penalty MitigationforSelf-Disclosed ViolatiollS, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,227 (1996).
273. For an economic analysis of why mitigating penalties are necessary to encourage auditing
and other self-monitoring by corporations, see Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of
Corporate Criminal liability, 23 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994). Professor Arlen argues that vicarious
corporate liability for violations committed by employees will not necessarily lead to greater corporate
self-enforcement efforts. This is because increased internal enforcement by firms will not only reduce
the number of violations that occur, but also increase the probability that the government will detect
these violations-thus enhancing the firm's expected liability. (The analysis assumes that corporations will voluntarily disclose violations uncovered through self-enforcement efforts.) This is true
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lar positions.274 Under EPA policy, the strongest incentives are for firms
that conduct an environmental audit or that have a systematic compliance
management program which "reflects the regulated entity's due diligence
in preventing, detecting, and correcting violations."275 For these entities,
the EPA does not seek gravity-based penalties for violations that are
promptly disclosed and corrected. Gravity-based penalties are penalties
that seek to punish violators after the economic benefit of noncompliance
has been recovered. The agency, however, may seek to recover any economic gain firms have realized from noncompliance. It also does not recommend criminal prosecution against these firms, with some limited exceptions. For other entities, the EPA reduces gravity-based penalties by
seventy-five percent for violations promptly disclosed and corrected even
if not the result of a formal audit or systematic compliance program. To
come within the policy, the violation must have been identified voluntarily
and not as a result of legally required monitoring or auditing.276 The policy does not apply to repeat violations or violations which resulted in acregardless of the size of the penalty; in fact, imposing greater sanctions may result in even greater incentive to reduce internal corporate enforcement expenditures. Professor Arlen recommends, among
other solutions, that penalties should vary based on the level of corporate self-enforcement expenditures.
274. In California, Pennsylvania, and Florida, state environmental agencies have adopted policies that largely parallel the EPA's guidance. See Memorandum from Gerald G. Johnston, Assistant
Secretary for Law Enforcement and Counsel, California Environmental Protection Agency, to Directors, Executive Officers, Chief Counsel, and Enforcement Chiefs, California Environmental Protection
Agency (July 8, 1996) <http://www.calepa.cahwnetgov!epadocslpolincni.txt> (describing the state
agency's policy on incentives for self-evaluation); OFFICE OF POLICY AND COMMUNICATIONS,
PENNSYLVANIA DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, Doc. No. 012-0840-001, POLICY To ENCOURAGE
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE BY MEANs OF ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AUDITS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (last modified on Feb. 5, 1997)
<http://www.dep.state.pa.usldep!subjectlfinal_policies!audiCpolicy.htm>; OFFICE OF THE GENERAL
COUNSEL, FLORIDA DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, DEP 922, INCENTIVES FOR SELF-EVALUATION BY
THE REGULATED COMMUNITY (1996), reprinted in DEP ENFORCEMENT MANUAL app. MISCELLANEOUS DIRECTIVES (1998) <http://www.dep.state.fi.us!ogc/documents!enfmanual!appendixl
dep922.pdf>. A number of other states have also enacted self-disclosure poliCies that do not include
audit privilege or immunity provisions. See The Review of Activities by the Federal Government Concerining Individuals or Organizations Voluntarily Submitting to Environmental Audits: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1997) (prepared state-

ment of Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator, Office of Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) [hereinafter Hearings on Environmental Audit
Privileges] (listing I I states with their own self-disclosure policies that do not limit enforcement
authority).
275. Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 194, at 66,708.
276. So long as the violations are voluntarily discovered, however, the policy applies even if the
violations must otherwise be reported. The violations must be disclosed promptly and prior to the
initiation of an enforcement action, investigation or citizen notice, and they must be corrected expeditiously. The regulated entity must also cooperate with enforcement agencies in determining the facts
of the violation, and take steps to prevent a recurrence of the violation.
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tual harm or presented a substantial threat to public health or the environment. It is also not applicable to criminal violations involving conscious
avoidance of, or willful blindness to, the law, or management practices to
conceal or condone noncompliance. 277

b. The benefits of mandatory, publicly disclosed audits of publicly
traded corporations: The current debate about auditing focuses on the
wisdom of privilege and immunity provisions-in particular, whether they
are necessary to promote corporate auditing practices, and whether they
undermine enforcement and the public's right to know. This emphasis is
too narrow; the discussion instead should be about making audits
mandatory for as many regulated entities as possible.
Although not without limitations, environmental auditing is a very effective means for businesses to monitor their compliance with environmental requirements, which is precisely why many responsible corporations voluntarily conduct them. As discussed above, audits may be more
extensive than agency inspections or carried out more frequently.278 Such
self-policing efforts, especially where results must be reported to governmental agencies, can be a highly effective tool for promoting compliance. 279 Ideally, all regulated firms should conduct audits. As a first step
in this direction, audits should be required for all publicly traded corporations. Publicly traded corporations can best afford environmental audits,
and many already conduct them. 28o
Environmental audits also should be disclosed to the public. There
are strong utilitarian and entitlement rationales justifying public disclosure.281 For example, disclosure of environmental audits, like disclosure
277. The EPA also reiterated its preexisting policy not to routinely request audit reports, but reserving its option to seek the reports in limited circumstances.
278. See supra Part III.A.3.
279. See Eric Bregman & Arthur Jacobson, Environmental Peifo171UJnce Review: Self-Regulation
in Environmental Law, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 465, 484 (1994) (arguing that there is no doubt that routine audits linked to effective internal control systems enhance the effect of regulation); Michael, supra note 40, at 575 (suggesting that self-reporting requirements of the Clean Water Act create an incentive for sources to comply rather than to confess noncompliance).
280. Moreover, publicly traded corporations are likely to be most sensitive to market pressure
triggered by public disclosure of environmental audits since the audience of parties interested in the
audits includes investors, consumers, and employees. Limiting an audit requirement to publicly
traded corporations is admittedly an imperfect solution. Smaller, closely held companies clearly
commit a substantial number of environmental violations. Moreover, some small public companies
may not be in a better position to bear the costs of audits than private companies. Nonetheless, this
incremental step is probably all that is politically feasible at this time.
281. Requiring public disclosure is consistent with the broad trend in environmental law toward
greater reliance on information disclosure and market-based incentives, and away from direct regulation. This development has been embraced by those on all sides of the political spectrum; conserva-

1998]

ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT

1249

of financial audits, helps promote the efficient functioning of securities
markets. Securities law requires publicly held corporations to disclose independently audited financial statements to the public and potential investors on the theory that disclosure provides investors with the information
they need to make intelligent decisions. Information in an environmental
audit-which is esseutially a snapshot of a firm's environmental healthis at least as relevant to some investors as a picture of a firm's financial
well-being.282 Likewise, audit disclosure can help consumers make betterinformed decisions about whether to purchase a firm's products, and allows workers to negotiate for less hazardous working conditions or demand wage premiums for risky jobs.283 Beyond the marketplace, disclosure furthers citizen power and advances democratic decisionmaking. It
allows local residents and members of the public to participate more effectively in permit, land use, and other local political decisions involvingthe company. It enhances the public's ability to bargain with private corporations and exert pressure on companies to change their environmental
practices.284 It also enables citizens to enforce environmental laws, since
"the public cannot participate in [the enforcement] process without having
access to adequate information regarding a facility's compliance with environmental regulations.,,285 In essence, disclosure has an important detertives favor disclosure because it relies on market forces, while consumer advocates endorse it as a
right and tool that enables individuals to protect their interests. See JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE
DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCE REGULATION: How OVERREGULATION CURES UNDERREGULATION AT
OSHA 209-10 (1988).
282. This is especially true as the socially responsible investment movement expands. See supra
note 59.
283. As discussed above, however, there are important limitations on the ability of the marketplace to promote compliance with environmental laws. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
284. For these reasons, the EPA has embarked on a program to provide the public with better
access to its integrated enforcement data system, including information about the past compliance of
companies and facilities. The agency advocates the program as "providing the public with a powerful
tool they can use to promote environmental accountability." Stahl, Enforcement in Transition, supra
note 3, at 22.
285. Steven A. Herman, It Takes a Partnership, 14 ENVTL. F., May-June 1997, at 26, 30. As a
noteworthy example of how audit privilege laws can frustrate citizen enforcement efforts, environmental advocates cite the experience of community groups living adjacent to a landfill owned by
Waste Management, Inc. in Cincinnati, Ohio. See Feel-Good Notions, supra note2l6. In 1996, based
on Ohio's recently enacted audit privilege law, Waste Management sought to withhold (and actually
recapture previously disclosed) audit results and other documents containing air emissions data,
compliance reviews, and other information. The company was unsuccessful because the state's audit
privilege law had yet to go into effect. Community advocates used the information, which showed a
pattern of toxic gas emissions from the landfill and alleged violations of federal environmental laws,
to persuade state regulators to issue a corrective order limiting emissions from the landfill. See id.
Steven Herman, EPA's Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance, also recently testified before Congress that audit privilege laws jeopardize human health and the environment. See
Hearings on Environmental Audit Privilege, supra note 274, at 49-55 (statement of Steven Herman).
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rent function and helps promote compliance by raising the firms' costs of
violating environmental requirements.286
In addition to these utilitarian rationales, public disclosure is justified
on entitlement grounds-namely, that members of the public have a fundamental right to know what substances and risks they are exposed to by
facilities in their community.287 Disclosure furthers individual autonomy
by creating awareness of the risks involved in specific choices and allowing individuals to decide whether or not to encounter these risks.
Businesses should be generally supportive of an auditing requirement,
since it is a practice that many have voluntarily embraced. Auditing, unlike substantive environmental regulation, does not intrude on management prerogatives or dictate how a firm must satisfy regulatory requirements. It is a process for identifying whether a firm is meeting
environmental requirements and c~ help a company avoid far more intrusive enforcement actions. Still, mandating audits, and in particular the
public disclosure of audits, is certain to generate business opposition. One
reason for opposition is the costs of audits. 288 Publicly traded corporations, however, should be able to absorb this expense without great hardship. Moreover, audits usually save firms money by identifying more efficient production processes and ways to reduce waste generation, as well
Hennan referred to two specific instances. In Arkansas, the EI Dorado Chemical Company attempted
to use the state's audit privilege law to shield environmental impacts infonnation from local citizens
who sued the company alleging that they suffered respiratory ailments due to the company's air emissions. See id. at 55. In Texas, Browning-Ferris, Inc. successfully used a privilege law to preclude
disclosure of two environmental audits that local residents sought to document groundwater contamination from the company's landfill. See id.
286. As Malcolm Sparrow argues, the success of the Emergency Planning and Community Right
to Know's (EPCRA) disclosure requirements, which mandate industrial facilities to report annually
their routine releases of certain toxic chemicals, demonstrates how an infonned public can be an ally
to the government in achieving compliance. See SPARROW, supra note 3, at 96. As a result of
EPCRA's requirements, from 1987 to 1993, facilities reported a national drop in toxic releases of 43%
from an initial figure of 7 billion pounds. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Efficient Pollution Rille Under
Attack, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,1995, at A16. Senator Frank Lautenberg has argucd that "the right.toknow [EPCRA] has probably led to more voluntary pollution prevention efforts and more environmental cleanup than any other environmental law." 141 CONGo REC. S9886 (daily ed. July, 13, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
287. Not all environmental audits will necessarily reveal this infonnation, but many likely will.
288. The costs of auditing a facility vary considerably, depending on its size, number of emission points and other factors. The 1995 Price Waterhouse survey of u.s. companies found that the
direct cost to audit a single facility ranged from $200 to $150,000, with a median cost of $1 0,000. See
Voluntary Environmental Audit, supra note 66, at 6. The median annual cost of an auditing program
for companies-many of which audit multiple facilities each year-was $120,000. See id. See also
DON SAYRE, INSIDE ISO 14001-THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
140 (1996) (noting that ISO 14000 environmental audits may cost around $10,000 to $100,000).
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as by reducing their exposure to enforcement actions and liability suits.289
For smaller businesses that cannot afford auditing programs, however, the
EPA and states should provide financial assistance for third-party auditors
or offer aUditing services for free, perhaps creating a cadre of trained governmental auditors. A good model is suggested by EPA's Region I, which
recently began providing free compliance and pollution prevention audits
to small and medium-sized companies.29o
Firms will object strongly to forced public disclosure of audit results,
and in particular to the unfairness of the use of audit information as the
basis for government enforcement actions or third-party liability suits.
However, regulated entities already are required to monitor, record, and in
many cases, report extensive aspects of their compliance with environmental laws to government agencies.291 Under the Clean Water Act, for
example, dischargers must regularly monitor and report their compliance
with permit limitations; the reports filed can be the basis of government or
citizen enforcement actions.292 Likewise, all sources required to have a
permit under the Clean Air Act must submit an annual compliance certification report documenting facility compliance with their permits.293
Permitted hazardous waste facilities also have extensive monitoring and
reporting obligations.294 Thus, a requirement that audit reports be dis289. See supra note 64, and infra notes 301-05 and accompanying text.
290. In exchange, participating companies must achieve compliance and implement at least one
pollution prevention project. See Hawkins, supra note 5, at 45.
291. See Silecchia, supra note 65, at 625-26 & n. 134. A variety of nonenvironmental regulatory
schemes likewise require firms to self-monitor and report violations, thus making available information that can be used by agencies in enforcement actions. See Michael, supra note 40, at 589.
292. See Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 122.41 0)(1) (1997).
293. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(c) (1994). See also 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3) (requiring enhanced
monitoring and submission of compliance certificates by all major stationery sources); 40 C.F.R.
§ 70.6(a)(3)(iii)(A) (providing that certified reports of required monitoring related to permits must be
submitted at least every six months and include U[a]ll instances of deviations from permit requirements"). The Clean Air Act also requires reporting emissions in excess of applicable standards from
sources that are subject to new source performance standards. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.7(c), (d). Furthermore, it requires reporting of excess emissions and monitoring results from sources subject to national
emission standards for hazardous air pollutants. See id. Likewise, utilities subject to the Clean Air
Act's acid rain trading provisions are required to install continuous emissions monitoring systems or
their equivalent. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651k(a). One commentator notes that U[s]elf-reporting and selfmonitoring are 'cornerstones' of the enforcement system" for the Clean Air Act's requirements.
ARNOLDREITZE, AIR POLLUTION LAW § 18-1 (1995).
294. For example, they must keep records of their training of personnel, internal facility inspections and repairs of facility equipment, waste analyses, operating logs, and other matters, all of which
are available for review by agencies during facility inspections. These entities must also submit to
regulators reports regarding releases, fires, and explosions at their facilities, and reports about facility
compliance with schedules set forth in the permit; they must conduct extensive on-site environmental
monitoring and report the results to regulators. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 19, at 54-26 to -27.
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closed is in many ways a logical extension of existing law.295 The fear of
third-party toxic tort lawsuits is more imagined than real because these
cases are enormously difficult to prosecute and win.296 But the more fundamental rejoinder to these arguments is that the information in audits is
largely of a public character, reflecting whether a firm is in compliance
with publicly enacted requirements designed to protect the public. 297 As
previously explained, depriving the public of access to this material denies
them knowledge fundamental to their ability to make fully-informed and
well-considered political and economic decisions-a cost too high to protect firms from the possibility of lawsuits.
c. The disadvantages of audit privilege and immunity laws to
enforcement: A mandatory audit requirement just for publicly traded
companies, notwithstanding its many benefits, is unlikely to be adopted
any time soon. In the meantime, a key policy question is the
appropriateness of an evidentiary privilege for audits or immunity from
prosecution for violations. This issue has sparked an intense debate among
the EPA, states, regulated entities, and the environmental community, with
one state official accusing the EPA of launching a "holy war" against
states with privilege and immunity statutes.298 The Clinton Administration
opposed many of the far-reaching state proposals, and warned a number of
states that such audit measures may result in the agency withholding or
revoking delegation of authority to administer federal environmental
programs.299 Citizen groups in five states have requested that the EPA
295. Moreover, government agencies report that they have rarely, if ever, used audit data as the
basis for enforcement actions. See infra note 304.
296. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
297. To the extent that audits discuss trade secrets or confidential business information, this information should be withheld.
298. See Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2, at
199 (prepared statement of Patricia S. Bangert).
299. The EPA has articulated the types of enforcement authority states with privilege and immunity laws must retain to receive approval to enforce federally-delegated programs. States must
have the authority to (1) obtain immediate and complete injunctive relief for any violation of program
requirements; (2) recover civil penalties for significant economic benefit, repeat violations and violations of judicial or administrative orders, serious harm, and activities that may present an imminent
and substantial danger; and (3) obtain criminal penalties for willful and knowing violations. The state
laws must also not interfere with the public's right to obtain information about a facility's compliance
with environmental requirements, and not restrict the state's ability to obtain information needed to
identify noncompliance or criminal conduct. See Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, Robert Perciasepe, Mary Nichols and Timothy Fields to U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Regional Administrators (Feb. 14, 1997), reprinted in Daily Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at E-16 (Feb. 24, 1997).
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withdraw parts of its delegated programs in their states because of the
passage of audit/immunity laws.30o
Without repeating the issues explored at length elsewhere,301 the arguments below form the basic contours of this debate. Advocates of
privilege and immunity provisions argue that these laws create a critically
important incentive for firms to conduct audits. Without these legal protections, many firms would forego audits because of fear that the information discovered will be used against them in enforcement actions or thirdparty lawsuits. In fact, the audit reports would provide a road map of violations for enforcement agencies. Moreover, the argument goes, selfaudits uncover and correct many violations that the government would
never discover on its own.302 Thus, absent protection from future enforcement, firms would expose themselves to greater risk by conducting
audits. 303 A 1995 Price Waterhouse survey found that two-thirds of the
firms with auditing programs in place would conduct more audits if penalties were waived for violations voluntarily discovered and disclosed.304
300. Petitions have been filed in Colorado, Idaho, Michigan, Ohio, and Texas. See id. Some
have taken the position that the push for audit/immunity laws has been driven by corporations with
poor environmental records. See Engel, supra note 135, at 349 & n.228 (quoting BEDFORD, supra
note 72).
301. The literature discussing the debate over audit immunity and privilege provisions is extensive. For some recent examples, see Heather L. Cook & Robert R. Hearn, Putting Together the
Pieces: A Comprehensive Examination of the Legal and Policy Issues of Environmental Auditing, 7
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 545 (1994); Peter A. Gish, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege and Environmental
Audit Reports, 25 ENVTL. L. 73 (1995); Michael Goldsmith & Chad W. King, Policing Corporate
Crime: The Dilemma of Internal Compliance Programs, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1997); E. Lynn Grayson
& Christina Riewer, EPA's Audit Policy and State Audit-Privilege Laws: Moving Beyond Command
and Control?, 27 Envtl. Law Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,243 (1997); Harris, supra note 35; Holdsworth,
supra note 269; Terrel E. Hunt & Timothy A. Wilkins, Environmental Audits and Enforcement Policy,
16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365 (1992); Johnston, supra note 66; Edwin F. Lowry, Environmental
Audit Privilege Legislation: Necessary for Business or a Nightmare for Prosecutors?, 17 PROSE·
CUTOR'S BRIEF 5 (1995); Van Cleve & Holman, supra note 13; Weaver et al., supra note 63; Marty,
supra note 14. See also Silecchia, supra note 65, at 603 n.58 (citing articles); Carr & Thomas, supra
note 71, at 115 & n.79, 117 & n.81 (citing articles).
302. See, e.g., Weaveret al., supra note 64, at7 ("[B]ecause the resources of EPA and most state
regulatory agencies are spread so thin, most violations discovered and reported by businesses as a result of voluntary environmental audits probably would not otherwise have been found, much less reported and corrected.").
303. See Marty, supra note 14, at 544-45 (arguing that audit privilege laws will reduce costs of
audits since attorneys will no longer he strategically employed to bring audits within attorney-client or
work-product privileges, and will lead to more effective auditing practices since the lack of privilege
protections encourages the production of vaguely worded and difficult-to· implement audit reports).
304. See Voluntary Environmental Audit, supra note 66, at 6. On the other hand, the survey
found that 75% of responding firms were already conducting audits, and that among companies that
did not audit, the primary reason most often cited was not fear of disclosure but a perception that the
firm's processes and products had an insignificant environmental impact. See id. at 5·6. Enforcement
agencies contend that privilege/immunity legislation is unnecessary because information in an envi-
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The opposing camp contends that audit privileges or immunities are
not necessary to stimulate auditing for a number of reasons. First, many
businesses wiII voluntarily conduct audits to reduce their liability and for
other sound business reasons. 305 Many will audit to comply with voluntary
environmental management codes.306 Additionally, firms already realize
important enforcement benefits from conducting audits, under the EPA's
voluntary disclosure policy, the Department of Justice's guidelines for
criminal prosecution of environmental violations, and the EPA's policy on
criminal environmental investigations.307 Even in the absence of such
formal policies, state and local agencies inevitably consider a firm's
auditing practices when calculating penalties or making other enforcement
decisions. 308
The EPA contends its policy is effective by pointing to the more than
225 companies that had disclosed and corrected violations at more than
700 facilities as of October 1997.309 Privilege proponents reply that privilege laws have resulted in a greater number of regulated entities reporting
and correcting violations than under the EPA's policy.310 In fact, the inironmental audit is virtually never used to prosecute a company; the most frequently cited statistic is
that it has been used in three cases. See Lowry, supra note 301, at 6. But as supporters of privilege
legislation note, the prospect that the information might be used still influences corporate willingness
to conduct audits. They also rejoin that if the information is used so rarely, enforcers should not object to cloaking it with a privilege.
305. See Harris, supra note 35, at 679-83 (arguing that the benefits to auditing include: avoiding
and reducing liability, reducing costs and increasing profits by gathering information about a company's expenditures for production and pollution prevention, attracting and maintaining corporate
investors, and generating favorable publicity).
306. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
307. See supra Part V.C.I.a. Businesses counter that penalty mitigation is not easy to obtain
under the EPA's policy; the policy itself is vague in certain key areas; and the policy excludes serious
violations. See Weaver et aI., supra note 64, at 7. See also Jim Moore & Nancy Newkirk, Not Quite
a Giant Step, ENVTL. F., May-June 1995, at 16, 19.
308. See, e.g., Krista McIntyre, Voluntary Disclosure-Gotella!, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 52,
53 (Spring 1997) ("No member of the regulated community can dispute that in any environmental
enforcement action (state or federal agency initiated) it is easier to negotiate resolution of violations
that are voluntarily disclosed and corrected, than to negotiate resolution of violations that were discovered independently by the government and are ongoing.").
309. See Environmental Audit Privileges, supra note 274, at 51 (statement of Steven Herman).
310. See Weaveret aI., supra note 64, at 12-13 (citing a 1996 report from the Texas Senate Natural Resources Committce indicating that the state environmental agency received 256 notifications of
intent to audit and 42 voluntary disclosures of violations from facilities during the first ycar the audit
privilege bill was in effect, and arguing that these figures compare very favorably to the 105 disclosures the EPA received from regulated entities during 1996). See also Environmental Audit Privileges, supra note 274, at 85-86 (prepared statement of Barry McBee, Chairman, Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission) (noting that during the first two and a half years the Texas audit
privilege bill was in effect, the state environmental agency received 650 notifications of intent to audit
and 100 voluntary disclosures of violations).
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tial evidence does not support these latter claims; there apparently has
been relatively little additional auditing and disclosure stimulated by the
state statutes.311 But this lack of activity may not be determinative either,
since, as audit advocates are quick to point out, companies may be chilled
from taking advantage of state laws by the prospect of direct federal actions or federal overfiling against them.312 At the very least, while the evidence is not conclusive, it suggests that most businesses (especially larger
firms) will likely audit for business reasons even in the absence of privilege/immunity protections.313
Opponents of audit privilege and immunity measures also contend,
with considerable justification, that privilege laws would complicate and
increase the costs of enforcement. These provisions would invite litigation
over what material is or is not privileged, a problem compounded by the
lack of clear guidelines in many state statutes over the scope of the privilege.314
Beyond these concerns, there are two overriding flaws of privilege/immunity measures. First, they seriously undermine the incentives
for facilities to take preventative steps to achieve compliance. To varying
degrees, they permit firms to sit back and wait until an audit is conducted
311. See Environmental Audits: State Immunity, Privilege Laws Examined for Conflicts Affecting
Delegated Programs, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 181, at AA-I, I (Sept 18, 1996) (observing that
some states report no instances of regulated entities seeking the protection of audit laws); Arrandale,
supra note 71, at 36 (noting that Colorado's audit/privilege statute has resulted in just 23 violation
disclosures in three years).
312. The Colorado Attorney General Office has complained that "it is impossible to measure the
success of audit programs if companies are discouraged from participating in them by EPA's threats of
overfiling. EPA's response [to State privilege and immunity laws], in practice, nullifies State laws."
Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State Governments, supra note 2, at 200 (prepared
statement of Patricia S. Bangert). On the other hand, federal overfiling-the initiation of a federal
enforcement action following a state action for the same violation against the same facility-occurs
very rarely, and because of the politically sensitive nature of such actions, is unlikely to increase in the
future. See id. at 161-62 (statement of Steven A. Herman). During fiscal years 1994 and 1995, the
EPA overfiled on 18 cases or about 0.1 % of state enforcement actions; during the next fiscal year, the
EPA overfiled in four cases. Moreover, the EPA has disclaimed any intention to target companies in
states with audit privilege and immunity laws. See id. at 162.
313. See Silecchia, supra note 65, at 628 (arguing that firms wiII continue to create environmental compliance plans because of substantial legal benefits for doing so). See also Breger, supra
note 3, at 327 (noting that the argument that companies will cut back their voluntary self-policing efforts in the absence of privilege laws, "[f]or large corporations, at least, is IittIe more than an advocate's assertion and should be taken as such").
314. See Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 194, at 66,710; Lowry, supra note 301, at 19
("[prosecutors] fear that in virtually every case where a company document is involved, the defense
will request a hearing about its admissibility."). A number of state laws require privilege questions to
be resolved by in camera proceedings, further adding to the expense of enforcement actions. See Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 194, at 66,710.
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before coming into compliance. Then, so long as a firm corrects and dis·
closes the violations, its sanctionable behavior will be excused. Privilege
laws achieve this effect indirectly by making it more difficult and in some
cases impossible for enforcement agencies to obtain evidence about viola·
tions contained in an audit report. Immunity statutes achieve this effect
directly. The broader versions of these latter measures immunize inten·
tional criminal conduct and serious violations that pose significant threats
to the environment. This runs counter to the assumptions of most en·
forcement activity; as one prosecutor succinctly puts it, "[y]ou wouldn't
expect that the act of confessing to a crime should bring with it an entitle·
ment of immunity .'>315
Privilege/immunity laws also allow firms to retain the economic
benefit they obtain from noncompliance, removing an important incentive
for timely compliance. As the EPA argues in opposition to state measures
that do not recoup economic benefit if violations are disclosed and cor·
rected, "[t]axpayers expect to pay interest or a penalty fee if their tax pay·
ments are late; the same principle should apply to corporations that have
delayed their investment in compliance."316
Second, privilege laws are highly objectionable because, as described
above, they keep a category of public environmental information pertain·
ing to the facility's compliance with environmental requirements secret
and out of the public's reach. 317 As one commentator summarizes, these
measures "[regard] third parties as almost unnecessary to administration of
the regulatory system.',318
The EPA's voluntary disclosure policy and similar state initiatives
strike a better, albeit not perfect, balance between promoting self·policing
and retaining a meaningful deterrent component of enforcement. The
policies provide strong encouragement to audit by waiving all gravity·
based penalties and generally not recommending criminal enforcement
when violations are voluntarily disclosed and corrected, but they do not
315. Lowry, supra note 301, at 5. Another commentator cchoes these concerns:
[Audit amnesty programs] emphasize, virtually to the exclusion of other considerations, the
need to correct the present violation .•.. [H]ow does an audit amnesty progmm affirmatively
discourage employees from allowing, through inattention or negligence, non·complying
conditions to come into existence? If employees can be presumed to be knowledgeable both
about their firm's audit procedures and the government's amnesty response, then it can be
speculated that their vigilance may in fact be reduced.
Welles, supra note 9, at 16 (citations omitted).
316. Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 194, at 66,707.
317. The EPA's position is that "[i]n the final analysis, an audit privilege invites secrecy and
breeds distrust." Herman, supra note 285, at 30.
318. Welles, supra note 9, at 46.
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grant any privileges to audit documents. The policies contain insufficient
incentive, however, for firms to take steps to prevent violations before the
audits are conducted.319 The only sanction facing a firm that does not act
proactively to achieve compliance is potential action by the EPA or states
to recover the economic benefit gained from noncompliance. However,
this merely puts a firm back in the position it would have been had it
originally complied; it does not alter the firm's basic cost-benefit calculation as a way to deter violations in the first place. A better approach would
be not to waive all penalties, but to allow enforcement agencies to consider
the voluntary disclosure and correction of the violations when determining
enforcement responses and the size of penalties to impose.32o Audits
should also be the basis for agencies to provide firms with other enforcement and permit benefits, such as less frequent inspections or inspections
reduced in scope, accelerated permit reviews, and eligibility to participate
in other flexible regulatory initiatives.321

2. Environmental Management Systems
Environmental management systems are more comprehensive than
environmental audits. Audits are intended to measure, at a fixed point in
time, a facility's compliance with a specific set of regulatory requirements
or other criteria. Management systems, by contrast, seek to evaluate and
319. There is an important qualification to this point, however. The EPA policy also provides
enforcement benefits to firms that voluntarily disclose and correct violations detected through "a
documented, systematic procedure or practice which reflects the regulated entity's due diligence in
preventing, detecting, and correcting violations." Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 194, at
66,708. Due diligence is defined by the EPA to include efforts to prevent, detect, and correct violations, including mechanisms for systematically assuring that compliance policies are being carried out.
See id. at 66,708, 66,710 to 66,711 (emphasis added). Thus, arguably, some firms that satisfy the
EPA's due diligence standard may have management systems that include preventative measures to
avert violations-systems comparable to the environmental management systems discussed below.
For these firms, it may be appropriate to waive gravity-based penalties for certain types of violations
when they are voluntarily detected and corrected. See infra notes 358-59 and accompanying text.
320. It also is desirable for enforcement officials to retain some discretion in choosing enforcement responses rather than being bound by fixed policies. There is extensive evidence demonstrating
that, contrary to popular misconception, agency officials act flexibly and pragmatically in meting out
penalties. There may be some instances where, despite the voluntary disclosure and correction of a
violation, a small penalty would be appropriate; the EPA approach would preclude this.
321. For a critique of the EPA's auditing policy as insufficiently ambitious, see Silecchia, supra
note 65, at 615-24. Professor Silecchia criticizes the auditing policy, as well as the Department of
Justice's policy on criminal enforcement of environmental violations and the Sentencing Commission's proposed guidelines for organizational environmental crimes, because it places too much emphasis on attaining legal compliance (and on certain means of realizing compliance), and gives insufficient attention to avoiding environmental harm and improving environmental performance beyond
what is required by law. See id at 616-33.
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typically improve the environmental impacts of all activities of a firm. 322
Moreover, the systems are process-oriented; the underlying notion is that
having better systems in place will lead to better environmental performance and less pollution. Many environmental management systems, therefore, do not focus on a facility's actual performance in complying with
regulatory standards. 323 Like environmental audits, management systems
have grown over the past decade in response to growing liability concerns
and enforcement actions. 324
a. The key environmental management systems: The three most
important environmental management systems for U.S. companies are the
standard contained in the ISO 14000 series, a recently published set of
environmental standards issued by the International Organization for
Standardization (IS 0);325 the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme
(EMAS) , a voluntary management system adopted by the European
Union;326 and the EPA's Environmental Leadership Project (ELP).
ISO's standards have been highly influential in the past,327 and the
ISO 14000 environmental standards are likewise predicted to become the
most widely accepted global environmental standards and a condition of
doing business with a number of countries and corporations.328 The management standard of the ISO 14000329 consists of several key components.
322.

See Keny E. Rodgers, The ISO Environmental Standards Initiative, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.1.

181, 184 (1996).
See WELFORD, supra note 72, at 75.
Their growth has also been fueled by the desire of some corporations to import total quality
management principles into the environmental area, and the desire of some firms to adopt sustainable
environmental practices.
325. ISO is an international standards-setting organization whose purpose is to promote international standards to facilitate international trade. It consists of the standards-setting organizations of
100 member nations. ISO standards are documented agreements of technical specifications that companies use as guidelines to ensure that materials and products fit their purpose. For example, the format of automatic teller machine cards is based on an ISO standard.
326. The EMAS standard is contained in Council Regulation 1836/93, art. 1(1), 1993 0.1. (L
168). It was initially proposed as a mandatory scheme for about 50 industrial scctors, but was
changed to a voluntary program under pressure from industry and concerns about implementation
costs. See WELFORD, supra note 72, at 72.
327. The 1987 ISO 9000 quality control standards have become a de facto requirement for doing
business in Europe and other parts of the world, and have been adopted by about 8,500 companies in
the United States. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 58, at 500-01; Michael Prince, ISO Now Offering
Voluntary Standards, Bus. INS., Nov. 11, 1996, at 21.
328. See Marc E. Gold, ISO 14000: A New Global Business Benchmark, 12 ENVTL. COMPLIANCE
& LmG. STRATEGY 1(May 1995).
329. The ISO 14000 series will establish environmental management systems in six areas: management systems, auditing, labeling, performance evaluation, life-cycle assessment, and terms and
definitions. The management systems standard, ISO 14001, will form the overarching framework for
323.

324.
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The first element is planning: Top management must establish an environmental policy for their organizations;330 firms must identify the
"environmental aspects" of their activities, products and services, and
applicable legal requirements;331 and they must establish environmental
objectives and targets, and a program documenting how and when these
will be achieved.332 The second element is implementation: Firms must
put in place a number of internal processes to carry out their policies and
objectives, including designation of responsible managers, training programs, communication systems and documented operating procedures.333
The final element is monitoring and review: Firms must regularly measure
the key characteristics of their activities that have a significant environmental impact, and must periodically conduct management system audits
to verify compliance with the ISO standard.334
Under the EMAS, companies are required to establish an environmental policy based on eleven basic principles of good management practice. For each participating site, companies must develop an environmental program that describes the company's environmental protection
objectives and an environmental management system.335 As with the ISO
14001 standard, companies must implement their policies and programs
through a variety of internal systems, including maintaining a registry of
"significant" environmental effects at each site.336 Each facility must also
engage in periodic environmental auditing at least once every three years
the other standards. For a comprehensive list of sources discussing the ISO 14001 management system, see Carr & Thomas, supra note 71, at 152 & n.160.
330. See International Standards Organization 14001, Environmental Management SystemsGeneral Guidelines on Principles, Systems and Supporting Techniques, §§ 4.0-4.1 (1996) [hereinafter
ISO 14001].
331. See id. §§ 4.2.1-4.2.2.
332. See id. §§ 4.2.3-4.2.4.
333. See id. §§ 4.3.1-4.3.7.
334. See id. §§ 4.4.1-4.4.4.
335. See Allowing Voluntary Participation by Companies in the Industrial Sector in a Community Beo-Management and Audit Scheme, Council Regulation 1836/93, Annex I, § C (1993), available in WESTLAW, ENFLEX-EU database [hereinafter Council Regulation]. The principles of good
management pmctice go well beyond simply achieving compliance, and include: assessing in advance
the environmental impact of all new activities and products; monitoring the impact of current activities on the local environment; preventing pollution and reducing pollutant emissions; and providing
information to the public necessary to understand the environmental impact of the company's activities. For a detailed list of citations discussing EMAS, see Carr & Thomas, supra note 71, at 167-68 &
nn.208-10.
336. See Council Regulation, supra note 335, Annex I, §§ A-C. Among other things, the management systems must include: periodic review at the highest appropriate management level; designation of key personnel responsible for environmental performance, education and training of personnel
at all levels; establishing procedures for investigation and remediation of noncompliance; and establishing communication procedures concerning environmental practices.
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that reviews both compliance issues and the facility's management system.337 Unlike the ISO standard, facilities also must prepare and publicly
disseminate statements that summarize in nontechnical form the findings
of internal audits. The statements must include an assessment of "all the
significant environmental issues of relevance," and a summary of information about emissions, waste generation, consumption of resources, and
other factors regarding environmental performance. These public statements are verified by "accredited environmental verifiers" who check to
ensure that the company is in compliance with all aspects of the EMAS
regulation. 338 Once the statements are verified, they are disclosed to the
public.339
The EPA's vehicle for encouraging environmental management systems, ELP, began as a pilot project in 1995 with ten private and two governmental facilities, and has expanded to include any eligible facility.340
To participate, firms must have a "mature" environmental management
system that expands on the ISO 14001 management requirements.341 The
environmental management system must specifically include systems for
achieving continual compliance with all legal requirements, continually
improving the organization's environmental performance, implementing
pollution prevention practices to stop the generation of pollution at its
source, and communicating with community stakeholders about the or337. See id. Annex II, § C. The auditing may be done by company staff or external auditors, but
the auditors must be technically qualified, and in the case of internal auditors, independent of the activities they are auditing.
338. See id. art. 6.1-.7. The verifiers, described as a new professional occupation that is "part
accountant, part environmental scientist, and part lawyer/regulator," are accredited by each European
Union member state, and must be independent. Orts, supra note 3, at 1306.
339. See Council Regulation, supra note 335, art. 4.7. The data underlying the environmental
statement remain confidential, however. See id. art. 10.3. Facilities that successfully comply with
EMAS requirements are officially registered and listed, and also can use a gmphic to announce their
compliance, but the gmphic cannot be used for advertising products or on packaging.
340. The EPA also seeks to encoumge states to work with regulated entities to develop environmental management systems through a grant progmrn administered by its Office of Water. See Proposal for Using Voluntary Environmental Management Systems in State Water Progmms, FRL-56787,62 Fed. Reg. 3036 (Jan. 21, 1997). Regional EPA offices are also experimenting with their own
initiatives to promote the development of environmental management systems, such as the "Merit"
progmm in EPA's Region 9 office.
341. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECl10N AGENCY, DRAFf-ELP PROPOSED FRAMEWORK (visited Feb.
1997) <http:www.envirosense.com!elp/om5frm.html> [hereinafter ELP PROPOSED FRAMEWORK]. A
"mature" management system is one that has been in place for at least two years and has gone through
an initial "shake-down" period in which the system's weaknesses were identified and corrected. Facilities are precluded from participating if they have been the subject of recent enforcement actions,
and they may be disqualified for recent instances of noncompliance.
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ganization's environmental management system.342 The facility also must
have an auditing program that periodically evaluates compliance with
regulatory standards and with EMS requirements. 343 Finally, the firm
must prepare an annual report, available to the public, that discusses the
facility's environmental performance and success in meeting its management objectives, and the results of environmental audits and any agency
inspections conducted during the year.344 Firms that participate in ELP
will receive a number of enforcement benefits.
b. Environmental management systems as the basis for enforcement
benefits: Environmental management systems are likely to improve
compliance and better the environmental performance of regulated
entities.34s Therefore, firms with environmental management systems in
place should be granted enforcement benefits, provided that several
conditions are met. First, the system should require compliance with
environmental requirements and prophylactic measures to prevent
violations in advance of any self-audits. Second, adherence to the system
should be verified by outside parties to ensure the system's integrity to
agencies, the public, and other private parties, including companies and
consumers doing business with the firm. Third, the environmental
management system should provide the public with access to
environmental information. The EPA's ELP and the EMAS standard meet
all of the above criteria; the ISO 14001 standard does not.
The orientation of the ISO 14001 standard, for example, fails to assure that a firm will realize any specific compliance benefits. ISO 14001
does not prescribe specific operational practices or set numeric or other
342. See id. The definition of pollution prevention is broader than that used in the ISO 14001
standard.
343. See id. Audits must be conducted, at a minimum, in the second and fifth years of a six-year
cycle.
344. See id.
345. As Richard Welford notes, "a systems approach to attaining the goals of an enterprise is
most likely to be successful. . .. No matter what the structure of the firm ... it is the lack of a comprehensive and effective management system which can often lead to failure." WELFORD, supra note
72, at 51. One writer describes the premise of ISO 14001 as an assumption that "organizations that
systematically manage their environmental obligations will improve their environmental performance,
broadly measured." Christopher L. Bell, Bench Test, 14 ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 24,25 ("This
assumption is based on the history that managing other organizational functions-inventory, finance,
production, quality-has typically improved their performance, and the common sense concept that it
is better to manage something than it is not to manage it."). Even skeptics concede that "[t]here is
little question that some environmental problems can be better addressed by shoring up a firm's management systems. A management system allows a firm to learn from its past mistakes, and to delineate clear pathways, systems and incentive systems for achieving specified goals." Lewis, Analysis of
[SO 14000, supra note 72.
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kinds of performance standards. It also does not require emissions and
discharge reductions. By its own terms, ISO 14001 does not necessarily
expect immediate, tangible environmental improvements from the management systems.346 Moreover, the standard cannot be counted on to ensure compliance with environmental regulations. While firms must include in their environmental policies a commitment to comply with
relevant environmental legislation and regulation, outside auditors certifying a firm's conformance to ISO 14001 are not expected to audit the company's actual compliance. 347 By contrast, both the EMAS standard and
ELP require participating firms to assure compliance with all environmental requirements.
Likewise, the ISO 14001 standard does not mandate that independent,
third parties verify adherence to the ISO requirements.348 Under EMAS, a
company's environmental policy, program, management system and audit
346. As described in the standard's guidance:
Although some improvement in environmental performance can be expected duc to the
adoption of a systematic approach, it should bc understood that the environmental management system is a tool which enables the organization to achieve and systematically control
the level of environmental performance that it sets itself. The establishment and operation
of an environmental management system will not, in itself, necessarily result in an immediate reduction of adverse environmental impact.
Council Regulation, supra note 335, Annex A, § A.4. As Professor Roht-Arriaza cxplains, the Unitcd
States (and somc other participants in the ISO drafting process) objected to any fixed set of mandatory
improvements, preferring a less substantive, more flexible approach that preserved management prerogatives. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 58, at 504-05. Thus, ISO 14000's substantive requirements
were considerably weakened from thc original British template on which thc standard was based in
order to achicvc consensus among all the participants. See id. at 534-36. See also BENCHMARK
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTING, ISO 14001: AN UNCOMMON PERSPECflVE 6-10, 15-17 (rev. 1996)
[hereinafter BENCHMARK CONSULTING] (criticizing ISO 14001 becausc it does not require improved
environmental performance, does not address health and safety requirements, and is far more limited
in scope and commiunent than international environmental agreements, such as Agenda 21, and voluntary industry codes, such as the ICC Business Charter and the Responsible Care program). Bm see
Joseph Cascio, They Will Be Used-For Good Reason, ENvTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 38, 39
(maintaining that focused management of the environmental aspects of a firm's activities required by
ISO 14001 will result in better environmental performance, as evidenced by the ISO 9000 product
quality standards).
347. See ISO 14001, supra note 330, §§ 4.1, 4.4.1. See Joseph Cascio, Implications of ISO
14001 for Regulatory Compliance, in FOURTII INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 137, at 45
("It must be remembered that under ISO 14001, no proof of actual compliance is actually required for
an organization to obtain registration. ISO 14001 requires only cvidence of working processes that
are designed to maintain compliance."); Gareth Porter, Little Effect on Environmental Perfomumce,
12 ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 43, 44. As Porter notes, it is unrealistic to expect firms to spend
resources on ensuring actual compliance if they know they can achievc ISO 1400 I certification simplY
by adopting appropriate procedures. As Porter further cxplains, "[h]aving a 'system in place for
compliance' does not necessarily lead to complying with environmental regulations." Id.
348. Some firms may nonetheless hire cxternal auditors to certify that their management systems
follow the ISO 14001 standard in order to become ISO "registered," a certification that confers a certain legitimacy upon firms. See Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 58.
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findings must be validated by independent, accredited environmental verifiers. ELP also requires outside verification; facilities may use internal
auditors to check compliance with a firm's management system, but their
work must be monitored by third-party observers.349
The ISO 14001 standard also fails to provide for meaningful public
disclosure of a facility's environmental performance.350 It does not require
disclosure of a facility's environmental audits, releases, or other pertinent
information about the environmental impacts of its activities and products.
The only information that must be disclosed is a company's environmental
policy.351 Both EMAS and ELP have much stronger disclosure elements
requiring release of annual environmental reports. As Eric arts argues,
disclosure of these reports will increase public trust that environmental
business practices are sincere, as well as increase the general level of information available concerning important environmental issues.352
EMAS' required public statements are broader than those required by
ELP; they must include information about emissions, waste generation,
consumption of resources, and the like, although firms may keep the data
underlying the statements confidential. ELP's public outreach component-the Community OutreachlEmployee Involvement Program that
every firm is required to have-is also disappointingly vague. It requires
facilities to "have a written policy to demonstrate its commitment to open
communication with its employees and with the community for the purpose of understanding and responding to environmental issues," as well as
a "strategy for identifying and interacting with affected communities,
identifying community needs and a plan of action for addressing those
community needs.,,353 The most concrete specification is that the facility
349.
350.

See ELP PROPOSED FRAMEWORK, supra note 341.
See BENCHMARK CONSULTING, supra note 346, at

19-21.
351. These very limited disclosure requirements resulted from pressure by the United States
during drafting of the ISO standard. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 58, at 504. They run counter to the
trend toward greater disclosure of environmental information in international environmental agreements and voluntary industry codes. See BENCHMARK CONSULTING, supra note 346, at 19.
352. See Orts, supra note 3, at 1323. See also BENCHMARK CONSULTING, supra note 346, at 20
("A core idea of the [European Union's] EMAS ... is that public pressure will motivate companies to
improve environmental performance. However, in order for this to work, there needs to be disclosure
of corporate environmental performance. Without external audit and public disclosure, selfmonitoring is an oxymoron.") (citations omitted).
353. The substantive requirements of the Community OutreachlEmployee Involvement Program
are that it (1) "should be designed to impart an environmental message or contribution;" (2) "should
respond to a community need or desire [and] provide ... a means of obtaining feedback from the
community regarding facility environmental issues;" and (3) "should involve employees and recognize that employees are one of the best resources of the facility [and] provide training or information
for employees to ensure that the employees know about the facility's position on environmental and
health issues, and environmental policies and plans." U.s. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DRAFr-
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must educate the community on any environmental impact the facility may
have. These hortatory guidelines do relatively little to ensure that affected
communities will become meaningful partners in corporate environmental
decisions or have any greater access to environmental information than
they enjoy under existing laws. If, as the EPA envisions, the ELP program
is designed to publicly recognize facilities that "demonstrate outstanding
environmental management practices,"354 firms should be required to do
considerably more, such as committing to allow citizen auditors direct access to the facility to monitor compliance with a firm's environmental
management objectives. 355
Despite these limitations, the EPA's ELP contains sufficient safeguards to ensure improvements in compliance, and the EPA has appropriately proposed to provide firms participating in ELP with enforcement
benefits.356 Specifically, the EPA will reduce facility inspections for participating firms and also waive gravity-based civil penalties for the violations, provided that the firms promptly correct any detected instances of
noncompliance with essentially the same exceptions that apply to disclosures by firms that voluntarily conduct aUdits. 357 Unlike the case with
audits, the ELP prompts far less concern that waiving gravity-based penalties will undermine an important element needed to deter violations in the
first place.358 This is because the ELP includes systems designed to
achieve ongoing compliance, effectively requiring firms to take preventive
measures before violations are detected. This more confident view is particularly true if independent parties certify the integrity of the environCOMMUNITY OUTREACH/EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT (visited Mar. 5, 1998) <http://es.epa.gov!elp!
pf4.html> (emphasis added).
354. Environmental Leadership Program: Request for Pilot Project Proposals, FRL-5001-5, 59
Fed. Reg. 32,062,32,062 (June 21,1994) [hereinafter Pilot Project Proposals].
355. Such a system would probably need to incorporate some mechanism for protecting the
(nonenvironmental) trade secrets of the firms. See generally Feel·Good NotiollS, supra note 219
(describing Good Neighbor Agreements that provide community members with the right to obtain any
company documentation or studies relevant to safety or environmental matters of concern and that
provide rights of access to company facilities for direct visual inspection and confidential discussions
with employees). See also Susan Casey-Lefkowitz, The Evolving Role of Citizens in Environmental
Enforcement, in FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 137, at 221, 227-28. In some
countries, citizens are deputized as public inspectors and carry out government inspection responsibilities. In other countries, citizens can demand inspections under certain circumstances. See id.
356. Firms that implement the EMAS should also be entitled to similar benefits from enforcement agencies.
357. See discussion infra notes 274-77 and accompanying text.
358. This is not to say that some deterrence value is not lost by waiving penalties. One could
certainly argue that firms will carry out preventative measures less diligently knowing that they will
not be sanctioned for any violations that nonetheless occur if the violations are voluntarily discovered
and remedied.
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mental management system program. The EPA should follow through on
other benefits it has suggested for participating firms, including expedited
permit approval and a streamlined process for modifying permits.359

3. Summary
Environmental auditing practices and management systems have great
potential to improve compliance with environmental laws. They should be
encouraged with carefully designed incentives and in some instances made
mandatory. They are not, however, a reason to dismantle traditional enforcement activities.
D. CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT SHOULD REMAIN AN INTEGRAL FEATURE OF
THE ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM

Citizen enforcement has played a significant role in fostering compliance with environmentallaw.36o Thus, a largely cooperative-oriented enforcement system is likely to be incompatible with vigorous citizen enforcement. 361 Indeed, some scholars who support cooperative approaches
expressly favor limiting the role of private enforcers or the ability of third
parties to affect agency enforcement priorities.362 The regulated community is beginning to focus on the inherent tensions between the different
modes of enforcement and to suggest devices to curtail citizen actions. 363
While citizen enforcement may not be compatible with a purely or
primarily cooperative-oriented system, it can and should be integrated into
359. See Enforcement: EPA Preparing for 1997 Launch of Environmental Leadership Program,
Daily Env't Rep (BNA) No. 200, at AA-l (Oct 16, 1996). Participating firms also receive public recognition and a logo that can be used for limited advertising purposes (in facility advertisements but
not on product advertising). Although the EPA should be commended for insisting that the ELP surpass the ISO 14001 standard in several key areas, the ELP is nonetheless insufficiently ambitious.
Most notably, the ELP does not require a substantive commitment to any specific set of environmental
goals, such as requiring all facilities to endorse a Code of Environmental Management Principles (as
the EPA initially considered). See Environmental Leadership Program, FRL-4552-6, 58 Fed. Reg.
4,802 (Jan. 15, 1993) (outlining possible elements of Corporate Statement of Environmental Principles); Pilot Project Proposals, supra note 354 (announcing that the EPA would not develop its own
principles but would work with organizations that have developed their own corporate or industry
codes). But see Silecchia, supra note 65, at 629-31 (praising the ELP because of its requirement that
firms engage in pollution prevention activities).
360. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
362. See Scholz, Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement, supra note 117, at 124, 129-30.
363. Thus, some propose permit conditions that explicitly provide for a certain number of instances of noncompliance, or that liberalize the underlying standards to provide for accidents or normal variations in operating conditions. See Ross Macfarlane & Lori Terry, Citizen Suits: Impacts on
Permitting and Agency Enforcement, 11 NAT. REsOURCES & ENV'T 20,24-25 (1997).
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a system that is deterrence-based but includes significaut cooperativebased features. Under the reforms proposed here, citizen enforcement
would remain a backdrop to traditional government enforcement. Citizen
enforcers could continue to bring actions to remedy violations where the
government has failed to act because of lack of resources, political pressures, capture of regulatory staff, or other factors. Moreover, citizens
could continue to file enforcement actions largely unsupervised by the
government, as they do under the current system.364
Some companies claim that the prospect of citizen enforcement is
likely to discourage businesses from implementing some of the reforms
suggested here, such as audits and other management systems.365 However, firms that self-police and correct discovered violations are likely to
face very little citizen enforcement. Under most federal statutes, coming
into compliance defeats a jurisdictional prerequisite for citizens to file
suit-namely that there is an ongoing violation alleged at the time a complaint is filed. 366 Even if citizens are not barred from suing, voluntary
compliance will greatly mitigate any penalties awarded and obviate the
need for injunctive relief. Finally, there is little evidence to support the
charge levied by some critics that citizen enforcement needs to be curtailed
because it is focused on trivial violations.367
E. REFORMS TO COMMAND AND CONTROL REGULATION SHOULD
INCLUDE STRICT ENFORCEMENT

Any discussion of enforcement would not be complete without briefly
touchiug on the separate but related issue of reforms in the underlying
substance of environmental regulation. As previously discussed, the substance of environmental regnlation is also in a state of flux and is moving
364. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
365. See supra Part V.C.
366. In Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 (1987), the Supreme Court ruled that the present tense language of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision, 33
U.S.C. § 505(a)(I) (1994), authorizing citizen suits against any person "who is alleged to be in violation" of the Act, only permits actions for ongoing violations. Several other federal statutes have
similarly worded citizen suit provisions. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(I) (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1) (1994); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1) (1994). Moreover,
in Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 S.Ct. 1003 (1998), the Supreme Court
held that as a matter of constitutional standing, citizens could not bring suits for wholly past violations
of a statute, at least where penalties authorized by the statute are payable to the federal government.
367. See Macfarlane & Terry, supra note 363, at 20, 23 (arguing that citizen suits "are being
prosecuted whenever there is evidence of a violation," and that U[t]he sole measure of [corporate] performance is strict compliance with all permit and regulatory requirements, [which business] must
achieve ... 100 percent of the time").
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toward providing greater flexibility to regulated entities. This is a hallmark of the Clinton Administration's "reinvention of environmental regulation,"368 as well as a major theme of state regulatory reform efforts. For
example, the EPA's Environmental Excellence (XL) initiative frees regulated entities from command and control requirements in exchange for a
commitment to accomplish environmental performance superior to what
would be achieved through compliance with existing regulation.369
The relaxation of underlying substantive standards further strengthens
the need to maintain strong deterrence-based enforcement provisions, including those that assure citizen groups a meaningful role in policing
compliance. Given that many of these reforms grant facilities great leeway
in meeting regulatory limits, government regulators and the public are no
longer assured that an effective control strategy is being implemented. In
return for this freedom, regulated entities should be held closely accountable for their promises.370
This point of view is reflected in the Clean Air Act's Acid Rain Program, which provides marketable allowances for sulfur dioxide emissions371 but with stringent enforcement provisions. Utilities subject to the
program are required to install continuous emission monitors (or their
equivalent), and if the monitors do not work, the EPA is required to assume that the source is operating in an uncontrolled manner.372 In addition
to the possible imposition of standard criminal and civil penalties for violations of the Clean Air Act,373 fIrms that fail to meet emission limits must
pay a penalty of $2,000 per excess ton emitted and must offset the excess
368. This reinvention encompasses a variety of initiatives, including greater reliance on marketbased incentives and performance-based standards rather than on command and control regulation,
more flexibility through development of industry-wide standards as opposed to individual poJIutant
approaches, and increased use of coJIaborative partnerships (between the public and private sectors
and between different levels of government). See Clinton & Gore, supra note 225.
369. See Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Emperor Have Any
Clothes?, 26 EnvtI. L. Rep. (EnvtI. L. lnst) 10,527 (Oct. 1996).
370. Professor Michael has identified a number of reasons why a backdrop of traditional enforcement practices is necessary in a system that grants flexibility to regulated entities: to verify
compliance by entities, to maintain the perception that noncompliance wiII be detected and sanctioned, to account for the diversity of regulated sources with some less skillful in achieving compliance, to ensure compliance where the costs of necessary preventative measures exceed the likely costs
of a system of self-regulation, and to maintain compliance if the failure of self-regulation programs
makes compliance unduly expensive. See Michael, supra note 40, at 544, 547.
371. Under the program, utilities are provided with allowances based on historic fuel consumption and operating factors, and provided with complete flexibility in determining how to meet these
limitations.
372. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651k(a), (d) (1994).
373. See id. § 7651j(e).

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW

1268

[Vol. 71:1181

emissions by an equal tonnage amount in the next year.374 Moreover, the
EPA is required to deduct allowances equivalent to the excess emissions
from those allocated to the source for the next year.375 Notably, recent
analyses indicate that the rate of noncompliance with the program has been
extremely low and may be zero.376
This type of strict enforcement approach, accompanied by citizen suit
provisions, should be the template for other regulatory flexibility efforts.

F.

BEITER WAYS TO MEASURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ENFORCEMENT
SHOULD BE DEVELOPED

Many observers agree that regulatory agencies should improve the
way they evaluate the effectiveness of their enforcement programs. The
EPA has recognized that its traditional approach of using numerical indicators is of "limited value for determining the state of compliance and identifying [the] environmental results and benefits of [enforcement] actions.,,377
The agency is currently engaged in an ambitious effort to develop additional performance measures for its enforcement program.378 State enforcement agencies have likewise begun exploring new evaluation measures.379 While these are worthwhile undertakings, it is important to realize
the inherent difficulties in developing precise, objective measurements of
success for an enforcement program.
One obvious starting point for improvement is to better evaluate the
extent of compliance by regulated facilities and the extent to which enforcement actions promote compliance. For example, Professor Joel
Mintz suggests that agencies should evaluate the percentages of regulated
sources inspected, their overall rates of compliance, and the rates of recidivism among violating sources.380 Another useful measure would be to
374. See id. § 7651j(a), (b). The sources must submit a compliance plan for achieving the required offsets within 60 days, which becomes a condition of the source's operating permit. See id.
§ 7652j(b).
375.
376.

See id.
See Byron Swift, The Acid Rain Test, ENVTL. F., May-June

1995, at 17, 17 (noting there has
been virtually 100% compliance with the aci~ rain trading provisions in the first two years of the program's operations).
.
377 . Workshop on National Performance Measures Strategy, supra note 197.
378. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
379. See GAO, EFFORTS TO Focus ON RESULTS, supra note 8, at 29-32.
380. See MINTZ, supra note 23, at 102-03. EPA's Performance Measures Strategy has proposed
measuring the percentage of significant violators with new or recurrent significant violations within
two years of any prior enforcement action. See DRAFT REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE
MEASURES STRATEGY, supra note 97, at 20.
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determine multimedia compliance rates for entire facilities or industry
sectors.381
However, determining the rate of compliance is easier said than done.
Indeed, the definition of "compliance" is not a fixed or purely objective
one. Because measurement techniques are never perfect, for example,
there is always some ambiguity in what constitutes a "violation."382 Other
subjective factors help determine what constitutes "compliance," such as
the time period an industry is given to reach compliance, or how strictly
businesses must adhere to a standard.383 Indeed, differing interpretations
of compliance partially underlie current disputes between the EPA and a
number of states about the effectiveness of the states' enforcement programs.384
Beyond ascertaining rates of compliance, agencies should measure
the environmental benefits of enforcement actions. This includes steps
taken by facilities in response to enforcement actions and reductions in
pollutants discharged by regulated entities. Most ambitiously, it would
also embrace improvements in the ambient environment resulting from enforcement actions.385 The EPA, as well as some states, has started calculating these measurements386 to varying degrees.387 Other federal envi381. The EPA has begun to develop such measures. See Stahl, Enforcement in Transition, supra
note 3, at 22. The EPA has also proposed to measure how quickly significant violators return to
compliance or enter compliance agreements. See DRAFT REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE
MEASURES STRATEGY, supra note 97, at 20.
382. See Clifford Russell, Environmental Enforcement, in INNOVATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY, supra note 32, at 215, 216 (arguing that the notion of a "violation" is always treated in literature as better defined than it possibly can be in practice). See also RUSSELL, ET AL., supra note 25, at
178 (noting that the unavoidable variation in discharge levels and imperfections in measurement
equipment introduces ambiguity into the notion of compliance and noncompliance).
383. See DIMENTO, supra note 101, at 26-27. For example, does compliance mean good-faith
efforts, substantial compliance, reasonable probability of compliance, or total compliance?
384. See, e.g., EPA, AUDIT OF REGION 9, supra note 21 I, at 7. A local air board in California
considered a facility in compliance if it immediately repaired a piece of equipment or submitted a
permit application even where the facility had previously violated same requirements. The EPA's
Inspector General, however, was concerned that repeat violations indicated the facility was not
achieving continuous compliance.
385. See NATIONAL ACADEMY, supra note 49, at 81 (suggesting that the EPA develop environmental performance indicators to measure changes in air and water quality, ecosystem health, and environmental threats to human health and welfare).
386. In 1994, the EPA began supplementing its measures of enforcement effectiveness with a
"case conclusion" sheet for enforcement actions. The case conclusion sheet lists steps taken by the
regulated entities, the environmental impact of such actions, quantitative reductions in polIutants, information about the types and impacts of compliance-assistance activities, and industry-specific
compliance rates. See DRAFT REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES STRATEGY, supra
note 97.
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ronmental agencies are also moving in this direction. 388 But attempting to
judge the effectiveness of an enforcement program by looking at these
measures is also problematic.

In many cases, calculating steps taken by

regulated entities will likely show important environmental benefits from
enforcement actions.

The EPA's

1996

enforcement report, for example,

estimated that its actions would reduce pollutant discharges by 260 million
pounds. 389 On the other hand, a facility's compliance with certain regulatory requirements, such as the many standards that are preventative, may
greatly reduce the risk of serious environmental harm but will not necessarily lead to a quantifiable emissions reduction or environmental benefit. 39o

It is

especially difficult to link compliance with actual improvements

in the ambient environment for a variety of reasons.

Environmental

changes may not manifest themselves for years; other confounding factors
may be at work that block or delay any changes resulting from specific actions.

Alternatively, the underlying regulation may be inadequate to

prompt changes, or ongoing pollution may result from a few major discharges.39I

387. See Wetherell. supra note 154, at 22-23 (describing new programs in 1l1inois, Indiana. and
Florida that place more emphasis on measuring environmental indicators and actions taken by regulated entities, and noting that "[n]o longer can [states] only count the number of inspections, enforcement orders entered, and fines collected. Instead, we must ask, Is the air and water getting cleaner? If
not, why not? Are companies complying with the law? ... Is the environment healthier for children?"). See also GAO, EFFORTS TO FOCUS ON REsULTS, supra note 8, at 33-34, 36-3S (describing
state programs and discussing the difficulties for states to quantify and measure environmental indicators as a means of evaluating compliance strategies).
388. For example, the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement recently announced that it will no longer collect data on the number of inspections conducted or violations citcd
by state regulators. Instead, it will measure the effectiveness of state programs by analyzing the number and extent of off-site pollution impacts from mining activities, and the number of mined acres that
meet various reclamation standards. See U.S. Dep't of Interior, Office Surface Mining. Reclamation
and Enforcement, "Reg-S", Appendix 11-3-8 (June 20, 1996). These reclamation standards include
restoration of land form and land capability, hydrologic reclamation, and contemporaneous reclamation.
389. See News Release from the U.S. EnvtI. Protection Agency, Environmental Enforcemcnt
Records Set for 1996 (Feb. 25, 1997) (on file with author).
390. The EPA has noted that "[c]ausality between program activities and outcomes is usually
impossible to prove. Outcomes cannot generally be attributed to individual functions of an agency or
program. 'Prevention' or deterrence of undesired outcomes is difficult to measure." DRAFT REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES STRATEGY, supra note 97, at 8.
391. See HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 209.
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An even more fundamental problem is the difficulty of measuring
what constitutes "better environmental quality.,,392 Professors Hunter and
Waterman have highlighted this problem with the Clean Water Act, concluding that
there is no uniform method of measuring water-quality across the fifty
states, and although some quantifiable measures do exist ... a major
problem with surface-water regulation in the United States is that nearly
twenty-five years after the enactment of the Clean Water Act of 1972,
we still do not have a reliable means of measuring the legislation's relative success or failure. 393
Similar problems exist, perhaps to a lesser degree, with other environmental media.
Finally, it is important that the search for improved performance
measures not override the essential purposes of environmental regulation.
One impetus behind the quest for improved performance measures is a desire to import into government the principles of private sector management
theory.394 Yet "there are such fundamental differences between the public
sector and the private sector that management theory from one will never
be applicable to the other.,,395 Thus, while in the private sector the search
for bottom-line measures of performance may be necessary and understandable, there are conflicting pressures in government that may frustrate
the ability to assess objectively the impacts of regulation, or in some cases
trying to do so may be inappropriate.

In summary, developing better ways to evaluate the efficacy of environmental enforcement and de-emphasizing bean counting is important,
and should lead to smarter, more targeted enforcement activities. But determining precisely how enforcement efforts translate into actual improvements in the environment is likely to prove an elusive goal.
392. See SPARROW, supra note 3, at 145 (explaining it is enonnously difficult to generate any
consensus, even scientific consensus, as to which measures of environmental quality have broad validity).
393. HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 26, at 210. They note that state agencies use very diverse and often dubious methods to measure water quality. One state relies on "reports of bad news
from citizens and other sources. If there are no reports of fish kills or complaints from recreational
areas, [state] officials interpret this as evidence that water quality in their state is sound." [d. at 207.
394. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE WITCH DocroRS 282-84 (1996).
In recent years, observers note, the public sector "has shown a blind affection for management theory
that is rarely seen in the private sector." [d. See also Ronald, The Role of the CEC, supra note 159, at
6-7 ("One of the mantras of total quality management is that, in order to control, you must manage
and, in order to manage, you must measure.").
395. MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 394, at 6.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The movement to transform environmental enforcement is being advanced with exceptional ardor. Before the old system is discarded however, it is critical for policymakers to engage in a careful and sober assessment of the calls for reform. If the system is flawed, will the proposed
changes improve it? In particular, is there a sufficient basis on which to
conclude that the new approaches will be superior to the ones being reformed?
As this Article demonstrates, the record does not support a wholesale
transformation of enforcement practices as has been proposed. Deterrence-based enforcement has many attributes essential to effective enforcement, the most notable one being its strong, credible threat of meaningful enforcement necessary to promote widespread voluntary
compliance. Strong enforcement also serves important expressive functions, better guards against agency "capture" by regulated entities, and ensures more consistent treatment of regulated facilities. Rather, the best
way to promote effective environmental enforcement is to integrate some
of the most constructive features of a cooperative model within a deterrence-based system. Agencies should provide more consultation and cooperative assistance to regulated entities, reward well-conceived selfpolicing efforts with reduced enforcement attention and lower penalties,
and expand the traditional indicia for measuring enforcement success.
Publicly traded corporations should be required to conduct environmental
audits. At the same time, government regulators should retain the ability
to respond to violations with strong and meaningful enforcement measures; measures that strip agencies of discretion in responding to certain
classes of violations undermine enforcement and shonld be avoided. Citizen enforcement should remain an important supplement to agency enforcement, and corporations should not be allowed to withhold from the
public information in environmental audits and other internal environmental reviews. In short, it is a thoughtfully and carefully considered
evolution in environmental enforcement that is called for, not a reckless
revolution.

